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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In August of 2016, I was invited to a conference call to discuss a research project that a local 
social justice organization—Gideon’s Army—was planning. Gideon’s Army had conducted 
listening sessions with black community members asking about the issues that were most salient 
in their lives. Aggressive policing was one of the top concerns that the community brought 
forward. Leaders in the organization knew that they would likely be dismissed by police and city 
leaders without strong evidence that a problem existed. They decided to tap into the knowledge-
base of the community to research policing in Nashville. A team member had already received 
the Metro Nashville Police Department’s (MNPD) traffic stop database for 2010-2015 and began 
a cursory exploration of the contents. When the five years of data were combined, more than two 
million stops were made over the period. As I listened on the conference call, I thought that I 
could offer a useful statistical skillset for the group. Almost three months later, we released 
Driving While Black: A Report On Racial Profiling In Metro Nashville Police Department 
Traffic Stops (Gideon’s Army 2016). The Nashville Scene, a local magazine, recently wrote that 
the report “fundamentally changed the conversation about policing in the city” (Hale 2019). 
 In the report, we argued that MNPD made more traffic stops than other comparable cities 
and that there were substantial racial disparities in traffic stops and searches (Gideon’s Army 
2016). Over the period of 2010-2015, MNPD made an average of 393,941 traffic stops annually.  
The residential driving age population (16 and over) in Nashville was 529,259 according to 
2010-2015 American Community Survey 5-year estimates (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). When 
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compared to the residential population, MNPD made 744 stops for every 1,000 driving age 
residents. In comparison, the National Institute of Justice found that 10.2% of respondents in the 
National Crime Victimization Survey had been stopped by police while driving in 2011 (Langton 
and Durose 2013). Similar-sized cities also made fewer traffics stops than Nashville. For 
instance, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC made 231 stops per 1,000 residents; Dallas, TX made 116 
per 1,000 residents; Louisville, KY made 181 per 1,000 residents; and Raleigh, NC made 196 
per 1,000 residents (Gideon’s Army 2016). We concluded that MNPD conducts seven times the 
national average rate of traffic stops and nearly four times that of comparable cities. In terms of 
the racial distribution of traffic stops, the report found that annually “MNPD made enough stops 
to have stopped 112% of the black population” compared to about 70% of whites (Gideon’s 
Army 2016:35). The Driving While Black report also investigated the racial distribution of police 
searches during traffic stops. The data showed that black residents were disproportionately 
searched during traffic stops compared to whites and when searched, black drivers were less 
likely to have contraband than whites. The findings suggested a lower standard of evidence being 
applied to initiate a search of black drivers.  
 In addition to the quantitative analysis of traffic stops in Nashville, the Driving While 
Black report included a qualitative analysis of 25 interviews with black community members. 
These interviews reflect how police decisions and demeanor can affect communities. 
Interviewers asked how black drivers felt when they were stopped. The report stated: 
When asked how interactions with officers made them feel, community members 
expressed feeling anxious, scared, angry, helpless, victimized, violated, 
traumatized, disrespected, dehumanized, and in many cases, confused as to why the 
officer stopped them in the first place. This fear, they shared with us, is informed 
by their past experiences with MNPD and by broader national social and political 
conditions, namely police killings of young black men (Gideon’s Army 2016:76). 
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Since community members reported anxiety and concern about their interactions with police, 
they engaged in “safety strategies” related to police contact (Gideon’s Army 2016). These 
included being aware of where documents are stored in their vehicle, attempting to stay calm 
when feeling unjustly targeted, awareness of movements and body position, and generally 
avoiding any contact with police or calling police when they may be useful. Stuart (2016) calls 
these behavioral adaptations a form of “cop wisdom.” Communities that are highly policed 
become copwise and adapt their behavioral signals to avoid police contact. Stuart (2016:150) 
argues that “when policing is hypervigilant, residents reinterpret their physical and social 
environment not only in terms of associated risks of crime, but also in light of their perceived 
likelihood of unwanted police contact.” Gideon’s Army’s (2016) research highlights that racial 
disparities in policing are occurring in Nashville and that there are consequences for the 
wellbeing of community members.  
Following the release of the report, community attention was placed on how MNPD 
officers interact with community members. The reception from MNPD was chilly at best 
(Garrison 2017). The Police Chief, Steve Anderson, issued a letter to the Metro Council 
critiquing the report’s methodology—in particular the use of the residential population as a 
benchmark to look for racial disparity. The Chief’s critique did not discuss vehicle searches or 
the qualitative findings of the report. The residential population benchmarking critique is valid 
and a limitation of the report. A large body of academic research shows that the residential 
population is not an accurate reflection of how police prioritize specific neighborhoods and 
target specific people for heightened scrutiny (Alpert, Dunham, and Smith 2007; Baumgartner, 
Epp, and Shoub 2018; Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014; Fridell 2004; Knox, 
Lowe, and Mummolo 2019; Natl. Acad. Sci. Eng. Med. 2018; Neil and Winship 2019; Ridgeway 
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and MacDonald 2010). Even though the limitation is well known, the use of residential 
population is common (for examples, see U.S. Department of Justice 2015, 2016). 
Methodological issues notwithstanding, the report tapped into the experiences of the community. 
One interviewee in the report said that, “I think it’s foolish for us to think that we cannot become 
a Ferguson or a Baltimore. Yes, we can. Yes, we can. The right match has not been struck, that’s 
all” (Gideon’s Army 2016:18). Less than four months after the report was released, Jocques 
Clemmons—a black man who lived in a highly-policed neighborhood where the largest public 
housing complex in Nashville is located—was shot by an MNPD officer while running from a 
traffic stop and allegedly reaching for a gun that he had dropped. After this incident, The 
Policing Project at New York University was contracted by the city of Nashville to evaluate 
whether the practice of traffic stops was effective for reducing crime and if there would be 
negative consequences if police made changes to their strategy. They found that racial minorities 
were disproportionately stopped in all areas of Nashville and that the number of stops had no 
relationship to the number of serious crimes committed (Policing Project 2018). They did not, 
however, evaluate racial disparities in police searches. 
This dissertation was sparked by my work on the Driving While Black report but takes a 
distinctly sociological approach to assess racial disparities, racial bias, and the consequences for 
community members. Each of the three papers (or dissertation chapters) presented below is 
engaged with ongoing theoretical and methodological debates in sociology, criminology, and 
police sciences. In addition to addressing ongoing scholarly discussions, these papers have 
implications for public policy in Nashville. The reminder of the introduction provides a broad 
overview of the sociology of policing and how it intersects with race. I briefly review the history 
of concepts and frameworks that inform the three substantive chapters of the dissertation.  
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SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND POLICING 
The sociologist Egon Bittner (1970) argued that “the role of the police is to address all sorts of 
human problems when and insofar as their solutions do or may possibly require the use of force 
at the point of their occurrence” (44). In Bittner’s analysis, the profession of policing is much 
more than controlling crime. Police officers are the social response to any situation where non-
negotiable coercive force is desired or needed. “Calling the cops” is a request for intervention by 
individuals tasked with controlling others. Police do not necessarily need to exercise coercion 
when called, their authority to coerce is often sufficient for most situations. Bittner’s theory of 
the police role is similar to Max Weber’s conception of the state. Weber defined the state as, “a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly on the use of legitimate physical 
force within a certain territory” (Gerth and Mills 1946; Terpstra 2011:4). If the state has the 
monopoly on physical force, the modern exercise of that force is through policing. 
 Where and how police exercise coercive force distributes the control of the state 
unequally across society. Scholars have argued since the 1980’s that the United States has taken 
a punitive turn “in which state surveillance, regulation, and punishment have become more 
aggressive, intolerant, and proliﬁc” (Stuart, Armenta, and Osborne 2015:237). A culture of 
control is embedded throughout American society (Garland 2001). One way the punitive turn 
toward control is put into practice is through police deployment strategies. Police focus their 
enforcement efforts in neighborhoods where crime is most likely to occur (Braga, Brunson, and 
Drakulich 2019; Braga and Weisburd 2010; Natl. Acad. Sci. Eng. Med. 2018). Neighborhoods 
where crime is common also tend to be areas where social disadvantages are concentrated 
(Sampson 2013; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). People living in disadvantaged areas 
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are disproportionately low-income and people of color and are therefore exposed to more police 
control that more affluent and white counterparts (Anderson 1999; Wilson 2012). Police have 
defended the overrepresentation of racial minorities in police stops by arguing that more crimes 
are committed by and against racial minorities than whites. Several decades of empirical research 
has shown that even though there are differences in the rate of crime perpetration and 
victimization, it does not fully explain the racial gap in police contact (Braga et al. 2019; Natl. 
Acad. Sci. Eng. Med. 2018). In fact, Weaver et al. (2019) argue that there has been a recent 
decoupling between crime behaviors and arrest, especially for blacks. Comparing the 1997 to the 
1979 cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, the authors find that the more recent 
cohort had a much higher probability of arrest than the previous generation. The increase in 
arrest probability from the 1979 cohort to the 1997 cohort was primarily for those who reported 
no criminal offending and more pronounced among blacks than whites. Weaver et al. (2019:112) 
state that, “what transpired in the last half century was not only an expansion of the state’s 
authority and citizens’ increased contact with the state’s punitive arm, it was a decoupling that 
transformed the historical relationship between criminality and exposure to arrest among 
Americans.”  
 Police contact in neighborhoods is a key entry point to the criminal justice system. A 
vehicle or pedestrian stop that turns into a search often precedes an arrest. The most likely reason 
that a person is arrested in a vehicle stop is possession of a small amount of drugs (Baumgartner, 
Epp, et al. 2018). Misdemeanor arrests can lead to a proliferation of legal problems if a person is 
not able to pay bail, fines, and court fees (Alexander 2012). If a person is held pre-trial and 
cannot afford bail, they may lose their job, housing, and custody of children (Heaton, Mayson, 
and Stevenson 2017). Until recently, Tennessee had a policy of suspending drivers’ licenses if 
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court fines were not paid. In July 2018, the license suspension policy was overturned in US 
federal court in part because it made paying fines more difficult and trapped poor people in a 
cycle of incarceration and legal debt. According to The Tennessean newspaper, from 2012 to 
2018 over 250,000 Tennesseans had their drivers’ licenses suspended for not paying court fees 
(Boucher 2018). Once a person has a criminal record—even only a misdemeanor offense—
gaining employment is more difficult than it would be without a record (Pager 2003, 2008; 
Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009; Pager and Shepherd 2008; Uggen et al. 2014). 
There are other ways that people become entangled with the criminal justice system. For 
youth in particular, schools are increasingly a site of legal sanctions and police presence—
especially in urban schools (Anderson 2017; Jones 2009; Morris 2016; Rios 2011, 2017). Rios 
(2011) argues that schools have become part of a ‘youth control complex’ that in conjunction 
with other social institutions criminalize young people of color. School administrators dole out 
harsh punishments including suspensions and expulsions in order to control the behavior of 
students. In ride alongs with police officers in California, Rios (2017) saw police officers having 
both empathetic and supportive interactions as well as unnecessarily punitive interactions with 
youth suspected of being gang affiliated. Officers, especially white officers, misinterpreted 
cultural symbols as gang symbols and responded with punitive sanctions. Rios (2017) concludes 
that the harsh, adversarial interactions that youth have with school officials and law enforcement 
further push them away from success. Unfair treatment by authorities is a risk factor for 
incarceration and school dropout (Rios 2017:157). 
 In this dissertation, I investigate one specific practice that police use in marginalized 
neighborhoods: aggressive patrol (Herbert, Beckett, and Stuart 2018). Aggressive patrol is 
referred to by several names including “hot spot policing,” “broken windows policing,” “quality 
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of life policing,” “order maintenance,” and “zero-tolerance” (Natl. Acad. Sci. Eng. Med. 2018). 
Each term has distinctions in intent and practices but all refer to increasing police scrutiny in 
places showing visible signs of social disorder and increasing the certainty of apprehension when 
crime occurs. Aggressive patrol is used to try to proactively uncover evidence of criminal 
activity. If a police officer considers a vehicle or driver as suspicious, they can use a minor 
violation or pretext to make a traffic stop (Epp et al. 2014). After the stop, the officer can 
convince a driver to consent to a search or, if the officer asserts probable cause, coerce a search 
of the vehicle. Aggressive patrol is thought to reduce crime through deterrence. When police 
focus on a specific area with proactive, aggressive strategies, the probability that a crime is 
investigated and a suspect is arrested increases. Others in the community also recognize that the 
probability of apprehension is high and will therefore avoid criminal activity (Nagin 2013; 
Nagin, Solow, and Lum 2015). In contrast to the deterrence argument, aggressive patrol can be 
counterproductive. Herbert, Beckett, and Stuart (2018:1498) argue that “aggressive patrol 
focused on the socially marginal will often increase the likelihood of notable class and race-
based disparities in both arrests and subsequent jail and prison terms.” Large racial disparities 
can reduce trust in the police and reduce the likelihood that community members will work with 
police (Epp et al. 2014; Meares, Tyler, and Gardener 2015). Focusing on discretionary searches 
during a traffic stop, this dissertation examines how racial disparities are produced and whether 
search decisions are biased against blacks and Hispanics. The third paper shifts focus to whether 
aggressive patrol practices in conjunction with unfair treatment by police are associated with 
depressive symptoms and anxiety symptoms for residents of Nashville.   
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DEFINING RACE IN THE CONTEXT OF POLICING 
Research on race and policing often hinges on definitions of race and racism. In this dissertation, 
I use both a structural definition of race and racism as well as engage with research that aims to 
identify whether racial bias can be attributed to individual decisions. I use the term black rather 
than African American because black people in the United States are diverse in their geographic 
backgrounds but experience discrimination based on the color of their skin. I do not capitalize 
racial categories throughout this dissertation in accordance with the American Sociological 
Association’s (2010) Style Guide. Following Omi and Winant (2015:110), I define race as “a 
concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types 
of human bodies.” Bodies themselves do not make race. Race is constructed through 
sociohistorical processes that give different types of bodies access to varying amounts of social 
power and material resources.  
 In addition to representing conflicts over power and resources, race is also a social 
identity. Racial meanings are produced by those in power as well as marginalized groups. From 
above, powerful groups and/or state institutions can impose meanings on subordinated groups. 
For instance, racial minorities are often criminalized by dominant groups which can lead to 
increased police scrutiny (Morris 2016; Rios 2007, 2011, 2017). Simultaneously, those meanings 
can be contested and countered by subordinated social groups. The process of extending racial 
meaning to previously unclassified identities, behaviors, and resources is called racialization 
(Omi and Winant 2015). Racialization is “enacted through meso-level organizations reinforcing, 
challenging, or altering racial meanings” (Ray 2019:30). Police agencies are organizations where 
racial meanings are enacted and reified. Bonilla-Silva (1997) argues that the embeddedness of 
racial categories at all levels of society—e.g. political, social, economic—is indicative of a 
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racialized social system. Racism is the ideology that supports the racialized social system and 
“guides actions of racial actors in society” (Bonilla-Silva 1997:474). Racist ideology becomes 
“common sense” because it rationalizes inequality and racial stereotypes (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 
2010; Omi and Winant 2015). Police practices are based on common sense assumptions about 
crime and, in turn, shape racial meaning in society and help produce the lived experience or race 
(Epp et al. 2014).  
The structural definition of race and racism given above differs substantially from the 
definitions used by police and in many studies of policing. For police, racism is usually defined 
as individual animus toward a person based on their race (Baumgartner, Epp, et al. 2018; Epp et 
al. 2014; Glaser 2014; Gumbhir 2007; Natl. Acad. Sci. Eng. Med. 2018). Racism in this 
perspective happens on the individual level and is due to individual decisions. Race is framed as 
an individual characteristic or group membership. When written into police policy, racial bias is 
given an even more narrow definition. For example, the Metro Nashville Police Department’s 
Manual defines biased based policing as “the selection of individuals for enforcement 
intervention based solely on a common trait of a group, such as race, ethnic origin, gender, 
socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, or age” [emphasis in original] (Metropolitan Nashville 
Police Department 2018:441). By this definition, racism or biased policing can only occur on an 
individual level and only if an officer intentionally (and demonstrably) targets a person based on 
race without any other pretext that can justify the action. Race can be used by officers in 
deciding to stop a vehicle or pedestrian but it can’t be the only reason for the stop. Not only does 
this definition of racism absolve police of bias in most cases but it also ignores the ways that 
organizations can reproduce and perpetuate racial inequality.  
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DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
In this dissertation, I examine racial disparities in discretionary vehicle searches by new 
police officers in Nashville, Tennessee and test whether police practices affect psychological 
wellbeing in the community. The first two papers evaluating racial disparity show how police 
disproportionately apply state power and control on people of color in Nashville. The third paper 
asks how that disproportionate application of coercive force is associated with distress for 
community members. I use both the structural and individual accounts of race and racism in this 
dissertation. The first paper (Chapter 2) examines racial disparities in discretionary searches for 
white, black, and non-black officers of color in the first three years of their careers. I test whether 
new officers’ search trajectories—the rate of searching drivers over the first years in their 
career—are best explained by statistical discrimination theory, social conditioning theory, or 
bureaucratic promotion theory. The results are consistent with a structural understanding of race 
since racial disparities are persistent over time and officers are more likely to conduct searches 
when they are about to become eligible for a promotion. The second paper (Chapter 3) draws 
more explicitly from an individual model of race and racism. I engage with the research literature 
on testing for racial bias in police decisions in order to identify whether officers conduct 
discretionary searches with different standards of evidence for white, black, and Hispanic drivers 
(see Neil and Winship 2019 for an overview). I find clear evidence of racial bias. The analysis 
would not meet the policy definition of bias-based policing in the MNPD manual because I 
cannot show that officers made the decision to search solely based on race. Nevertheless, the 
findings should be concerning for police administrators and policy makers. The final paper 
(Chapter 4) tests whether proactive policing in conjunction with having previously experienced 
unfair treatment by police is associated with depressive and anxiety symptoms. Using the 
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Nashville Stress and Health Survey, I find that black respondents have increased depressive 
symptoms if they have experienced unfair police treatment. The heightened risk of depressive 
symptomatology is more pronounced when living is a neighborhood where police make many 
misdemeanor arrests, self-initiated reports, and discretionary searches. I do not find a 
relationship of proactive policing or unfair treatment by police with anxiety symptoms. Together, 
these three papers provide a snapshot of how police practices differentially impact Nashville 
residents based on race and ethnicity. I address policy implications in the discussion of each 
chapter and the concluding chapter of the dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 2 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN POLICE OFFICERS’ DISCRETIONARY SEARCH 
TRAJECTORIES:  STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION, SOCIAL CONDITIONING, AND 
BUREAUCRATIC PROMOTION INCENTIVES 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Police officers tend to search black drivers more often than white drivers when they conduct a 
traffic stop. Large disparities in search rates may delegitimize police and contribute to inequities 
throughout the criminal justice system. Little is known about how individual officers develop 
their search tendencies throughout their careers. Drawing on theories of statistical discrimination, 
social conditioning theory, and bureaucratic promotion theory I examine the rate at which 
officers who are white, black, and non-black people of color (POC) conduct discretionary 
searches over the first three years of their careers. The results show that there is a large disparity 
between search rates for black and white drivers from the beginning of officers’ careers 
consistent with statistical discrimination theory. Black police officers diverge from white and 
non-black POC officers reducing their search rate after their first year on the force. When 
officers become eligible for promotion in the third year, white and non-black POC officer 
increase their search rate as suggested by bureaucratic promotion theory’s proposition that 
employees will increase productively while black officers do not. Together, these findings show 
that racial disparities can be influenced by organizational structure as well as the biases that are 
established early in their career. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent criminal justice reform efforts have encouraged the public to focus on racial disparities in 
the criminal justice system. Most research shows that black people are more likely than whites to 
be stopped, searched, and arrested by police (Alexander 2012). Once in the court system, blacks 
are more likely than whites to be convicted of a crime and receive harsher sentences for equal 
crimes compared to whites (Cole 1999; Patterson 2015; Walker, Spohn, and DeLone 2012). The 
result is a system of racialized mass incarceration where, in 2018, 2.3 million people in the 
United States were in jails, prisons, or other detention facilities and an additional 4.5 million are 
under community supervision, probation or parole (Bobo and Thompson 2010; Prison Policy 
Initiative 2019). Black Americans are subject to correctional control disproportionately 
compared to their representation in the population. In 2016, blacks were 28 percent of the 
probation population and 38 percent of parolees while comprising 13 percent of the general 
population (Kaeble 2018; Patterson and Wildeman 2015). The observed racial disparities are no 
accident but the result of state and federal policies that disproportionately target and harm black 
communities (Alexander 2012; Bobo and Thompson 2006; Tonry 2011).  
Loïc Wacquant (2001) argues that the expansion of the carceral state through policing, 
probation, and parole following the Civil Rights Movement and accelerated by the War on Drugs 
has led to a “solidification of the centuries-old association of blackness with criminality and 
devious violence” (117). Sociologists show that the concentration of imprisonment and 
correctional control in poor, black communities is now one of the primary driving forces of race-
based social stratification (Beckett and Western 2001; Massey 2007; National Research Council 
2014; Pettit and Western 2004; Western 2002, 2006). Racial disparities in criminal justice 
contact often begin early in life with schools increasingly working with police and intense 
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suspicion and criminalization of young people of color creating a school to prison pipeline (Jones 
2009; Rios 2011, 2017). After police contact occurs and a citation or arrest is made, the formal 
criminal justice process begins. The most common way a person comes in contact with a police 
officer is during a traffic stop (Davis, Whyde, and Langton 2018; Langton and Durose 2013). 
When a traffic stop leads to a search, police officers are making a judgment about who is 
suspicious (Epp et al. 2014). In aggregate, search decisions are a filter that leads to the criminal 
justice system. If racial disparities are abundant, they are one of the first steps in producing the 
overrepresentation seen throughout courts and corrections. 
Modern urban police forces are large bureaucratic organizations that enforce the legal 
code. Police officers are street-level bureaucrats that make decisions about how the law is 
implemented on a case-by-case basis (Lipsky 1971). Each small decision about when to conduct 
a traffic stop or a discretionary search can have large implications for the driver. If the driver is 
found with drugs or an illegal weapon, they will face consequences from courts including fines, 
probation, and/or imprisonment. Often overlooked are situations where a driver is searched but 
has nothing illegal in his or her possession.  In this case, the driver must sit on the curb while a 
state bureaucrat rifles through their personal belongings. To the driver, this may feel somewhere 
between an annoyance and an injustice, entirely based on the police officer’s judgment that the 
driver is not the be trusted. The driver’s perception of the search on the annoyance-injustice 
spectrum is likely influenced by their subject position. If the driver sees their treatment as 
equitably distributed and carried out in a professional manner, the search is likely an annoyance. 
If, however, the driver knows that others who share an identity, notably race, are 
disproportionately subject to police searches, feelings of injustice are a likely response. This is a 
problem beyond the issue of procedural fairness itself. When police officers’ decisions are 
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perceived as biased by the community, the overall legitimacy of the police force is tarnished 
(Meares et al. 2015). 
Ideally, new police officers are trained to exercise their legal authority in fair and 
unbiased ways. In practice, decades of racial profiling research suggests that race contributes to 
officers’ enforcement decisions (Baumgartner, Epp, et al. 2018; Epp et al. 2014; Glaser 2014; 
Tonry 2011). Implicit and explicit racial bias can influence an officer’s evaluation of facts and 
circumstances leading to higher rates of searches on people of color (Glaser 2014). Black men in 
particular are often seen as suspicious and singled out for searches (Davis 2017; Eberhardt 2019; 
Rios 2007, 2011). Studies investigating racial disparities in search decisions tend to show that 
black drivers are more likely to be searched than white drivers after a traffic stop (Baumgartner, 
Epp, et al. 2018; Epp et al. 2014; Higgins, Vito, and Grossi 2012; Rojek, Rosenfeld, and Decker 
2012). Some research also indicates that white officers are more likely than black officers to 
conduct searches but there are mixed findings across different jurisdictions with several studies 
finding few, if any, differences between white and black officers (Close and Mason 2007; Klahm 
and Tillyer 2015; Rojek et al. 2012; Tillyer 2014; Tillyer and Klahm 2011; Tillyer, Klahm, and 
Engel 2012). 
This study investigates how racial disparities in discretionary searches are produced 
within police organizations. Officers self-select into the profession but are trained uniformly in 
their police academy how to enforce laws in the jurisdiction while respecting the rights of 
community members. Following training, officers are socialized into the police organization and 
have experiences in the field that likely shape how they make decisions to conduct searches. If 
the first years on the force are formative and help set career trajectories, the quality of policing 
occurring in these years requires greater attention from researchers. Using data from Nashville, 
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TN, I examine how often officers who are white, black, and non-black people of color (POC) 
decide to conduct discretionary searches during their first three years on the police force. My 
theoretical approach is shaped by theories of racial discrimination and by bureaucratic promotion 
theory. 
Theories of racial discrimination–specifically social conditioning theory (Smith and 
Alpert 2007) and statistical discrimination theory (Pager and Karafin 2009)–suggest alternate 
trajectories of search behavior over time. Social conditioning theory suggests that stressful 
negative experiences with racial minority suspects accumulate and lead to increasing racial 
disparities over time, especially for white officers (Klahm and Tillyer 2015; Smith and Alpert 
2007). Statistical discrimination, in contrast, would predict that a racial disparity between black 
and white drivers would begin large and remain stable over time. In addition to processes of 
racial discrimination, racial disparities are produced within a racialized organizational structure 
that incentivizes certain behaviors (Ray 2019). Ray (2019) proposes that organizations, including 
police agencies, should be understood as embedded within a larger racial social structure that 
patterns the internal practices of the organization along racial lines. Officers across racial groups 
may exercise their agency in different ways—i.e. changing their discretionary search rates—in 
response to organizational norms of career advancement. Bureaucratic promotion theory argues 
that once eligible for a promotion, officers will adjust their performance metrics by conducting 
more searches in hopes they will receive a promotion (Halaby 1978; Jacobs 1981; Lutfey and 
Mortimer 2006). When examined through the lens of racialized organizations, there will likely 
be differences between officers by race in how they respond to organizational incentives 
initiating higher numbers of searches, especially on black drivers who have less social power 
(Rojek et al. 2012).  
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This paper makes several contributions to the research literature. First, I examine 
discretionary search decisions as a longitudinal process that develops over time. As a career 
trajectory, discretionary search rates show how individual officers change over time and whether 
specific career points are related to officers’ decisions to conduct searches. Second, by using a 
longitudinal model I test whether racial disparities increase over time—consistent with social 
conditioning theory (Smith and Alpert 2007)—or whether racial disparities exist at the beginning 
of the career and persist over time—a proposition of statistical discrimination theory (Pager and 
Karafin 2009). Third, I apply an organizational perspective which shows how officers may adjust 
their policing practices in response to the bureaucratic promotion system used by the police 
force. Finally, this paper has implications for studies of officer race on racial profiling research. 
The results show that black officers conduct discretionary searches at a similar rate to their white 
peers when they are compared cross-sectionally. When the temporal nature of the data is 
modeled, black officers diverge from their white peers by conducting fewer discretionary 
searches.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Police officers are given wide latitude to make decisions about conducting searches during 
a traffic stop (Friedman 2017). Police officers conduct discretionary searches in response to their 
suspicion that they will find evidence of a crime (i.e. drugs or illegal weapons). Officers are 
trained to observe behavioral and situational cues from the driver or passengers in order to 
establish specific and articulable facts and circumstances that justify conducting a search. For 
instance, if a driver is seen trying to hide something from the officer or the vehicle smells of 
marijuana, the officer can allege that they have probable cause to search the vehicle. If an officer 
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does not have enough evidence to establish probable cause but still desires to search the vehicle, 
they may ask the driver for consent to conduct a search. Both are examples of discretionary 
searches. Armenta (2017) found that officers in Nashville are taught to “push the stop” by taking 
additional steps to investigate the driver and vehicle if they felt suspicion or had a hunch. She 
found that racial and ethnic stereotypes led to determinations of suspiciousness. She writes that 
during her ride-alongs, “officers voiced suspicions about young Latino men that hinged on 
whether they believed Latino men were workers or possible gang members” (Armenta 2017:68). 
Ethnicity was being used as a proxy for suspicion. Researchers argue that these stereotypes come 
from through repeated exposure to racial minorities in criminal or deviant situations or from 
prior assumptions about racial or ethnic groups as a whole (Alpert, Dunham, and Stroshine 2014; 
Knowles, Persico, and Todd 2001; Pager and Karafin 2009; Smith and Alpert 2007). Another 
possibility is that weak justifications to search drivers are based on organizational incentives to 
show productivity. In the remainder of this review, I will review previous research related to 
discretionary search decisions specifically focusing on officer race, officer experience, and driver 
race. Then, I will develop hypotheses based on social conditioning theory (Smith and Alpert 
2007), statistical discrimination theory (Knowles et al. 2001; Pager and Karafin 2009; Schwab 
1986), and bureaucratic promotion theory (Halaby 1978; Jacobs 1981) which suggest alternate 
hypotheses related to search decisions over time. I review these theories and test whether they fit 
the observed patterns over time. 
 
Probability of a Discretionary Search 
The probability that an officer will decide to search a vehicle during a traffic stop is used in 
many studies to show whether a racial disparity exists between black and white drivers. Black 
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drivers, in particular, are usually found to be searched at a higher rate than white drivers when 
stopped by police officers (Ariel and Tankebe 2016; Baumgartner et al. 2017; Baumgartner, Epp, 
et al. 2018; Epp et al. 2014; Glaser 2014; Rojek et al. 2012; Tillyer et al. 2012). While this 
method is useful for describing and testing explanatory reasons for a racial disparity, it does not 
show whether any specific stop or officer was affected by bias (Fridell 2004; Knowles et al. 
2001; Ridgeway 2008). Even if all searches meet the legal requirements for constitutionality, 
large racial disparities are often considered unfair by community members (Meares et al. 2015). 
Tests for racial disparity are useful to illustrate the underlying social processes leading to the 
observed data. Examining differences in officers by race and experience helps determine the 
processes leading to discretionary searches. 
 
Officer race-driver race 
Following urban uprisings in the 1960’s, The National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders (The Kerner Commission) recommended hiring more racial minority officers to 
increase police legitimacy and decrease police abuses of black civilians (Gillham and Marx 
2018; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968). In 1987, only 14.6 percent of 
local police officers were racial or ethnic minorities; by 2013, 27.3 percent of officers were a 
racial or ethnic minority (Reaves 2015). More specifically, black officers comprised 12 percent 
of officers in 2013. Similarly, President Obama’s 2015 Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
echoed the Kerner Commission’s recommendation of increasing officer diversity (President’s 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing 2015). Whether racial minority officers differ from white 
officers in their decisions as police officers has been a topic of substantial debate. Black officers 
often report experiencing racism in the workplace from their white peers and identify situations 
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where white officers have abused their power with racial minority suspects (Bolton and Feagin 
2004). In terms of decisions to search vehicles during traffic stops, there has been mixed 
evidence across studies. 
Rojek, Rosenfeld, and Decker (2012) analyzed the probability of a search for different 
officer race/driver race combinations in St. Louis, Missouri. Taking a conflict theory approach, 
they argue that the power differential between officer and driver within the racial social structure 
will predict the likelihood of a search. They found that the most likely officer race/driver race 
combination leading to a search is white officers stopping black drivers followed by white 
officers stopping white drivers, black officers stopping black drivers, and the least likely to lead 
to a search is black officers stopping white drivers. They interpret these findings as support for 
their theory that white officers have status as both a police officer and a white person so they will 
use their relative power against lower status individuals more frequently. Similarly, Close and 
Mason (2007) analyzed data from Florida Highway Patrol from 2000 to 2002 and found that 
black officers were 15 percent of the force but conducted only four percent of the searches. 
White officers comprised 73 percent of the force and conducted 88 percent of searches. 
Other studies have found contradictory or mixed findings related to officer and driver race 
combinations. Tillyer, Klahm, and Engel (2012) found that white officers were 2.9 times more 
likely to conduct a discretionary search than non-white officers. In their data from Cleveland, 
Ohio, they did not find an increased risk of being searched for black or Hispanic drivers overall 
but did find that young black men specifically are at higher risk of a search. Officer race did not 
moderate this relationship indicating that white officers are not more likely to search young black 
men than non-white officers. Instead, they found that the increased discretionary search risk was 
predominantly driven by officer assignment rather than officer race. Officers assigned to traffic 
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detail were more likely than non-traffic officers to search young black men. They attribute these 
results to the fact that traffic officers are less likely to have ongoing contacts in specific 
geographic areas and therefore may rely on stereotypes more than officers who become familiar 
with the neighborhoods they patrol. Similarly, Klahm and Tillyer (2015) use 2009 data from a 
large, urban Southwestern city and find no differences in the probability of searches for black 
drivers compared to white drivers or in black officers compared to white officers. These 
contradictory findings on the relationship between officer race/driver race show that more 
nuanced work is needed to examine the social contexts that are related to racial disparities in 
discretionary searches. 
 
Officer experience 
Klahm and Tillyer (2015) argue that professional experiences as a police officer are more 
likely to predict discretionary search rates than officer race. The authors contend that the 
majority of previous research has primarily treated experiences as a count of the number of years 
an officer has been on the force without measuring previous police activity. Drawing on Smith 
and Alpert’s (2007) social conditioning model, they hypothesize that officers with greater 
exposure to racial minorities and young suspects in the past will search more often than those 
with less exposure. Klahm and Tillyer (2015) split their observation year (2009) into six-month 
segments and hypothesized that officers who stopped more racial minorities, searched more 
drivers, and that those who found more evidence in searches during the first half of the year 
would conduct more searches in the second half of the year. The findings support for the 
hypotheses and Klahm and Tillyer (2015) argue that, “officers gain experience during searches 
that influences their decision making in the future” (356). Officers who conducted more searches 
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and found more evidence continued to conduct searches at higher rates in the second half of the 
year. It is not clear from this study how officer experience prior to the beginning of a calendar 
year affect discretionary search activity. If police officers gain experience throughout their 
careers that influences their discretionary search behavior, officers’ first years on the police force 
should receive greater scrutiny. 
 
Social Conditioning Theory 
Smith and Alpert’s (2007) theory of social conditioning is often used to explain why racial 
disparities are so persistent in police outcomes. They argue that due to historical and structural 
forces, police officers often work in racially segregated communities that have persistent 
problems with violent crime. Officers do not intend to discriminate but they are exposed to 
stressful situations—often with racial minority suspects—that prime their cognitive schema to be 
suspicious of people of color. Psychologists often refer to this priming as implicit bias (Eberhardt 
2019; Glaser 2014). In this model, officers are receiving a biased sample of negative experiences 
with racial minorities. Officers develop an illusory correlation of race with criminality through 
direct exposure to racial minority suspects. If an illusory correlation is applied to routine 
encounters with the public—like traffic stops—they are more likely to treat a person in biased 
ways. With more time on the force, the likelihood of having negative experiences and developing 
biased cognitive schema increases. Smith and Alpert (2007) do not develop a temporal aspect of 
their theoretical model. Since social conditioning is framed as a process, temporality is implicitly 
assumed. The longer officers are potentially exposed to negative social encounters with racial 
minorities, the more likely they are to show biases in their decisions. When framed as an average 
effect on officers’ decisions, if social conditioning is driving a racial disparity the discretionary 
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search rate for black drivers would likely increase relative to the rate of discretionary searches of 
white drivers. Hypothesis 1 tests whether social conditioning theory is supported: 
Hypothesis 1: Evidence will support social conditioning theory if the discretionary search rate 
for black drivers increases relative to the discretionary search rate for white drivers over time. 
 
Statistical Discrimination 
The main mechanism of bias proposed by Smith and Alpert is a cognitive model that is 
acquired over time. Research suggests that there is both a temporal process as well as baseline 
levels of statistical discrimination that lead to racial disparities in hiring decisions. Statistical 
discrimination occurs when presumed group-level attributes are applied to an individual (Pager 
and Karafin 2009; Schwab 1986). Pager and Karafin (2009) propose a model in which employers 
bring their prior beliefs about black employees to their hiring decisions which then will either be 
confirmed or denied once working with black employees. They argue that the process of racial 
discrimination is due to both previous knowledge or beliefs and a process of updating beliefs 
using new information. In the case of discretionary searches during a traffic stop, police officers 
have prior knowledge and beliefs about race and crime. In the police academy, officers are 
trained on general crime statistics and the racial composition of the population of crime suspects. 
Officers are then likely to generalize from these statistics to other interactions with the public. 
For instance, homicide suspects and victims are often disproportionately racial minorities. If the 
racial composition of homicide suspects leads an officer to search more black drivers than white 
drivers instead of the specific context of each stop, that officer would be practicing statistical 
discrimination. Beliefs about blacks and crime can be confirmed or disputed as officers gain 
more experience. Social conditioning theory suggests the process of confirmation is through 
negative interactions with racial minority suspects. From a longitudinal perspective, the initial 
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racial disparity between decisions to search black and white drivers is most likely due to 
previously held knowledge or information gained from training. If social conditioning were also 
taking place and updating prior beliefs, over time the disparity between black and white drivers 
would grow. If social conditioning was not occurring and statistical discrimination was the only 
source of racial bias, the disparity would remain equal over time. Hypothesis 2 tests whether 
statistical discrimination theory is supported: 
Hypothesis 2: Evidence will support statistical discrimination theory if the discretionary search 
rate for black drivers is consistently greater than the discretionary search rate for white drivers 
over time. 
 
Bureaucratic Promotion Incentives 
Police officers not only manage their interactions with the public but are also employees 
within a bureaucratic organization. Organizational social psychologists argue that workers’ 
desire to show productivity is an orientation toward future promotion (Lutfey and Mortimer 
2006). Weber argues that in a rationalized bureaucracy, “each individual worker is 
mathematically measured, each man becomes a little cog in the machine and, aware of this, his 
one preoccupation is whether he can become a bigger cog” (Weber quoted in Mayer 1956:126–
27). Organizational theorists argue that promotion within a bureaucracy is determined by both 
fixed and discretionary criteria (Halaby 1978). Fixed criteria are the institutional requirements 
placed on advancement. For instance, a union contract may govern who is eligible for a 
promotion or there may be requirements about years of service prior to eligibility. Discretionary 
criteria are applied by evaluating performance. Jacobs (1981) argues that promotion in police 
agencies requires longer periods of observation at each level of the organization to avoid 
controversy, and those who are most productive (without being involved in a controversy) will 
be promoted. Police researchers have observed that productivity is often emphasized by 
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supervisors over more holistic measures of quality policing (Armenta 2017; Moskos 2008). 
Moskos (2008) conducted an ethnographic study of Baltimore police by working as an officer in 
the field for one year. His supervisors emphasized arrests and required officers to make at least 
two arrests per month, otherwise they would have to write a report justifying their lack of arrests. 
Giving quotas for stops or arrests to officers is illegal but departments can have “performance 
goals” which give recommended numbers that officers should aim to achieve. 
Since officers have no control over fixed promotion requirements, they are likely to adjust their 
performance outcomes—including discretionary searches—to show supervisors they deserve 
promotion. If there is a time requirement before promotion, the year prior to eligibility is when 
officers are most likely to boost their numbers. If promotion incentives contribute to search 
activity, there should be a curvilinear pattern for search probability over time with a pronounced 
rise in the year of eligibility. Hypothesis 3 tests whether bureaucratic promotion theory is 
supported: 
Hypothesis 3: Evidence will support bureaucratic promotion theory if the discretionary search 
rate increases in police officers’ third year on the force.  
 
 
Officer Race/Ethnicity 
Even though racial minority officers receive the same training as other officers, they bring 
life experiences that may protect them from developing racist stereotypes (Bolton and Feagin 
2004; Thompson 2003). The police academy has a standardized curriculum that teaches the skills 
required to be a police officer as well as the philosophy of the department. Departments are 
increasingly teaching new officers community oriented policing and problem solving skills to 
reduce unnecessary use of force and bias (Bradford and Pynes 1999). Teaching community 
oriented and problem solving skills in the academy may not make as large of an impact as 
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intended. In a longitudinal study of 14 successive training academies in Phoenix, a community 
policing and problem solving curriculum made recruits feel more positive toward community-
focused strategies but over the first year of field training the positive attitudinal changes 
dissipated (Haarr 2001). Haarr (2001) suggests that the on-the-job socialization as well as the 
prior beliefs officers bring to the profession are more influential than the standardized curriculum 
offered to new recruits. If racial stereotypes are common for white officers, new recruits—
especially white recruits—may be socialized toward believing them.  
Black officers may be less likely to adopt the dominant racial ideology of the organization 
than white officers. In a study of black officers conducted in the late 1990’s in the American 
South, Bolton and Feagin (2004) found that black officers commonly reported that their own 
experiences growing up in segregated neighborhoods informed their choices as officers. The 
officers said that they understood why police were not trusted. One officer said, “blacks from my 
generation had to run from police. They were beaten up badly. Some were killed, shot and they 
just had bad experiences. So when I did become a cop, I can see them [parents] telling their kids 
to stay away from cops…I can understand why” (Bolton and Feagin 2004:51–52). The black 
officers in the study also reported that they heard their white peers using racist language, use 
excessive force against black community members, and have mistrust for black officers by 
framing them as taking the side of black communities over police (Bolton and Feagin 2004). 
Black officers in several studies have reported exclusion from “old-boy” networks that are useful 
for mentorship and promotion (Bolton and Feagin 2004; Thompson 2003).  
Research on racial attitudes of white and black officers show that white officers tend to 
hold more racially biased opinions of black people than the white population at large. LeCount 
(2017) uses nationally representative data from the General Social Survey to test whether white 
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law enforcement officers differ from other whites and whether black law enforcement officers 
differ from other blacks. White officers are more likely than other whites to deny that there is an 
educational disadvantage for blacks and to believe that blacks are not disadvantaged by 
discrimination. White police officers are nine times more likely than non-law enforcement 
whites to believe blacks are more violent than whites. White officers are more likely to have 
higher racial resentment, to deny discrimination of blacks, believe that whites are discriminated 
against, and endorse stereotypes of black criminality than whites in the general population. Black 
law enforcement officers did not differ from the black population on any of the 12 measures of 
racial beliefs in the General Social Survey. While LeCount’s (2017) study does not show a 
causal relationship between having negative on-the-job experiences with black people and 
holding racial stereotypes, the findings indicate that white officers are more likely to hold 
racially biased views than whites who are not in law enforcement.  
Black police officers bring their lifetime of racial socialization as a background to the 
training they receive as police officers. It is likely that white officers may differ from officers of 
color in how they make decisions to search drivers over time. Non-black officers of color may 
also experience a protective effect against racial disparities in vehicle search decisions. The three 
hypotheses above may vary by officer race. With officers of color more likely to have lifelong 
experiences of racial discrimination and more social experience with people of color, negative 
experiences with black suspects may be less likely to form biases. I test this proposition in 
hypothesis 1a: 
Hypothesis 1a: White officers will increase the discretionary search rate for black drivers 
relative to the discretionary search rate for white drivers to a greater extent than black or non-
black officer of color over time. 
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Antonovics and Knight (2009) argue that if statistical discrimination is the only form of 
discrimination occurring in vehicle search decisions there should be no differences in search rate 
by officer race. They argue that black and white police officers would use the same statistical 
evidence to make decisions. Hypothesis 2a tests this proposition: 
Hypothesis 2a: Black and non-black officers of color will have a lower racial disparity in 
discretionary searches between black and white drivers. 
Finally, the possibility of promotion may be less of an incentive to conduct more searches 
for black and non-black officers of color than for whites. White officers may be included in 
cliques that are likely to endorse aggressive strategies against black drivers and have fewer life 
experiences that show them the consequences of aggressive policing. Hypothesis 3a tests 
whether officers of color act differently in promotion years: 
Hypothesis 3a: Black and non-black officers of color will not increase their discretionary search 
rate in their third year on the force to the same extent as white officers. 
 
Figure 1: Predicted Discretionary Search Trajectories 
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Predicted Trajectories 
Figure 1 shows predicted trajectories for bureaucratic promotion theory, social 
conditioning theory, and statistical discrimination theory consistent with the hypotheses above. If 
social conditioning theory is the only process of discrimination occurring, early in the career 
there would be small disparities between black and white drivers but the disparity would increase 
linearly as more officers have negative encounters with racial minority suspects. If statistical 
discrimination is the only process at work, there would be an initial disparity between black and 
white drivers that would remain consistent over time. Finally, if the prospect of a promotion 
increases search rates, the trajectory over time would be unchanged from year one to year two 
but increase in the third year. I also test for differences in trajectories by officer race because 
officers of color and white officers are likely to diverge. White officers are likely more 
susceptible to developing racial stereotypes as suggested by social conditioning theory and 
therefore conducting more discretionary searches over time than black or non-black officers of 
color. Racial minority officers may also be less likely than whites to raise their search 
productivity—particularly for black drivers—when they become eligible for a promotion 
because they are more likely to have family and friends who have experienced bias from police. 
 
The Nashville Context 
When an officer joins Metro Nashville Police Department (MNPD), they attend the police 
academy and spend their first three years on the force as patrol officers. The academy teaches 
recruits the policies of the department and what will be expected of them as officers including 
how to conduct legal and unbiased searches. They receive their first assignment in one of eight 
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precincts as a patrol officer on one of three shifts. The eight precincts in Nashville differ 
substantially from one another. Central Precinct encompasses downtown Nashville and many of 
the tourist areas of the city. In contrast, North Precinct is a large and heterogeneous area. The 
precinct includes the historically black neighborhood of North Nashville where two historically 
black universities—Fisk University and Tennessee State University—are located. The zip code 
for North Nashville has the highest incarceration rate in the nation for black men born in the 
1980’s (Looney and Turner 2018). North Precinct extends to the Northernmost part of the county 
which is rural and lightly populated. Each precinct has unique challenges that lead to specific 
policing strategies. Patrol officers learn the strategies and norms of their assigned precinct. After 
three years in Patrol, officers can then be reassigned to other units (e.g. Narcotics, Investigations, 
Homicide, Domestic Violence, Flex). Officers aiming to be promoted to Flex—a unit dedicated 
to proactive policing in high-crime areas—or other proactive units often increase the number of 
traffic stops and searches they conduct to prove to their supervisor that they would be a good 
candidate (Armenta 2017). 
Patrol detail is both a training ground and a rite of passage into the police department. Each 
Patrol unit is supervised by a sergeant and the officers work together closely to respond to 
emerging community needs. The on-the-job experience gained while assigned to a Patrol unit 
aims to hone police skills but is also a source of socialization into departmental culture. Officers 
leave the academy trained in departmental policy but learn how policy is practiced once in the 
field. While assigned to Patrol, officers learn about the city they are patrolling and problems 
specific to neighborhoods. Officers spend their days working from their vehicle, responding to 
emergency and non-emergency calls for service, assisting other officers when needing backup, 
making traffic stops, issuing citations, making arrests, and completing paperwork. Officers’ 
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productivity, including number of arrests, traffic stops, and searches, contributes to their career 
advancement. Armenta (2017:61–62) found in her 2012 ethnography of MNPD’s South Precinct 
that officers were encouraged to conduct proactive traffic stops because, “the more productive 
officers received better evaluations and were more likely to have their preferences 
accommodated when they requested new shifts, assignments, and promotions.” She also reported 
that an officer credited receiving his preferred days off to his productivity and the unit had a 
sense of competition for conducting the most stops. Similarly, Fox 17 News Nashville reported 
that a 2015 email from a lieutenant to his precinct, “ask[ed] officers to increase physical arrests 
and to take a zero-tolerance approach.” The email gave recommended performance goals of 2 
arrests and 11 traffic stops a week for patrol officers (Quinones 2015). Armenta (2017) also 
found resistance to the competition with some more experienced officers lamenting the dragnet 
approach because it required no skill. 
Focus groups of MNPD officers conducted in 2001 and 2002 split by race and gender 
showed stark differences in how white and black officers understood racial profiling (B. N. 
Williams, Peters, and Speer 2003). The focus groups with white men and white women both had 
a common theme that denied the existence of racial profiling or that it was a problem. One white 
officer said, “I like to think we profile conduct. We don’t profile people. If that conduct involves 
descriptions of people or statistics of who’s doing what and where, well then so be it” (14). In 
contrast, the focus groups with black men and black women both acknowledged that racial 
profiling was common and had happened to them when not in uniform. A black male officer also 
pointed to productivity statistics as important. He said, “there was a big deal about the stats, and I 
was watching all the other boys making them stats, but they were making them illegal stats. No 
probable cause, but there was mighty trumped up charges just to say, ‘Hey Sarge, I’ve got this 
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paperwork over here’” (21). White and black officers bring different life experiences with them 
to the profession and clearly diverge with one another about the impact of police on black 
communities. 
Recently, Nashville activists have criticized the discretionary search trends of MNPD 
officers. Gideon’s Army (2016), a non-profit organization in Nashville, published a report 
analyzing traffic stops and vehicle searches conducted by MNPD between 2010 and 2015. The 
report argued that MNPD searched black drivers based on probable cause at a rate 3.4 times 
higher than white drivers in 2015 but were 15% less likely to find any evidence of a crime. 
Similarly, black drivers were 2.3 times more likely to be searched based on consent in 2015 and 
officers only found evidence in 11% of consent-based searches of black drivers. The report 
authors conducted logistic regression models to estimate the odds of a search or finding evidence 
but did not include theoretically relevant controls for driver demographics, officer demographics, 
location, or type of stop. The Gideon’s Army report sparked community conversations on 
policing in Nashville that are ongoing. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data 
Data for this paper come from MNPD administrative records received through open 
records requests. I use two databases for the analysis beginning January 1st, 2010 and ending 
December 31st, 2017. First, a database of all traffic stops conducted in the jurisdiction. At every 
traffic stop, officers are required to fill out a form (Form 252) about the stop. They enter 
information about the demographics of the driver, the reason for the stop, whether they 
conducted a search, the legal justification for the search, and the outcome of the stop 
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(i.e. warning, ticket, misdemeanor citation, arrest). The second source of data is employee 
demographics and assignments. The department keeps records of all officers’ assignments and 
transfers. They also collect demographic information on the officer including gender, age, and 
race. I match the traffic stop data and the employment data by employee identification number 
and date. 
The final sample includes 419 officers that joined MNPD January 1, 2010 and after then 
completed three full years on the force by the end of 2017. Since officers join the force in 
staggered cohorts, I calculate years on the force in relation to the first assignment after the 
training academy. A number of stops are excluded from the sample for several reasons. Drivers 
who were not identified as non-Hispanic black or non-Hispanic white are excluded from the 
analysis. The officers in the sample conducted 43,109 stops of non-black, non-white drivers. 
Drivers under the age of 14 were also excluded, a total of 102 cases. Gender was missing in 24 
also excluded cases. Searches conducted for non-discretionary reasons are excluded as well. 
These include searches conducted because the driver had an outstanding warrant (N=530). When 
a driver has an arrest warrant, the officer is required by policy to make an arrest and search the 
vehicle. Additionally, searches conducted incident to arrest (N=2,303) and inventory searches 
(N=191) are excluded because they are non-discretionary. The final sample includes 462,768 
traffic stops. 
 
Measures 
The dependent variable is whether a discretionary search was conducted after a traffic stop. 
On the 252 Form, officers select whether a search was conducted (yes or no) and if they checked 
“yes,” they select the legal justification for the search. The officer can select multiple 
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justifications for a search. For instance, many searches (N=1,770) are indicated as both probable 
cause and consent, both discretionary reasons for a search. Legally, if the officer has probable 
cause then consent is not needed; however, many officers will ask for consent from the driver 
rather than making the stop more confrontational than needed. Since multiple justifications are 
given for searches, deciding on the specific justification becomes subject to additional error. 
Following previous research, I exclude searches where a non-discretionary justification (warrant, 
incident to arrest, or inventory) is given and include all other searches as discretionary. 
Independent variables are drawn from stop-level characteristics, officer characteristics, and 
the geographic region of the city. At the stop-level, the driver’s race is coded as a binary variable 
for black drivers with whites as the reference. Gender indicates female. Driver’s age is centered 
at age 25 to assist with interpretation of interaction effects. The reason for the stop given by the 
officer is included as a set of binary variables. Officers can select whether the stop was made due 
to a moving violation (reference group), an investigatory stop, a vehicle equipment violation, 
illegal parking, regulatory violation, no seatbelt, or due to safety. At the officer-level, officer 
race/ethnicity is measured from the employee demographics as non-Hispanic white, non-
Hispanic black, and all other officers (referred to as non-black POC). White officers are the 
reference group. Officer gender is a binary variable comparing female to male officers. Officer 
age is measured in years and mean centered. To adjust for geographic differences, the precinct in 
which the stop occurred is included. Controlling for precinct adjusts for different crime rates, 
neighborhood differences, and institutional priorities in each of the eight precincts in Nashville. 
Central precinct (Downtown Nashville) is the reference group. 
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Analytic Strategy 
The analysis proceeds in several steps. First, descriptive statistics are calculated for all 
variables. Descriptives are reported split by officer race. The most common statistical test for 
differences between nominal variables is a Chi-Square test. The Chi-Square test and ANOVA 
test, however, are sensitive to sample size. The sample size of traffic stops (N=462,768) is large 
enough that all tests will show differences to be statistically significant even if they are not 
actually substantive. I report both the significance from the Chi-Square test or ANOVA as well 
as Cramer’s V for two categorical variables and eta-squared for the ANOVA test. Cramer’s V, 
commonly denoted as !", measures the effect size of a correlation between two discrete 
variables. The interpretation of Cramer’s V is context dependent but generally effect sizes with 
two degrees of freedom are considered negligible when less than .07 (Sun, Pan, and Wang 2010). 
Eta-squared (#$) is the amount of variance explained in a continuous variable by the grouping 
variable. 
The second step of the analysis is fitting a latent growth curve model to estimate officers’ 
search trajectories over their first three years on the force. In a multilevel modeling framework, 
there are many model specifications that could be used to fit the model. A standard 2-level 
growth curve model expects one observation measured at each time period for each level-2 unit 
(i.e. the officer) (Snijders 2011). In this case, there are many traffic stops in each time period. 
One strategy to simplify this case would be to aggregate traffic stops for each time period. An 
aggregated model would not be able to estimate the effect of driver demographics on vehicle 
search probabilities. To address this limitation, I fit the model trajectory with a 3-level growth 
curve model. At level-1, observations are individual traffic stops. At level-2, an interaction term 
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between time and officer gives three groupings per officer associated with each time point. 
Finally, level three is the officer. I calculate the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) based on 
Wu, Crespi, and Wong (2012) as implemented in the sjstats package in R (Lüdecke 2018). 
I test for the best fitting trajectory without other covariates in the model but the same pattern is 
found when fit with a full model. To fit the trajectory, I estimate a series of models introducing 
time and time2 sequentially and then, finding that the curvilinear trajectory is the best fit, test 
whether time and time2 should be included as random slopes at level-3 (Curran, Obeidat, and 
Losardo 2010; Snijders 2011). I compare the log likelihood, Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC), and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to establish which model provides the best fit of 
the data. BIC is the most conservative estimate of model fit because it favors parsimony by 
penalizing additional parameters. I also conduct an ANOVA deviance test comparing model fit. 
 
Piecewise growth models 
The third step of analysis is estimating the main effects models and probing for between-
officer variability. Following the recommendation of Hernández-Lloreda, Colmenares, and 
Martínez-Arias (2004), after fitting a quadratic model I estimate two separate slopes for time. 
The first gives the trajectory between times one and two. The second shows the trajectory 
between times two and three. Fitting a piecewise model assists with interpretation of random 
effects since polynomial terms are often challenging to interpret (Curran et al. 2010; Hernández-
Lloreda et al. 2004; Snijders 2011). Another advantage of the piecewise model is that it can be 
estimated as a 2-level model since the period one slope variance and the period two slope 
variance account for all variability of time that would otherwise be modeled at level-2 in the 3-
level model. When estimated as a 3-level piecewise model, the level-2 variance is zero and the 
   38 
model is identical to the 2-level model. The 3-level curvilinear model discussed in the previous 
section and the 2-level piecewise model are functionally equivalent and only differ in 
interpretation of the time slopes. Estimating the model as 2-level is more parsimonious and 
reduces the likelihood of estimation errors or non-convergence. Findings are substantively 
identical across various model specifications. 
After estimating the model with all covariates and random time period slopes, I probe 
whether driver race should be included as a random effect. The random slope for driver race is 
interpreted as between-officer propensity for searching black drivers. Including driver race as a 
random effect is the best fitting model. Finally, I use the random intercept, random time period 
slopes, and random driver race model to estimate fixed effect interactions among time, officer 
race, and driver race. I estimate two-way interactions between each combination of variables and 
a three-way interaction among the three key variables. All models are fit using the glmer() 
function from the lme4 package in R (Bates et al. 2015). 
Equations and variance matrices for the final piecewise growth model including random 
intercepts, random slopes, and random driver race effects (Table 3, Model 2) are shown below: 
Level-1 Equation (stop level): log ()*+,(-. = 01* + 0+*34561)* + 0$*34562)* + 09*:;<=>?@4A6@)* + B)* (1) 
Level-2 Equations (time X officer level): 01* = C11 + D1*  0+* = C+1E)FG+ + D+* (2) 0$* = C$1E)FG$ + D$*  09* = C$1HIJ"KLM)NGM + D9*  
with variances, 
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B)* ∼ P 0, ST$  D1*D+*D$*D9* ∼ P
0000 ,
U11U1+ U++U1$ U+$ U$$U19 U+9 U$9 U99  (3) 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptives 
Stop-level (level 1) and officer-level (level 2) descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. A 
total of 346 white officers (82.6% of total) are included in the population of officers completing 
three years on the force between 2010 and 2017. A total of 34 (8.5%) black officers and 39 
(9.3%) non-black POC officers are included in the population. All Chi-Square tests on level 1 
variables are significant due to the large sample size; Cramer’s V is a measure of association that 
is not sensitive to sample size. The effect sizes on all level 1 comparisons are small which shows  
that the differences between white, black, and non-black POC officers shown by the Chi-Square 
tests are not substantive. White officers made 387,328 traffic stops which led to 11,274 
discretionary searches (2.9% of stops), black officers made 30,954 traffic stops leading to 551 
discretionary searches (1.8% of stops), and non-black POC officers made 44,486 traffic stops 
leading to 1,311 discretionary searches (2.9% of stops). When stopping black drivers, white and 
non-black POC officers searched 4.3% and 4.2% of the black drivers they stopped, respectively, 
while black officers searched 2.6%. White and non-black POC officers searched 1.8% and 1.9% 
of the white drivers they stopped, respectively, while black officers searched 0.9%. 
Black and non-black officers of color were more likely to be women with 18% of officers in both 
groups being female. Only 7% of white officers are female. A Chi-Square test shows that this 
difference is significant (V$ =8.85, df=2, p<.05) and Cramer’s V shows a small to moderate  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for All Years 
 White Black Non-Black POC   
N-Officers 346 34 39   
N-Stops 387,328 30,954 44,486   
 Mean/
N 
(SD)/Prop Mean/
N 
(SD)/Prop Mean/
N 
(SD)/Prop Sig. 
Diffa 
Effect 
Sizeb 
Stop-level (level-1) N=462,768 
Searches 11,274 .029 551 .018 1,311 .029 *** .017 
Black Drivers 
Stopped 
173,977 .449 15,526 .502 19,707 .443 *** .027 
Black Drivers 
Searched 
7,531 .043 405 .026 836 .042 *** .022 
White Drivers 
Stopped 
213,352 .551 15,428 .498 24,779 .557 *** .027 
White Drivers 
Searched 
3,743 .018 146 .009 475 .019 *** .016 
Women 
Stopped 
159,905 .413 13,294 .429 18,306 .412 *** .009 
Women 
Searched 
2,519 .016 99 .007 283 .015 *** .017 
Driver Age 36.92 (14.13) 37.35 (14.50) 37.06 (14.16) *** .000 
Moving 
Violation 
Stops 
148,663 .384 11,568 .374 17,072 .384 *** .005 
Investigative 
Stops 
4,844 .013 348 .011 565 .013 *** .003 
Vehicle 
Equipment 
Stops 
137,725 .356 8,964 .290 15,503 .348 *** .034 
Parked 
Vehicle Stops 
555 .001 36 .001 23 .001 *** .008 
Regulation 
Stops 
44,185 .114 4,272 .138 4,274 .096 *** .026 
Seatbelt Stops 5,826 .015 1,008 .033 1,216 .027 *** .042 
Safety Stop 43,944 .113 4,679 .151 5,739 .129 *** .031 
Officer-level (Level-3) N=419 
Officer Age 27.64 (5.22) 28.59 (6.93) 27.36 (3.18)  .003 
Proportion 
Women 
Officers 
.07 - .18 - .18  
* 
.15 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
a Significance levels report p-value from Chi-Square test for nominal variables and ANOVA test for 
continuous variables 
b Effect size reports Cramer’s V for all difference tests between nominal variables and eta-squared for 
nominal-continuous comparisons because they are robust to large sample size.  
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effect size of .15. Officers across racial/ethnic groups did not differ significantly by age. On 
average, white officers were 27.64 years old (sd=5.33), black officers were 28.59 years old 
(sd=6.93), and non-black POC officers were 27.36 years old (sd=3.18).  
 
Fitting Trajectory Shape 
The first step of the analysis is to establish the shape of the growth trend over time. Table 
2 shows the null model and sequentially adds fixed effects for time and time2 testing for linear or 
non-linear growth. Model 1 shows the null model which has a level-2 ICC of .16 and the level-3 
ICC of .18, which is acceptable for estimating a 3-level model. Model 2 incorporates time as a 
linear fixed effect. Model 3 adds the time2 to the model. Both the linear and quadratic fixed 
effects in Models 2 and 3 are significant. The log likelihood, AIC and BIC are smaller in Model  
Table 2: Evaluating Model Fit and Growth Form Over Time Using Three-Level Multilevel Model 
Predicting a Discretionary Search During Traffic Stop for Officers in First Three Years  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) 
Time   .28*** (.04) -.33* (.13) -.37** (.12) 
Time2     .29*** (.06) .28*** (.05) 
Constant -4.29*** (.06) -4.60*** (.07) -4.46*** (.08) -4.37*** (.07) 
Random effects; Level 2 (N= 1,257) 
Level-2 Intercept SD .91 .84 .82 .51 
Random effects; Level 3 (N=419) 
Level-3 Intercept SD .96 .99 .99 .95 
Time SD 
   
1.15 
Time-Intercept Corr. -.27 
Time2 SD .24 
Time2-Intercept Corr. .17 
Time2 –Time Corr. -.99 
Observations (Level 1) 462,768 462,768 462,768 462,768 
Log Likelihood -51,566.98 -51,533.45 -51,524.86 -51,464.00 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 103,140.00 103,074.90 103,059.70 102,948.00 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 103,173.10 103,119.10 103,114.90 103,058.50 
Residual DF 465,480 465,479 465,478 465,473 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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3 than Model 2 indicating that a curvilinear model better fits the data. An ANOVA test 
comparing model fit showed that Model 3 fit the data more accurately than the linear trajectory 
model ( V$ =17.17, df=1, p<.001). Model 4 tests whether time and time2 should be included as 
random effects. The log likelihood, AIC, and BIC are lower in Model 4 compared to Model 3 
suggesting that the curvilinear trajectory varies between officers. The ANOVA test supports 
Model 4 as an improved fit over Model 3 ( V$ =121.71, df=5, p<.001). The best fitting trajectory 
for discretionary search rate over time is a quadratic growth model with random effects for time 
and time2.  
 
Main Effects 
Piecewise growth models including all covariates are shown in Table 3. Model 1 includes 
random intercepts and random slopes for time period 1 and time period 2. The fixed effect 
portion of Model 1 shows that the average officer does not change the rate that they search 
between their first and second year on the force (b=-.10, se=.07, p=.19). From the second to third  
year on the force, the average officer increases their rate of searching drivers (b=.42, se=.05, 
p<.001). The odds ratio for the second time period is 1.52 showing that searches increased 52% 
between the second and third years. This result supports the hypothesized increase in searches 
due to a promotion incentive (Hypothesis 3). Black officers (b=-.25, se=.20, p=.21) and non-
black POC officers (b=.01, se=.18, p=.95) do not differ from their white peers in how often they 
conduct discretionary searches. Female officers also do not differ from their male peers and 
officer age is not associated with discretionary searches. 
Black drivers are more likely to be searched than white drivers (b=.76, se=.02, p<.001). 
The odds ratio of black drivers being searched compared to white drivers is 2.14 which indicates  
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Table 3: Piecewise Growth Curve Models Predicting a Discretionary Search During Traffic Stop for 
Officers in First Three Years (N=462,768) 
 (1) (2) 
 b (se) b (se) 
Time Period 1 -.10 (.07) -.09 (.07) 
Time Period 2 .42*** (.05) .41*** (.05) 
Black Officer (Ref=White Officer) -.25 (.20) -.25 (.20) 
Non-Black Officer of Color .01 (.18) -.005 (.18) 
Officer Age (Mean centered) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
Female Officer (Ref=Male) -.11 (.19) -.14 (.19) 
Black Driver (Ref=White Driver) .76*** (.02) .89*** (.03) 
Female Driver (Ref=Male Driver) -1.06*** (.02) -1.06*** (.02) 
Driver Age (Centered at Age=25) -.04*** (.001) -.04*** (.001) 
Investigatory Stop (Ref=Moving Violation) 1.50*** (.05) 1.50*** (.05) 
Vehicle Equipment Violation -.15*** (.02) -.15*** (.02) 
Parked Stop -.20 (.26) -.20 (.26) 
Regulatory Stop -.01 (.03) -.01 (.03) 
Seatbelt Stop .13* (.06) .12* (.06) 
Safety Stop -.07 (.04) -.07 (.04) 
East Precinct (Ref=Central) .15* (.07) .14* (.07) 
Hermitage Precinct  .05 (.07) .02 (.07) 
Madison Precinct .38*** (.08) .36*** (.08) 
Midtown Hills Precinct -.01 (.07) -.02 (.07) 
North Precinct .25*** (.07) .24*** (.07) 
Other/Unlabeled Precinct .005 (.06) -.01 (.06) 
South Precinct .001 (.07) -.01 (.07) 
West Precinct .07 (.07) .05 (.07) 
Constant -4.08*** (.09) -4.14*** (.09) 
Random effects; Level 2 (N=419) 
Level-2 Intercept SD (U11)  1.06 1.15 
Time Period 1 SD(U++) 1.11 1.10 
Time Period 1 -Intercept Corr. (U1+) -.45 -.41 
Time Period 2 SD (U$$) .81 .80 
Time Period 2 -Intercept Corr. (U1$) -.18 -.13 
Time Period 2 –Time Period 1 Corr. (U+$) .18 .18 
Black SD (U99)  .44 
Black-Intercept Corr. (U19)  -.38 
Black- Time Period 1 Corr. (U+9)  -.07 
Black- Time Period 2 Corr. (U$9)  -.16 
Log Likelihood -47,499.72 -47,382.27 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 95,059.43 94,832.53 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 95,390.78 95,208.06 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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that the odds of a black driver being searched are more than twice as large as the odds that a 
white driver is searched when stopped by police. The predicted probability that a black driver is 
searched when all other variables are the reference category is 3.5% while the predicted 
probability of a white driver being searched is 1.7%. Women are less likely than men to be 
searched (b=-1.06, se=.02, p<.001) and older drivers are less likely to be searched than younger 
drivers (b=-.04, se=.001, p<.001). Compared to stops made for moving violations, investigatory 
stops (b=1.50, se=.05, p<.001) which are made based on a suspect or vehicle description are 
more likely to result in a search and stops initiated because the driver was allegedly not wearing 
a seatbelt were more likely to lead to a discretionary search (b=.13, se=.06, p<.05). Stops made 
for vehicle equipment violations (b=-.15, se=.02, p<.001) are less likely to result in a search than 
moving violations. There is also geographic variability in search probabilities with a higher 
likelihood of discretionary searches in East Precinct (b=.15, se=.07, p<.01), Madison Precinct 
(b=.38, se=.08, p<.001), and North Precinct (b=.25, se=.07, p<.001) compared to Central 
Precinct. 
Random effects in Table 3, Model 1 show that there is considerable variation among 
officers over time. The random intercept standard deviation (U11) is the amount of variability in 
the first year after the academy. A standard deviation of 1.06 means that between officers there is 
a great amount of variation with some officers searching at a rate higher than the norm. The time 
period 1 random slope (U++ = 1.11) and the time period 2 random slope (U$$ = .81) show the 
standard deviation of slope trajectories over time. The second time period is less variable than 
the first period but still has substantial variability in between officer slopes. The Time Period 1-
Intercept Correlation (U1+ =. ,45) is negative indicating that officers are tending toward more 
convergence in the second year compared to their first. The Time Period 2-Intercept Covariance 
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(U1$ = −.18) is also negative indicating convergence from year two to year three. Finally, the 
Time Period 2-Time Period 1 correlation (U+$ = .18) indicates that officers’ change from year 
one to two and their change from years 2 to three are moderately correlated. 
 
Driver race random effects 
Model 2 in Table 3 tests whether including a random slope for driver race improves the 
model fit. When driver race is added as a random effect, the model is a better fit with lower log 
likelihood, AIC and BIC. The fixed effect for the log odds of a black driver being searched 
increases from .76 in model 1 to .89 in model 2. The odds ratio increases from 2.14 to 2.43. The 
standard deviation of driver race random slope (U99 = .44) shows that officers vary in how they 
decide to conduct searches. Figure 2 plots conditional modes for each officer. Conditional modes 
are the difference between the population-average response given the fixed-effect values and the 
response predicted for a specific officer (Bates et al. 2015). The population average is graphed at 
the value of one in Figure 2 and deviations from the population are shown as box plots. The box 
plots show that there is more variance among white officers than black or non-black officers of 
color. Most officers fall close to the average effect but several officers are above average in 
searching black drivers. A few officers search at rates lower than their peers as well. Since 
including a random slope for driver race improves model fit, I estimate subsequent interaction 
models with a random slope for driver race. 
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Figure 2: Conditional Modes of Officers Showing Between-Officer Variability in Probability of 
Searching a Black Driver 
 
 
Interaction Effects 
Fixed Effects Interactions are shown in Table 4. All models include random intercepts, 
random time period slopes, and a random driver race slope. Model 1 estimates the interaction 
effect of officer race with time periods 1 and 2. The interaction terms between black officers and 
time period one (b=-.50, se=.28, p=.07) and black officer and time period two (b=-.41, se=.21, 
p=.05) approach statistical significance. When estimated separately, both reach statistical  
significance at the p<.05 level. The predicted slope over time by officer race is graphed in Figure 
3. In the first year after academy, the average black officer searches black drivers at a similar rate 
as white officers but reduces their search rate compared to white officers in their second year on 
the force. In the second period, black officers remain stable while white officers and non-black  
Table 4: Interaction Effects of Officer Race, Officer Gender, Race of Driver, and Time Predicting a 
Search (N=462,768) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) 
Time Period 1 -.03 (.08) -.17* (.09) -.09 (.07) -.11 (.09) 
Time Period 2 .44*** (.06) .52*** (.06) .41*** (.05) .51*** (.06) 
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Black Officer (Ref=White Officer) .12 (.25) -.25 (.20) -.25 (.23) .10 (.31) 
Non-Black Officer of Color .13 (.23) -.004 (.18) .07 (.20) .10 (.27) 
Black Driver (Ref=White Driver) .89*** (.03) .86*** (.07) .90*** (.04) .85*** (.08) 
Time Period 1 X Black Officer -.50† (.28)     -.41 (.34) 
Time Period 1 X Non-Black Officer of Color -.26 (.25)     -.35 (.30) 
Time Period 2 X Black Officer -.41† (.21)     -.59* (.28) 
Time Period 2 X Non-Black Officer of Color .09 (.18)     .42* (.21) 
Time Period 1 X Black Driver   .12 (.08)   .11 (.08) 
Time Period 2 X Black Driver   -.16*** (.05)   -.11* (.05) 
Black Officer X Black Driver     -.01 (.15) .02 (.26) 
Non-Black Officer of Color X Black Driver     -.09 (.12) .07 (.23) 
Time Period 1 X Black Officer X Black Driver       -.13 (.30) 
Time Period 1 X Non-Black Officer of Color X 
Black Driver       .14 (.25) 
Time Period 2 X Black Officer X Black Driver       .26 (.25) 
Time Period 2 X Non-Black Officer of Color X 
Black Driver       -.50
** (.16) 
Constant -4.18*** (.10) -4.12*** (.10) -4.15*** (.10) -4.16*** (.11) 
Random effects; Level-2 (N=419) 
Level-2 Intercept SD (U11)  1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Time Period 1 SD(U++) 1.09 1.11 1.10 1.09 
Time Period 1 -Intercept Corr. (U1+) -.40 -.40 -.41 -.40 
Time Period 2 SD (U$$) .79 .80 .80 .80 
Time Period 2 -Intercept Corr. (U1$) -.12 -.15 -.13 -.13 
Time Period 2 –Time Period 1 Corr. (U+$) .16 .18 .18 .16 
Black SD (U99) .44 .43 .43 .43 
Black-Intercept Corr. (U19) -.38 -.38 -.38 -.40 
Black- Time Period 1 Corr. (U+9) -.08 -.10 -.08 -.08 
Black- Time Period 2 Corr. (U$9) -.15 -.09 -.15 -.10 
Log Likelihood -47,377.47 -47,376.86 -47,381.95 -47,365.64 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 94,830.93 94,825.71 94,835.90 94,823.27 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 95,250.64 95,223.33 95,233.52 95,331.34 
Note: †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
  
 
officers of color increase their search rate in their third year. This interaction supports the 
hypothesis that black officers are less likely to raise their search rate when they are eligible for a 
promotion compared to white or non-black officers of color (Hypothesis 3a). 
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Figure 3: Percent of Drivers Searched Over Time by Officer Race 
 
Model 2 interacts time period with driver race and is graphed in Figure 4. In the first time 
period, black drivers are searched more often than white drivers but the slope from year one to 
year two remains stable. This pattern supports the hypothesis that statistical discrimination may 
underlie decisions to conduct discretionary searches because there is a consistent gap from the 
beginning of the officers’ time on the force (Hypothesis 2). In time period 2, the search rate of 
both white and black drivers increases but the increase is more pronounced for black drivers than 
white drivers. The rise for both groups supports bureaucratic promotions and the excess increase 
for black drivers compared to whites supports social conditioning theory. Model 3 does not find  
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Figure 4: Percent of Black and White Drivers Searched Over Time 
 
 
Figure 5: Percent of Drivers Searched Over Time by Officer Race and Driver Race 
significant effects of officer race interacted with driver race. Finally, the three-way interaction in 
Model 4 finds a significant effect for non-black POC officers searching black drivers in time 2. 
The interaction is plotted in Figure 5. The three-way interaction shows whether the trajectories of 
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officers by race differ between black and white drivers. The results indicate that white officers 
increase their rate of searching black drivers more than non-black officers of color from the 
second to third year. While both increase their rate of searching black drivers, the rise is more 
pronounced for white officers. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper investigates racial disparities in discretionary searches during traffic stops for 
new police officers in Nashville, Tennessee. Previous research suggests that there are differences 
in discretionary searches between white officers and non-white officers (Klahm and Tillyer 
2015; Rojek et al. 2012; Tillyer 2014; Tillyer and Engel 2013; Tillyer et al. 2012). By estimating 
piecewise growth curve models, this paper investigates average within-officer change over time 
as well as between-officer variability in deciding to search black and white drivers over the first 
three years as a police officer. Social conditioning theory suggests that experiences with racial 
minority community members while on the force are likely to increase racial disparity over time, 
especially for white officers (Smith and Alpert 2007). Statistical discrimination theory would 
suggest that previous biases would lead to a disparity in the first year on the force. A small 
disparity in the beginning of a career and a positive linear trajectory, would provide support for 
social conditioning theory. Discrimination theories are supplemented with bureaucratic 
promotion theory, which argues that officers have routinized career trajectories that are shaped 
by the rules of the bureaucracy as well as standardized measures of performance (Baron, Davis-
Blake, and Bielby 1986; Halaby 1978; Lipsky 1971). Since searches during traffic stops and 
arrests are incentivized as performance goals in the bureaucratic system, in anticipation of a 
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potential promotion officers are likely to increase productivity. A curvilinear trajectory in 
discretionary search activity with an increase in the third year would support this theory. 
The growth trajectory shows a curvilinear shape that is stable between years one and two on the 
force but rises substantially between years two and three. The trajectory shows the average 
officer effect over time. This result supports the proposition that the incentives from the 
organization affect how officers prioritize searches in their policing activity. There is also 
substantial heterogeneity between officers. The random effects suggest that the most divergence 
between officers occurs in their first year out of the police academy and diminishes slightly each 
year. Future research should more closely examine the variety of trajectories that an officer may 
take in the first years of their career. This analysis also does not assess whether the increased rate 
of searches actually leads to a higher probability of promotion. Additional research is needed to 
examine how performance metrics shape career advancement. 
The main effects models showed no differences in discretionary search patterns by officer 
race but the interaction models showed that black officers reduce their search rate relative to 
their white peers when examined over time. In the first year after the police academy, all officers 
conducted searches at similar rates. In the third year as an officer, white and non-black officers 
of color increased their search rates while black officers did not. Black officers may be less 
likely to increase their productivity in response to institutional incentives compared to white 
officers. Black officers have most likely experienced racism in their own lives and may have a 
better understanding of how aggressive policing can lead to resentment from community 
members (Bolton and Feagin 2004; LeCount 2017). Black officers may resist a “numbers 
driven” mentality that could lead to promotion within the law enforcement ranks. 
Black drivers are searched at twice the rate of white drivers even after controlling for 
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officer characteristics, the reason for the stop, the geographic location, driver age, driver gender, 
and accounting for unobserved officer-level variability. The persistence of the disparity shows 
that increased suspicion is placed on black drivers when officers conduct traffic stops. When 
officers exit the police academy, all racial groups of officers conduct searches of black drivers at 
about double the rate of white drivers. Antonovics and Knight (2009) argued that statistical 
discrimination was most likely if there were few officer-race differences in searches because 
they would all be applying the same set of biased facts. It is likely that statistical discrimination 
is a factor in producing the racial disparity between white and black drivers. Since black officers 
decline in their rate of searching black drivers, they may be resisting the commonplace 
association between violent crime rates and discretionary searches. The rate of increase for black 
drivers in the third year post-academy is greater than for white drivers. Social conditioning may 
be part of why the rate increases more for black drivers but the relative stability of the disparity 
shows that officers are instilled from the academy to approach black community members with 
higher suspicion, an example of statistical discrimination. In public statements about racial 
disparities, MNPD officials point to higher rates of serious violent crime to justify the higher rate 
of searches and arrests (Reicher 2016). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
National Incident Based Reporting System (2017), in 2017 7,682 violent crime incidents 
(homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) were known to MNPD. Of the 9,794 suspects 
in these crimes, 6,193 (63%) were black. Traffic stops and discretionary searches rarely find 
evidence of serious crime. Instead, they are most likely to find small amounts of drugs 
(Baumgartner, Epp, et al. 2018). Applying one statistic to justify higher suspicion of everyone in 
a group is statistical discrimination. 
There are several limitations to this analysis. One criticism of analyzing the probability of 
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conducting a search is that the population of drivers who are stopped is not a random sample of 
drivers (Baumgartner, Epp, et al. 2018; Fridell 2004; Neil and Winship 2019; Ridgeway and 
MacDonald 2010; Simoiu, Corbett-Davies, and Goel 2017). The sample of stopped drivers was 
taken from an unknown population of drivers that could vary based on the amount that they 
drive, access to vehicles, neighborhoods where they drive, and rule violating behavior. This 
limitation is commonly referred to as the “benchmarking problem” or “denominator problem” 
since the population of drivers at risk of being stopped is unknown. Once stopped the population 
of drivers at risk of a search is known but it is conditional on the unknown probability of the 
initial stop. Assuming that all stopped drivers have an equal probability of being searched is an 
unreasonable assumption. Controlling for stop reasons and the precinct in which the stop was 
made helps adjust for different search probabilities following a stop but the results may still 
reflect systematic differences in who was stopped. This method also does not directly test 
whether different thresholds of suspicion are applied to drivers of different races, only the 
proportion of drivers who were searched after they were pulled over (Neil and Winship 2019; 
Simoiu et al. 2017). Even with these limitations, this paper makes an important contribution to 
the literature on proactive policing by showing that officers have different longitudinal 
trajectories in how often they decide to search drivers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The decision to conduct a search at a traffic stop is influenced by not only the specifics of 
the officer-driver encounter but also the organizational policies that govern career trajectories. 
Bureaucracies operate with explicit rules on upward mobility and officers distinguish themselves 
based on quantifiable productivity measures. While socially conditioned bias may influence 
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some officers, there are broader trends of statistical discrimination and increasing the proportion 
of drivers being searched when becoming eligible for a promotion. Whether increasing 
productivity actually leads to a higher probability of promotion is an important area for future 
research. Administrators should be aware of how performance metrics translate into the 
community. Encouraging officers to conduct more searches or make more arrests is more likely 
to lower the suspicion applied to the suspect than it is to increase the number of suspicious 
people the officer stops. The findings also suggest that officer training should be evaluated and 
emphasis should be placed on avoiding assumptions about an individual based on group-level 
data. Statistical discrimination often feels rational but leads to an unfair application of the law in 
practice. As the bureaucrats that make street-level decisions about the law, police officers must 
balance community needs, administrative priorities, and their own career paths. Police reform 
requires focus on the many ways that police outcomes are shaped, including the organizational 
structure itself and the ways that officers are trained. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ARE DISCRETIONARY VEHICLE SEARCHES RACIALLY BIASED?: APPLYING THE 
HIT RATE AND THRESHOLD TEST TO NEW POLICE OFFICERS IN NASHVILLE, 
TENNESSEE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Whether and to what extent police officers discriminate against black and Hispanic drivers in 
their decisions to conduct discretionary vehicle searches is a challenging but important question 
for scholars and policy makers. Two primary tests are used to evaluate whether discrimination is 
occurring: the hit rate test and the threshold test. The hit rate test examines whether contraband is 
found at different rates on groups of drivers. If one group has a lower hit rate, the test indicates 
discrimination. The hit rate test is limited by the problem of infra-marginality—the possibility 
that distinguishing guilty from innocent drivers is easier for some groups than others—limiting 
its validity. The threshold test (Simoiu et al. 2017) aims to overcome infra-marginality by 
computationally inferring the suspicion threshold at which a search is initiated. This paper 
applies the hit rate test and the threshold test to rookie police officers over the first three years of 
their career in Nashville, Tennessee. Results from the hit rate test and threshold test are relatively 
consistent and indicate discrimination against black and Hispanic drivers. Over the first three 
years of an officer’s career, the hit rate and threshold for searches based on probable cause 
remains consistent yet racially disparate. When other forms of discretionary searches are 
included—i.e. consent-based searches—officers have a higher hit rate over time and raise their 
suspicion threshold increases for searching white drivers but not blacks and Hispanics. Together, 
the results show that police officers treat blacks and Hispanics differently than whites when 
deciding to conduct a search.   
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INTRODUCTION 
People of color in the United States are more likely than whites to have contact with police and 
regularly report unfair treatment or discrimination from police officers (Beckett 2016; Davis et 
al. 2018; Dottolo and Stewart 2008; Engel 2005; Glaser 2014; Stewart et al. 2009). Community 
members often cite baseless suspicion leading to a police action as an injustice (McLean and 
Worden 2017). Traffic stops–especially those based on pre-textual reasons (i.e. making a stop for 
a traffic code technicality to investigate the driver for a suspected crime)–can often seem 
unjustified and the driver may feel discriminated against (Baumgartner, Epp, et al. 2018; Epp et 
al. 2014; McLean and Worden 2017). When traffic stops result in a search, drivers are more 
likely to feel that the officer behaved inappropriately (Davis et al. 2018; Langton and Durose 
2013). This is especially true if the justification seems flimsy or unjustified. Numerous media 
(Balko 2018), government (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 2015; U.S. 
Department of Justice 2015, 2016), non-profit (American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of 
Massachusetts 2014; Gideon’s Army 2016), and academic (Baumgartner, Epp, et al. 2018; 
Dottolo and Stewart 2008; Epp et al. 2014; Harris 1999; Warren et al. 2006) sources show that 
blacks and Hispanics in the United States feel as though they experience heightened scrutiny 
from police, an experience of “driving while black or brown.” 
While many individuals report discrimination from police, scholars have sought to 
develop tests to determine whether and to what extent discrimination is occurring in police 
decisions. Rather than adjudicate single cases of discrimination, tests for racial bias seek to 
determine whether police are systematically discriminating against individuals using 
administrative data of police activity. Researchers also seek to separate discriminatory treatment 
from other non-discriminatory mechanisms that produce racial disparities in police contact (Neil 
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and Winship 2019; Ridgeway and MacDonald 2010). For instance, disparities in individual 
officers’ outcomes may occur because they are assigned to specific geographic areas (Neil and 
Winship 2019). Other potentially confounding factors are the unit assignment and job experience 
of police officers. Tillyer, Klahm, and Engel (2012) found that officers assigned to conduct 
primarily traffic stops were more likely to have racial search disparities than officers assigned to 
patrol more specific areas. Additionally, Tillyer and Klahm (2011) found that officers assigned 
to conduct traffic enforcement were less likely to find contraband when conducting a 
discretionary search as compared to officers who were assigned to patrolling specific areas. 
When assigned to specific areas, officers can develop first-hand knowledge of the issues within 
the community they patrol. The amount of time on the force and assignment history may also 
influence how often an officer decides to conduct searches or their accuracy in finding 
contraband (Klahm and Tillyer 2015). To account for these differences, this study focuses on 
new officers who are developing their policing skills who are all assigned to Patrol units. 
This study builds on previous research by investigating racial bias in police searches 
focusing on new officers assigned to Metro Nashville Police Department’s (MNPD) Patrol 
Division over the first three years of their career. All new officers in Nashville, Tennessee must 
be a patrol officer for three years before they are eligible for reassignment to another division. 
All officers, therefore, are in an equivalent position and their trajectories can be examined 
longitudinally. I conduct two analyses to make inferences about whether black, Hispanic, and 
white drivers are treated differently in decisions to conduct vehicle searches at traffic stops. First, 
I test whether officers find contraband at different rates when deciding to search a driver. Finding 
contraband at lower rates for one group during stops is interpreted as discriminatory because 
officers are applying different evidentiary standards to different groups (Knowles et al. 2001; 
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U.S. Department of Justice 2016). Using conditional logistic regression models with fixed effects 
for officers I examine whether officers improve their ability to find evidence over time and 
whether that change is equal for searches of white, black, and Hispanic drivers. I examine 
searches based on probable cause as well as discretionary searches more broadly. Second, I 
conduct a threshold test to examine whether decisions to conduct searches are due to differential 
suspicion or due to differential probabilities of drivers carrying contraband by race, a problem 
referred to as infra-marginality (Ayres 2002; Engel 2008; Engel and Tillyer 2008; Pierson, 
Corbett-Davies, and Goel 2017; Simoiu et al. 2017). While each test has limitations, together 
they help infer whether police officers decide to conduct searches of drivers equitably by race or 
ethnicity. There are two primary contributions of this paper to the research literature. First, I 
apply the hit rate test and threshold test to new officers in a longitudinal framework that shows 
how decision making changes over time. Understanding racial bias as a temporal process 
clarifies when bias is most likely and when interventions might be needed. Second, I focus the 
analysis on officers which shows how individual officers may be culpable for racial disparities or 
whether racially disparate treatment is a normative process in the department among patrol 
officers.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Decisions to conduct a search during a traffic stop have come under close scrutiny from 
researchers examining racial bias in police decisions. During a traffic stop, searches can be 
conducted for either discretionary or non-discretionary reasons. Non-discretionary reasons include 
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serving a warrant of a driver, searching a driver incident to arrest, and inventory searches1. In these 
cases, officers are required to search the vehicle. Since these searches do not require an estimation 
of the probability that a driver has contraband, discrimination is unlikely (Tillyer and Klahm 2011). 
In contrast, discretionary searches can be conducted based on probable cause, consent of the 
driver, or reasonable suspicion of weapons possession. Probable cause is the strictest standard that 
can be applied and it requires specific and articulable evidence that finding contraband is likely 
(Goldberg 2013; Ortman 2016). A common reason given to establish probable cause is the smell 
of marijuana which indicates that there is likely marijuana in the vehicle. Consent searches do not 
require any suspicion and can be conducted any time that an officer asks a driver for consent to 
search and the driver gives consent. Finally, if an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that 
there is a weapon in the car, he or she may conduct a protective search of areas were a weapon 
could be hidden. Since probable cause searches involve the strictest standard, this study tests for 
racial disparities in probable cause search outcomes specifically as well as discretionary search 
outcomes more generally. 
The decision to conduct a search is based on a variety of situational and contextual factors 
including behavioral cues, location, and the driver’s criminal record. Officers are trained to “look 
past the stop” to look for cues that suggest criminal activity (Armenta 2017). If an officer sees 
signs of criminal behavior, they determine whether the evidence meets the probable cause 
standard to conduct a coerced vehicle search. If the evidence does not meet the probable cause 
standard, they decide whether they will ask the driver for consent to search the vehicle. If the 
                                                
1 Warrant searches occur when the driver has an outstanding warrant for arrest. Searches incident to 
arrest are those that are conducted after arresting a driver. The most common reason is for driving under 
the influence (DUI). If a driver fails a roadside sobriety test, the officer arrests the driver and 
subsequently searches the vehicle. Inventory searches are conducted when impounding a vehicle. 
Searches incident to arrest and inventory searches overlap in their legal justification (Wallentine 2017). 
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same cues used to judge suspiciousness vary based on race, the officer would be racially 
profiling and discriminating against the driver. Two tests of discrimination have been proposed 
to examine whether drivers are facing discrimination, the hit rate test and the threshold test. 
 
Hit Rates 
Hit rates measure the rate at which officers find evidence of a crime when conducting a 
search. Measuring the outcome from a decision helps determine whether individuals are treated 
fairly throughout the process. Adapted from a test for discrimination in loan decisions (Becker 
1957), outcome tests are used in relation to policing, banking, housing, and other areas where 
outcomes may differ based on race. Assessing hit rates has been a common way to examine 
whether bias is present in decisions to conduct a search. The US Department of Justice (2016:53) 
in their investigation of the Baltimore Police Department said that, “the best measure of racial 
patterns in searches is a comparison of the rates at which officers find contraband during searches, 
or ‘hit rates.’” If officers are less likely to find contraband on one racial group of searched drivers, 
as was the case in the DOJ’s Baltimore investigation, that group is being discriminated against and 
searched with a lower standard of evidence. 
Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) formalized an economic version of the model that 
assumes an equilibrium is reached between officers deciding to conduct searches and drivers 
carrying contraband. They argue that, on the one hand, officers decide to conduct searches based 
on the efficiency of finding contraband and that not finding evidence is a cost to be avoided. On 
the other hand, drivers respond to the probability of being caught with contraband and will adjust 
their behavior accordingly. Given these conditions, an equilibrium will develop based on rational 
actors maximizing personal efficiency. Once an equilibrium is reached, if one racial group is 
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found with evidence less often, they would be experiencing discrimination. Knowles, Persico, 
and Todd (2001) did not find evidence of discrimination in their analysis of Maryland State 
Police from 1995 through 1999. Subsequent research reevaluating the model has argued that the 
strong assumptions about behavior of officers and drivers do not match the circumstances in 
which searches are conducted (Antonovics and Knight 2009; Ayres 2002; Close and Mason 
2007; Engel 2008; Engel and Tillyer 2008; Persico and Todd 2008). Small changes in the 
assumptions, for instance whether drivers in a racial group modify their contraband carrying 
behavior in response to race-specific search rates, can lead to large changes in the interpretation 
of whether discrimination exists (Engel 2008; Engel and Tillyer 2008). 
 
Limitations of the hit rate test 
Even though the DOJ has stated that hit-rates are good evidence of whether discrimination 
is occurring, a simple comparison of hit-rates by race may overestimate or underestimate bias 
because police priorities and deployment are often not considered (Ayres 2002; Engel 2008; Engel 
and Tillyer 2008; Neil and Winship 2019; Simoiu et al. 2017). Neil and Winship (2019) review 
several problems stemming from omitted variables that can influence outcome tests. For instance, 
if police are more likely to make stops in areas with high crime and those areas also have higher 
proportions of racial minorities, even without racial discrimination the search rate and hit rates 
could show racial disparities. Similarly, if police focus on specific offenses (i.e. gun possession) 
or specific types of offenders (i.e. gang members) they may be treating all people they contact with 
the trait equally but the racial distribution of the trait in society could lead analysts to declaring 
racial bias when none exists. These factors are often unobserved in administrative data but are 
important for estimating whether hit-rates differ by race due to discrimination. 
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Another limitation of the hit rate test is the infra-marginality problem (Ayres 2002; Engel 
2008; Engel and Tillyer 2008; Simoiu et al. 2017). Imagine the hypothetical scenario borrowed 
from Simoiu et al. (2017) where there are two types of white drivers and two types of black 
drivers. White drivers either have a 1% chance of carrying contraband or a 75% chance of 
carrying contraband. Black drivers either have a 1% or a 50% chance of carrying contraband. If 
officers search all drivers that have a 10% chance of contraband or higher, searches of whites 
will have a 75% hit rate whereas searches of blacks will result in a lower hit rate of 50%. The 
decision to conduct searches can use the same criteria but different probabilities of contraband 
possession could lead to unequal hit rates. This is an example of infra-marginality. To test for 
discrimination, we are concerned with the marginal cases when a person goes from being not 
suspicious enough to search to an officer deciding to conduct a search. Hit rates pool all searches 
regardless of whether the case is marginal or clear-cut. Of course, the probability of a driver in 
the population of all traffic stops possessing contraband is not a bimodal distribution. Officers 
will observe drivers on a spectrum of probabilities from 0 to 1. If a population has a larger 
variance (i.e. more people near the ends of the spectrum), it is easier to distinguish guilty from 
innocent individuals. This leads to fewer unnecessary searches and a higher hit rate than in a 
low-variance population where determining guilt is more difficult.  
 
Threshold Test 
Simoiu et al. (2017) develop a test for search thresholds in response to the problems of infra-
marginality and omitted variable bias in hit-rates. The threshold test assumes a model of decision 
making where an officer who has made a traffic stop uses all of the available contextual and 
behavioral information to estimate a probability, (\)), that the driver has contraband in the vehicle. 
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Taken together, these probabilities create a distribution of suspiciousness signals referred to as a 
signal distribution. Each officer is likely to have a threshold (3]) that, when exceeded by their 
estimated probability of contraband possession for each stop (\)), they will conduct a search of the 
driver (\) > 31 	⇒ a6<@=ℎ). The threshold test assumes thresholds are race-specific and fixed for 
each officer. If there is no bias, the threshold for each racial group should be equal. If the threshold 
for black drivers is lower than the threshold for white drivers (3H < 3e), black drivers are being 
discriminated against.  
The signal distribution and the thresholds are not observed and must be inferred from the 
data. To do this, a hierarchal Bayesian latent variable model estimates the unobserved signal 
distribution and search thresholds for each racial group within the primary hierarchical unit of 
analysis, in this case officers. The model is described in detail by Simoiu and colleagues (2017) 
and will be discussed briefly here. For each stop (4), there are four observed quantities: the 
driver’s race (@), the hierarchical unit of analysis which in this paper is the officer’s ID number 
(g), whether the stop resulted in a search (h) ∈ 	 {0, 1}), and whether contraband was found during 
the stop (l) ∈ 	 {0, 1}). The probability of finding evidence during any given stop (\)) is modeled 
as a random draw from a race- and officer-specific signal distribution. The inferred signal 
distribution is produced through both observed and unobserved processes therefore it accounts 
for omitted variable problems present in other forms of analysis. With the observed quantities 
and inferred signal distribution, the threshold can be calculated based on two assumptions. First, 
the search rate is the area under the signal distribution that is above the threshold for initiating a 
search. Second, the hit rate is the mean of the distribution conditional on being above the search 
threshold.  
The signal distribution is parameterized as a beta distribution with a mean !M] and a total 
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count parameter mM]. !M] represents the overall probability that a driver of race @ stopped by 
officer g will have contraband. mM] represents the heterogeneity across drivers of race @ stopped 
by officer g. Each officer has a threshold for searching each race of driver denoted as 3M]. If 3M] > \, the officer will conduct a search. For each stop, 4, whether a search occurs, h), and 
whether contraband is found, l), is generated through a stochastic process in three steps: 
1. Given the driver’s race, @), and the hierarchal unit of analysis, g), the officer observes a 
signal \) ∼ :63<(!M-]-, mM-]-), where !M-]- and mM-]- are defined as: !M] = ;gn43,+(!M + !]) 
and mM] = 6o\(mM + m]) 
2. A search is conducted (h) = 1) only if \) ≥ 3M-]- 
3. If h) = 1, then l) ∼ q6@rgD;;4(\)); otherwise l) = 0. 
The stochastic process is parameterized with !M , mM , !] , m] , and 3M] . Weakly 
informative priors are placed on all parameters. Finally, the posterior distribution of the parameters 
is estimated with Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling implemented in Stan (Carpenter et al. 2017) 
through the Rstan interface (Stan Development Team 2018). I sampled four Markov chains in 
parallel and judged convergence by potential scale reduction factors (Gelman and Rubin 1992) for 
all parameters being below 1.05 (s < 1.05) and visual inspection of the chains. 
Previous research implementing the threshold test has focused primarily on comparing 
police departments within states. Simoiu et. al’s (2017) initial publication of the threshold test 
implemented it with the 100 departments in the state of North Carolina that made the most traffic 
stops. They conducted a comparison of search rates and hit rates with the threshold test. All 
searches, including non-discretionary searches (i.e. warrant, incident to arrest), were included in 
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their analysis. Across the state, they found black and Hispanic drivers were searched more often 
than whites or Asians were, officers were less likely to find contraband on black or Hispanic 
drivers than on whites or Asians, and a lower threshold was applied to Black and Hispanic 
drivers than to white or Asian drivers. While the pooled results of the three tests across the state 
were consistent, they found that the hit-rate and threshold findings showed contradictory results 
in Raleigh. The hit rate test suggested discrimination against whites but the threshold suggested 
discrimination against blacks. Baumgartner, Christiani, et al. (2018) also conducted a threshold 
test on data from departments in North Carolina from 2002 to 2016 and tested whether there was 
an intersectional effect of race and gender on search thresholds. They found that black women 
were searched with similar thresholds to their white counterparts and the overall racial disparity 
was due to the concentration of low-suspicion searches of black men. Pierson et al. (2017) 
applied a hit rate test and the threshold test to a larger body of 60 million state patrol stops across 
the United States. They estimated search thresholds for the 100 counties with the most traffic 
stops in each state with the requisite data. In the hit rate test, they found that black and white 
drivers who are searched possessed contraband at the same rate (about 28% of searches) while 
Hispanics had a lower hit rate (22%). In contrast to the hit rate test, threshold tests within states 
generally showed lower thresholds for both black and Hispanic drivers compared to whites. 
 
Current Study 
In contrast to previous research, I estimate officer-specific hit rate tests and threshold tests. 
While location-based disparities are an important aspect of racial bias, another question is whether 
specific officers are biased. Previous implementations of both tests have focused on departments 
as a whole. I focus specifically on patrol officers in the first three years of their careers because 
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they are all in structurally equivalent positions within the police department and have the same 
level of experience. I also examine how hit rates and search thresholds change over time in the 
first three years of officers’ careers. The focus on patrol officers who are new to policing is a novel 
application of hit rate and threshold tests. Most research pools all officers within a jurisdiction; 
however, officers have different assignments that affect their enforcement actions. Job tenure may 
also impact hit rate because officers should become better able to distinguish between drivers who 
have contraband and those who do not as they gain professional experience. Officers are also likely 
to establish their own normative search thresholds in the foundational early years of their career. I 
test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Officers will be less likely to find contraband on black and Hispanic drivers than 
on whites. 
Hypothesis 2: Officers will become more successful at finding evidence on drivers over time. 
Hypothesis 3: Officers’ hit rate over time will improve more for white drivers than black or 
Hispanic drivers. 
Hypothesis 4: Officers will initiate a search of a black or Hispanic drivera with a lower 
threshold of suspicion than for white drivers. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
This paper is informed by several bodies of theory that are discussed in-depth in the first 
paper of this dissertation. Bias is not a static process but is a combination of preconceived ideas 
about groups—i.e. statistical discrimination—as well as a process of reinforcement through social 
experiences or social conditioning. In addition to processes that may lead to bias, the 
organizational structure in and of itself may contribute to the priorities officers place on conducting 
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searches. Smith and Alpert’s (2007) social conditioning theory argues that officers develop 
associations between racial minorities and crime through direct exposure to stressful interactions 
on the job. By repeated interactions with racial minority suspects, officers can develop an “illusory 
correlation” between race and criminality. Smith and Alpert (2007) do not distinguish between on 
the job exposure with stereotypes brought from previous experience and training on race and crime 
statistics. Statistical discrimination theory (Pager and Karafin 2009; Schwab 1986) argues that 
people make decisions using their perceptions of groups in search of efficiency. If, for example, a 
police officer knows that the majority of homicide suspects and victims in Nashville are black 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation 2017), he or she may be more likely to assume that a black driver 
could be involved in criminal activity. That assumption is statistical discrimination because it 
applies a group-level statistic to an individual encounter. In combination, statistical discrimination 
and social conditioning create a process where officers bring previous knowledge and stereotypes 
from their lived experiences and training and then, while interacting with suspects, those 
stereotypes can be confirmed or denied. When applied to hit rates, it is likely that officers become 
more accurate at finding evidence over time because they have had time to hone their skills. It is 
also likely that racial disparities change over time as well. If there is a gap in the first year, it is 
most likely that statistical discrimination is a contributing factor. If the hit-rate gap expands, social 
conditioning may be leading to more discrimination. In contrast, if the gap declines, social 
conditioning may be having an anti-discriminatory effect by exposing officers to racial minorities 
in a variety of contexts. 
Organizational structure may also contribute to decisions to conduct searches. Specifically, 
within a structured bureaucracy, promotion is guided by fixed and variable criteria (Halaby 
1978). In Nashville, one fixed criteria for new officers being promoted is that they must spend 
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three years on the force prior to being eligible for a promotion. Variable criteria includes 
productivity or the number of stops, searches, and arrests made by officers (Armenta 2017; B. N. 
Williams et al. 2003). Therefore, in the third year on the force, officers may be more likely to 
conduct searches with lower thresholds of suspicion. If this is the case, their hit rate would 
decline in the third year and their threshold for conducting a search would be lower in the third 
year. 
 
METHODS 
This analysis uses administrative data received through open records requests to Metro 
Nashville Police Department (MNPD). Two databases are used in the analyses that span 2010 to 
2017. First, records from all traffic stops conducted in the jurisdiction. Officers are required to 
submit an electronic form whenever a traffic stop is conducted. On the form, they indicate whether 
a search was conducted, the legal justification for the search, and whether evidence was found in 
the search. The second database is employee demographics and unit assignments. Officer race, 
gender, and age are included in the dataset as well as the precinct and unit assignment for every 
officer. Officers are selected for inclusion in the analysis if they were listed as a trainee as their 
first entry in the database and subsequently completed three years as an officer. Officers are 
required to complete three years to be eligible for a promotion. Since officers join the force in 
staggered cohorts, years on the force are calculated in relation to the first assignment after the 
training academy. 
A total of 417 officers were eligible based on joining the force and completing three years 
as an officer; however, 15 conducted no searches in the time period and are excluded from the 
analysis. The 402 included officers conducted 485,443 traffic stops that had complete data for 
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driver’s race, ethnicity, age, and the reason for the stop. Since this paper focuses on discretionary 
searches, 3,606 searches conducted for non-discretionary reasons (i.e. incident to arrest, warrant, 
or inventory) are excluded. For this paper, I focus on two types of searches, discretionary 
searches in general and searches conducted with probable cause. The hit rate analysis examines 
only the stops that led to a search, 13,871 discretionary searches and 4,840 probable cause 
searches. The threshold analysis uses all 481,937 stops meeting the above criteria to estimate the 
signal distribution. 
 
Measures 
For the hit-rate analysis, the dependent variable is whether evidence was found during the 
search. When conducting a search, officers select whether evidence was found (“yes” or “no”) and 
then they can optionally specify whether drugs, weapons, or other contraband were found. They 
do not specify the type or quantity of drugs or weapons found. I code a search as having a “hit” if 
the officer identifies that evidence was found and I do not disaggregate by type of evidence. 
Independent variables for the hit rate analysis include time which is measured as a continuous 
variable coded as 0, 1, or 2 based on the number of years the officer has been on the police force. 
Driver race/ethnicity is measured as two binary variables for black non-Hispanic drivers and 
Hispanic drivers. White non-Hispanic drivers are the reference category. Driver race/ethnicity is 
recorded based on officer perception. Tennessee driver’s licenses do not list race. Therefore, 
categorization is not based on racial or ethnic identity but on how an officer categorizes the 
driver. Driver gender is measured as female compared to male. Driver age is a continuous 
variable centered at age 25. The reason for the stop is a set of binary variables that adjust for the 
stated reason the officer initiated the traffic stop. Variables included in the model measure the hit 
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rate for investigatory stops, vehicle equipment violations, parked vehicle stops, regulatory stops, 
seatbelt stops, and safety stops compared to moving violations, which can include speeding or 
running a stop sign. 
The threshold test relies on four observed quantities: the driver’s race, the officer’s ID 
number, whether the stop resulted in a search, and whether contraband was found during the 
stop. All other quantities are produced through the Bayesian estimation procedure. 
 
Analysis 
Hit rate test 
The hit rate analysis aims to estimate the probability of finding evidence if a search is 
conducted in the first three years of an officer’s career. I estimate a conditional logistic regression 
model using the clogit() function in R’s survival package (Therneau 2015). The model estimates a 
fixed-effects logistic regression which holds constant unmeasured heterogeneity in the strata 
variable, officer ID number. Conditional logistic regression is fit using a conditional maximum 
likelihood estimator that uses only within-group variation (Allison 2005). Groups with no 
variability are excluded from the estimation. For instance, if an officer conducts two searches and 
finds evidence in both there is no variability in their outcome and they are excluded from the 
analysis. In the analysis of all discretionary searches, 61 officers found no evidence and three 
found evidence in 100% of their searches. In the probable cause analysis, 63 officers found no 
evidence and 35 found evidence in 100% of searches. The loss of information due to no variability 
in the outcome is a limitation of fixed effects models (Allison 2005). Alternate models estimated 
with Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) were tested and the results are substantively similar. 
GEE estimation produces population-averaged coefficients while conditional logistic regression 
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produces a subject-specific coefficient. Since the goal of this analysis is to estimate the pattern of 
officers over time, conditional logistic regression is the best choice for the analysis (Allison 2005). 
I test for racial disparities and time trends in contraband discovery rate for probable cause searches 
as well as all discretionary searches. To examine whether the time trends vary by driver 
race/ethnicity I estimate models that include two-way interaction effects. I include a fixed effect 
for the officer which adjusts for all time invariant characteristics of officers including, race, gender, 
and age. 
 
Search thresholds 
As discussed above, outcome tests such as the hit rate test are limited by the problem of 
infra-marginality. There is a possibility that black, Hispanic, and white drivers tend to give 
different signals of suspiciousness that could lead to erroneous conclusions from the hit-rate test. 
Using the threshold test (Simoiu et al. 2017), I examine search thresholds for individual officers. 
I estimate the models on probable cause searches specifically as well as all discretionary searches 
more generally. Finally, I estimate a threshold model on each of the first three years of officers are 
on the force to examine how thresholds change in response to bureaucratic promotion theory. To 
test for racial or ethnic differences in the posterior threshold distributions, I compute the difference 
between the implied threshold for whites and the comparison group at each step of the MCMC 
chain. This process is similar to comparing group means where, after subtracting one from the 
other, zero indicates no difference; however, this method computes the difference on 2,000 MCMC 
samples creating a probability distribution for group differences. From this distribution, I calculate 
the highest density interval (HDI) to quantify the probability that the thresholds are equal 
(Kruschke 2011). If a 95% HDI of the difference distribution does not include zero, the likelihood 
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that the thresholds are equal is less than 2.5%. An important advantage of Bayesian methods is the 
ability to calculate the percent of samples below zero to better quantify the likelihood of a null 
finding. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the stops and searches conducted by officers in the 
sample. The left column includes all stops conducted, the center column includes all discretionary 
searches, and the right column includes only probable cause searches. Officers conducted 481,937  
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Stops, Discretionary Searches, and Probable Cause 
Searches 
 Stops All Discretionary Searches 
Probable Cause 
Searches 
 N/mean %/(SD) N/mean %/(SD) N/mean %/(SD) 
Total 481,937  13,871  4,840  
Evidence Found 3,307 1% 3,307 24% 2,423 50% 
Black Driver 205,326 43% 8,772 63% 3,304 68% 
Hispanic Driver 29,036 6% 735 5% 246 5% 
White Driver 247,575 51% 4,364 31% 1,290 27% 
Female Driver 195,667 41% 2,984 22% 1,100 23% 
Driver Age 37 (14.0) 30 (11.1) 27 (9.3) 
Moving Violation 184,766 38% 5,049 36% 1,784 37% 
Investigatory Stop 6,212 1% 771 6% 273 6% 
Vehicle Equipment 
Violation 168,796 35% 4,383 32% 1,590 33% 
Parked Stop 631 0% 17 0% 8 0% 
Regulatory Stop 53,470 11% 1,513 11% 484 10% 
Seatbelt  8,490 2% 454 3% 166 3% 
Safety 57,701 12% 1,571 11% 493 10% 
 
traffic stops, 13,871 discretionary searches and 4,840 probable cause searches. They found 
evidence in 3,307 discretionary searches (24%) and 2,423 probable cause searches (50%). Black 
officers made 30,960 stops (6%), 576 discretionary searches (4%), and 196 probable cause 
searches (4%). Non-black officers of color made 46,803 stops (10%), 1,375 discretionary searches 
(10%) and 500 probable cause searches (10%). White officers made 404,174 stops (84%), 11,920 
   73 
discretionary searches (86%) and 4,144 probable cause searches (86%). Black drivers composed 
43% of all stops, 86% of discretionary searches, and 86% of probable cause searches. Hispanic 
drivers composed 6% of all stops, 5% of discretionary searches, and 5% of probable cause 
searches. White drivers composed 51% of all stops, 31% of discretionary searches, and 27% of 
probable cause searches. Female drivers were stopped 195,667 times (41%), searched 2,984 times 
based on all discretionary reasons (22%), and 1,100 times based on probable cause (23%). The 
mean age of drivers stopped was 37 (SD=14), drivers searched for all discretionary reasons were, 
on average, 30-years-old (SD=11.1), and those who were searched based on probable cause were 
27-years-old (SD=9.3) on average. The most common reason for a stop is a moving violation, a 
total of 184,766 stops (38%), followed by vehicle equipment violations, 168,796 stops (35%). 
These categories are also the most common for searches. Of the discretionary searches, 5,049 
(36%) were conducted during a moving violation and 4,383 (32%) during a vehicle equipment 
violation stop. For probable cause searches, 1,784 (37%) were conducted during a moving 
violation and 1,590 (33%) during a vehicle equipment violation stop. 
 
Fixed Effects 
Table 6 shows estimates from fixed effects models predicting discovery of contraband in 
searches. Model 1 predicts the likelihood of finding contraband during all discretionary searches 
while Model 3 includes only searches conducted based on probable cause. When examining all 
discretionary searches, officers become more successful at finding evidence over time. Model 1 
estimates that an officer will improve their hit rate 25% each of their first two years on the force. 
Officers are less likely to discover contraband on black or Hispanic drivers than on white drivers. 
Given a search, and holding all time invariant officer characteristics constant, the odds of an officer 
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finding evidence on a black driver are 19% lower than the odds of finding evidence on a white 
driver. For Hispanic drivers, discretionary searches are less likely to find contraband than searches 
of whites. The odds of finding contraband during a discretionary search of a Hispanic driver are 
24% lower than when a white driver is searched. 
Turning to probable cause searches (Model 3), hit rates do not increase over time. The 
coefficient for time in Model 2 measures within-officer change over time and shows that, in 
general, more experience is not associated with finding evidence more often when conducting 
probable cause searches. Contraband is less likely to be found on black and Hispanic drivers than 
on whites during probable cause searches. The odds of finding contraband on a black driver 
during a probable cause search are 33% lower than the odds that a white driver will have  
contraband. Similarly, the odds that a Hispanic driver has evidence in a probable cause search 
are 24% lower than for whites. 
 
Interaction models 
Table 6 shows two-way interaction effects of time with driver race/ethnicity. Fixed effects 
for officers are included in all interaction models. Model 2, showed graphically in Figure 6, finds 
that the hit-rate disparity in all discretionary searches between white drivers and black and 
Hispanic drivers declines over time. There is a positive slope over time for all groups indicating 
that officers are better able to discover evidence with more experience but the increase is greater 
for drivers of color. The groups converge over time but there is still a disparity between white and 
non-white drivers. This result supports a positive interpretation of social conditioning theory. With 
more experience, officers become less biased in their decision making. In regard to probable cause 
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searches, the interaction terms in Table 6, Model 4 show that the hit rate for probable cause 
searches does not differ by race/ethnicity over time. 
Table 6: Conditional Logistic Regression Estimates Predicting Probability of Finding Contraband in 
Traffic Stop Search 
 All Discretionary Searches Probable Cause Searches 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time .22*** .13** .04 -.04 
 (.03) (.05) (.04) (.06) 
Black Driver -.21*** -.39*** -.40*** -.58*** 
 (.04) (.10) (.05) (.13) 
Hispanic Driver -.27** -.72** -.27* -.67* 
 (.09) (.26) (.11) (.34) 
Female .01 .01 -.07 -.07 
 (.04) (.04) (.05) (.05) 
Driver Age (Centered at age 25) -.01*** -.01*** .001 .001 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Investigatory Stop (Ref=Moving 
Violation) 
.15 .15 .14 .15 
(.08) (.08) (.10) (.10) 
Vehicle Equipment Violation -.07 -.07 -.06 -.06 
 (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) 
Parked Stop .89* .91* .66 .66 
 (.37) (.37) (.43) (.43) 
Regulatory Stop -.19** -.19** -.002 -0.0000 
 (.06) (.06) (.08) (.08) 
Seatbelt Stop -.11 -.11 -.16 -.16 
 (.11) (.11) (.13) (.13) 
Safety Stop -.04 -.04 -.05 -.05 
 (.07) (.07) (.08) (.08) 
Time X Black Driver  .12 †  .12 
  (.06)  (.08) 
Time X Hispanic Driver  .29†  .25 
  (.15)  (.19) 
Observations 13,871 13,871 4,840 4,840 
Hits 3,307 3,307 2,423 2,423 
Note: †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Figure 6: Within Officer Change in All Discretionary Search Hit Rate by Driver Race/Ethnicity 
Over Time 
 
Threshold Analysis 
Table 7 gives the number of stops, search rate, and hit rate for the threshold test. The number 
of stops differs because officers without searches of a group are excluded from the group’s 
estimation. Comparing search and hit rates in Table 7 indicates that both black and Hispanic drivers 
are searched more often than whites and contraband is less likely to be found. The hit-rate disparity 
is particularly large for probable cause searches. These figures are consistent with the results of 
the fixed effects models, which showed lower hit rates for black and Hispanic drivers as compared 
to whites. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Number of Stops, Search Rates and Hit Rates organized by Search Type 
(Columns) and Unit of Analysis (Rows) 
All Discretionary Search Probable Cause Search 
 Stop count 
Search 
rate 
Hit 
rate   
Stop 
count 
Search 
rate 
Hit 
rate  
White 234,705 1.9% 26% White 180,648 0.7% 61% 
Black 201,647 4.4% 23% Black 185,122 1.8% 46% 
Hispanic 20,625 3.6% 21% Hispanic 13,121 1.9% 47% 
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Recall that the threshold test predicts race-specific search thresholds by drawing from a 
posterior signal distribution of drivers’ likelihood of carrying contraband. Each officer has a race 
specific threshold (3M]) which is then weighted based on the number of stops made to produce a 
single predicted threshold and signal distribution. The threshold is represented as percentage 
indicating the probability of contraband possession required for an officer to initiate a search. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 shows predicted thresholds and 95% HDIs for each test. As expected, the 
thresholds for conducting a search when examining all discretionary searches are substantially 
lower than for probable cause searches. The 95% HDIs are narrower when all discretionary 
searches are combined (± 2-4%) than when probable cause searches are examined alone (± 4-
20%). The threshold for searching Hispanic drivers (1% all discretionary; 18% probable cause) is 
lower than for whites (8% all discretionary; 36% probable cause) and the 95% HDIs do not 
overlap which indicates discrimination against Hispanic drivers. Officers require less suspicion 
of contraband possession to conduct a search of a Hispanic driver than a white driver. The 
threshold for all searches of 1% indicates that officers need little, if any, suspicion to pursue a 
search. The thresholds for black drivers (6% all discretionary; 26% probable cause) are lower 
than for whites (8% all discretionary; 36% probable cause). The 95% HDIs overlap in both 
Table 8: Search Thresholds and Highest Density Intervals (HDI) organized by Search 
Type 
All Discretionary Search Probable Cause Search 
 Search Threshold 95% HDI  
Search 
Threshold 95% HDI 
White 8% (4.5%, 11.1%) White 36% (29.1%, 43.6%) 
Black 6% (3.5%, 7.7%) Black 26% (20.6%, 30.0%) 
Hispanic 1% (0.0%, 3.1%) Hispanic 18% (4.9%, 27.8%) 
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cases. One advantage of Bayesian methods is the ability to calculate the proportion of MCMC 
samples that could lead to an equal threshold between groups or a lower threshold for whites. For 
all discretionary searches, white and black thresholds differ on average by 2.4% and overlap in 
7.1% of samples. White and Hispanic thresholds differ by 6.7% and overlap in 0.5% of samples. 
For probable cause searches, white and black thresholds differ on average by 10.6% and overlap 
in 1% of samples. White and Hispanic thresholds differ by 18.7% and overlap is 0.6% of 
samples. White-Hispanic threshold differences clearly show a lower standard of evidence being 
applied to searches of Hispanic drivers compared to whites. White-black threshold differences 
show that, especially during probable cause searches, a lower standard of evidence is applied to 
black drivers compared to whites. When examining all discretionary searches, the white-black 
difference is relatively small and while most posterior samples indicate a lower threshold for 
black drivers, there is considerable uncertainty with 7.1% of samples showing equal or higher 
thresholds for black drivers. 
In addition to an average search threshold across officers, each officer has a predicted 
race-specific threshold for conducting a search. Figure 7 plots implied search thresholds for  
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Figure 7: Implied Officer Thresholds, All Discretionary Searches 
 
 
Figure 8: Implied Officer Thresholds, Probable Cause Searches 
 
 
officers by driver’s race/ethnicity for all discretionary searches and Figure 8 plots probable cause 
searches. Each officer is represented by a circle which is sized by the number of stops he or she 
made. On the x-axis is the threshold needed for a white driver to be searched. On the y-axis is the 
threshold for a racial or ethnic minority driver. The dashed line on the diagonal would indicate 
parity in search thresholds. For all discretionary searches, there is more heterogeneity between 
officers when searching white drivers (x-axis) than there is when searching either black or 
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Hispanic drivers (y-axis). The black-white comparison shows that many officers are clustered 
around the parity line but a large portion of officers are also applying a lower threshold to black 
drivers. The Hispanic-white comparison shows very high consistency among officers searching 
Hispanics with less suspicion than whites. Plotting predicted officer thresholds for probable 
cause searches (Figure 3) show similar results. The black-white comparison for probable cause 
search thresholds is clearly below the diagonal indicating a lower threshold for black drivers. 
The Hispanic-white comparison also is below the diagonal indicating discrimination.  
 
Figure 9: Empirical Cumulative Density Function of Differences Between White Officers and 
Black Officers: All Discretionary Searches (Left), Probable Cause Searches (Right) 
 
 
 
Another way to visualize how individual officers differ in their search threshold toward 
groups is by subtracting the threshold for minority drivers from the threshold for white drivers 
for each officer. A positive difference indicates that whites have a higher search threshold than 
the minority group. The resulting empirical cumulative density function for each difference is 
shown in Figure 9. Each dot represents one officer and the vertical line represents an equal 
threshold applied to minority and white drivers. The left panel shows threshold differences for all 
discretionary searches. For black drivers, 89 (24.2%) officers apply a higher or equal threshold to 
whites than blacks in all discretionary searches and the median officer has a threshold for blacks 
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that is 1.7% lower than for whites. For Hispanic drivers, only two officers (1%) apply a higher 
threshold to whites than Hispanics and the median officer has a threshold for Hispanics that is 
5.8% lower than for whites. The right panel of Figure 4 shows threshold differences for probable 
cause searches. Only four officers (1.6%) have a threshold for blacks that is greater than or equal 
to their threshold for whites and the median officer has a threshold for blacks that is 10.6% lower 
than for whites. Only one officer (1%) has a threshold for Hispanics that is greater than or equal 
to their threshold for whites and the median officer has a threshold for Hispanics that is 18.7% 
lower than for whites. Figure 4 shows that the majority of officers apply lower thresholds to 
black and Hispanic drivers than they do for whites.  
 
Figure 10: Signal distribution and Predicted Search Thresholds: All Discretionary Searches 
(Left), Probable Cause Searches (Right) 
 
 
Finally, average inferred signal distributions and search thresholds are plotted in Figure 
10. The signal distributions show the officer-weighted probability of drivers possessing 
contraband. In both plots, the signal distribution shows that at low levels of suspicion, more 
black drivers display signals of suspiciousness. Since the signal distribution takes unobserved 
variability into account there could be many factors contributing to the difference. On the 
officers’ side, they may be assuming that blacks are more suspicious due to racial bias or their 
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previous experiences with blacks as suggested by social conditioning theory. Black drivers may 
be more likely than whites to be nervous around police, which can be interpreted as suspicious 
behavior. White and Hispanic drivers have very similar signal distributions but are searched with 
a lower threshold than whites. These results provide strong evidence that Hispanics are 
discriminated against in search decisions and suggest that black drivers face discrimination 
particularly when officers allege probable cause. 
 
Threshold change over time 
 
Figure 11: Search thresholds and 95% HDI by Driver Race/Ethnicity and Time 
 
 
One potential factor that could influence racial discrimination is how long officers have been 
on the force. The results reported in the previous section pool all three years on the force. When 
models are estimated by year, the numbers of stops and searches decreases and the error increases 
but the results can help illustrate trends. Figure 11 shows the inferred average threshold estimated 
each year after the training academy. For all discretionary searches, officers apply a similarly low 
threshold to all racial/ethnic group—if they have any suspicion, they pursue a search. Over time, 
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the threshold for whites increases while the threshold for black drivers and Hispanic drives both 
remain lower. By year three, the 95% HDI for the white threshold no longer overlaps with the 
highest density interval for Hispanic drivers indicating discrimination. For probable cause 
searches, the thresholds remain relatively stable over time. With the reduced sample size, the HDIs 
are large but the thresholds show the same pattern of the pooled model with whites having the 
highest threshold followed by black drivers and Hispanic drivers. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper investigated racial bias in police decisions to conduct searches during officers’ 
first three years on the force. Two tests for bias were conducted. The hit rate test has been a 
common test for racial bias in searches but has also faced controversy because of significant 
limitations (For a review see Engel 2008). This paper applies the hit rate test as a longitudinal 
trajectory of officers using a fixed effects model adjusting for observed and unobserved time 
invariant officer characteristics (Allison 2005). The hit rate test suffers from several forms of bias 
including omitted variable bias and infra-marginality (Ayres 2002; Engel 2008; Engel and Tillyer 
2008; Neil and Winship 2019; Simoiu et al. 2017). Simoiu and colleagues (2017) developed an 
alternate test, the threshold test, which sidesteps the limitations of the hit rate test through 
estimation of a hierarchal Bayesian latent variable model. The model infers the amount of 
suspicion an officer would need to initiate a search on drivers of different races or ethnicities. In 
contrast to previous research that applies the threshold model to geographic units (departments or 
counties), I apply the model to rookie police officers in the first three years of their careers with 
officers as the hierarchal unit of analysis. I also compare two different categories of searches, 
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probable cause searches and a more general category of discretionary searches which includes 
searches based on alleged probable cause, consent, and protective frisks. 
Results from the hit rate and threshold test are relatively consistent and show 
discrimination in search decisions against black and Hispanic drivers. The hit rate analysis shows 
that officers are better able to find evidence over time when all discretionary searches are 
combined but not when probable cause searches are examined in isolation. The improvement 
seen in discretionary searches shows that officers have more success over time in searches where 
their discretion is highest; however, the hit rate for non-probable cause searches is low. Probable 
cause searches produce contraband in 50% of searches but when including other non-
discretionary searches the hit rate is only 24% meaning that searches without probable cause 
produce evidence infrequently. There is slightly more improvement in searches of black and 
Hispanic drivers but the higher hit rate for whites is consistent. Probable cause is the highest 
standard of evidence that officers apply when conducting a vehicle search. If the hit rate for 
probable cause searches is stable, that indicates that they are consistently applying probable 
cause criteria from the academy onward. Black and Hispanic drivers have lower hit rates in 
probable cause searches. Overall, the hit rate analysis suggests that racial bias is occurring in 
search decisions. These findings support a substantial body of research finds that racial bias from 
police officers is common but is novel by focusing on how hit rates change over a career 
trajectory.  Due to the limitations of the test the results should be triangulated using the threshold 
test. 
Results from the threshold test support the findings of the hit rate test. The clearest 
finding is that the threshold used to search Hispanics is substantially lower than the threshold 
used to search whites. This result is consistent with Armenta’s (2017) research on policing of 
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Latinos in Nashville where officers’ decisions often “hinged on whether [officers] believed 
Latino men were workers or possible gang members” (68). When there was a language barrier, 
officers often erred on the side of suspicion. The threshold test shows that almost no suspicion is 
needed to pursue a discretionary search with a Hispanic driver. The threshold for probable cause 
searches of Hispanics is considerably lower than for whites. 
For black drivers, the threshold for probable cause searches is lower than for whites 
which suggests that being black adds to suspiciousness. The inferred signal distribution indicates 
that officers perceive a greater portion of the black drivers they stop as potentially carrying 
contraband. Similarly, the hit rate test showed a larger disparity in hit rate between black and 
white drivers when examining probable cause searches compared to all discretionary searches. 
This finding is also consistent with research showing that in the United States blackness is 
associated with suspiciousness (Davis 2017; Eberhardt 2019; Eberhardt et al. 2004; Thompson 
and Bobo 2011). For discretionary searches overall, the threshold is likely lower for blacks than 
whites but not to a large degree. The difference between probable cause searches and all 
discretionary searches points to the importance of disaggregating by search types since different 
results can be found when multiple search types are pooled. 
In the broader context of research on racial bias in police searches, these findings add 
additional evidence that discrimination against racial minorities, especially blacks and Hispanics, 
by police is common. Whites are given the benefit of the doubt from officers while racial and 
ethnic minorities are not. Officer-specific predicted thresholds show that officers are relatively 
consistent in their lower search threshold for racial and ethnic minorities. For whites, officers 
vary with a wide range of thresholds being applied. Over time, officers are changing their 
discretionary search threshold with whites but are keeping their thresholds for black and 
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Hispanic drivers relatively stable. If higher thresholds are being applied to whites, they could be 
less likely to be caught with contraband than a black driver giving the exact same signals to 
police officers. Threshold differences could be a contributing factor leading to the 
overrepresentation of people of color in the criminal justice system for minor offenses. 
There are several limitations to this analysis. Administrative data can often underestimate bias 
since there is no information about people who were not stopped by police (Knox et al. 2019). 
The unknown “at-risk” population can systematically bias outcomes and the direction of bias can 
be difficult to predict (Hannon 2019). A focus on post-stop outcomes should reduce the impact 
of the unknown population who was not stopped but the unknown population on the roads is still 
a concern (Fridell 2004). The threshold test should reduce some of the bias from the at-risk 
population problem because unobserved processes are accounted for when sampling the 
posterior signal distribution. Further research should examine how well the threshold test adjusts 
for underlying bias in data. Administrative records also assume accuracy on the part of officers 
filling out paperwork. It is likely that officers differ in their classification of searches. It is 
common for officers to identify searches as both consent-based and probable cause-based. In this 
study, if probable cause was selected, the search was counted as a probable cause search 
regardless of other selected categories. If officers conducted searches without indicating that a 
search was conducted, the results would be biased and overestimate the hit rate or threshold 
assuming that unrecorded searches did not yield contraband. Limitations of the hit rate analysis 
include infra-marginality and omitted variable bias, both of which the threshold test aims to 
reduce. The threshold test has its own limitations. The level of aggregation (i.e. officers, units, 
patrol zones, precincts, counties, police jurisdictions, states) may show different thresholds 
because policies and practices may vary at different levels (Neil and Winship 2019; Simoiu et al. 
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2017). It is also not clear what magnitude of threshold difference should be interpreted as bias. 
This study finds a 2% difference between whites and black when examining all discretionary 
searches. It is unlikely that this difference is random based on comparing the posterior 
distributions but it is not clear whether the difference has a substantive difference. This study, to 
my knowledge, is the first to apply the threshold test at the officer level and finds that thresholds 
vary more for white drivers than black drivers. Focusing on the individuals who are making the 
decisions can be useful for identifying whether bias is due to several officers or is systematic 
across the department. These results lend support to the contention that bias is systematic rather 
than caused by a few “bad apples.” 
 
CONCLUSION 
Racial justice advocates in the United States have called attention to the ways that police 
treat people of color differently from whites. The tools researchers use to show the extent of bias 
have faced a number of significant limitations but the multiple methods used in this paper paint a 
picture of disparate, discriminatory treatment of black and Hispanic drivers in Nashville, 
Tennessee. Police administrators, officers, policy makers, and advocates should work to make 
changes to officer training and monitoring procedures to ensure that all people are treated equally. 
Searches will never be 100% accurate at finding evidence but the standard used to make decisions 
to conduct searches can be improved and applied more consistently across population groups. 
Creating equity in policing is a long-term project that will require extensive social change as well 
as analysis to track the efficacy of policy changes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
UNFAIR TREATMENT BY POLICE, NEIGHBORHOOD PROACTIVE POLICING, AND 
MENTAL HEALTH IN NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 In an effort to combat crime, police agencies target specific areas for proactive, aggressive 
enforcement strategies. Targeted proactive policing has been cited as a reason why racial 
minorities report unfair or discriminatory treatment from police officers more often than whites. 
Recent research suggests that both aggressive policing and police mistreatment may undermine 
psychological wellbeing. This paper examines the effect of personal and vicarious unfair 
treatment by police (UTBP) and neighborhood proactive policing on depressive and anxiety 
symptoms for a sample of black and white residents of Nashville, TN. The results show that 
personal and vicarious UTBP is more likely to occur to blacks than to whites. Personally 
experienced UTBP is associated with increased depressive symptoms for blacks but not for 
whites in models split by race. Similarly, proactive policing is associated with a higher risk of 
depressive symptom for blacks prior to controlling for socioeconomic status but is not associated 
with depressive symptoms for whites. Neither unfair police treatment nor proactive policing are 
associated with anxiety symptoms. Interaction models show that living in high proactive policing 
areas is a greater risk for depressive symptomatology when UTBP has been personally 
experienced. Together, the results show that police mistreatment is not only commonly reported 
but undermines certain forms of mental health for black residents of Nashville. The findings 
support a growing body of research suggesting that both experiences of police mistreatment and 
police practices undermine psychological wellbeing for black Americans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Police officers are given the power to detain, search, and arrest people that they suspect are 
violating the law—by force, if necessary. For many black people in the United States, police 
shootings of black men and women represent the worst fear of what can happen to their family, 
friends, or themselves when interacting with police (Bor et al. 2018). Even without force, police 
contact can be invasive, frightening, and detrimental to future life plans (Fagan and Ash 2017; 
Geller and Fagan 2019; Tyler, Jackson, and Mentovich 2015). If someone has experienced unfair 
treatment by police in the past, they are likely to be more concerned about the possibility that 
future interactions could also be unfair or discriminatory. Additionally, if they also live in an 
aggressively policed neighborhood, their distress could be more pronounced. The exposure to 
unfair treatment by police and aggressively policed neighborhoods has been linked to a variety of 
deleterious health outcomes, especially for blacks (DeVylder et al. 2017, 2018; Geller et al. 
2014; Geller, Fagan, and Tyler 2017; McFarland, Taylor, McFarland, et al. 2018; McFarland, 
Taylor, and McFarland 2018; Oh, DeVylder, and Hunt 2017; Sewell 2017; Sewell and Jefferson 
2016; Sewell, Jefferson, and Lee 2016). The stress associated with discrimination from police 
and the chronic strain of living in highly policed neighborhoods are both potential stressors that 
could influence the psychological wellbeing of black people in the United States.  
Unequal policing between black and white communities is not a new phenomenon but a 
reflection of historic and current racial inequities. Racial inequalities in policing are multifaceted 
and take place on both the individual as well as neighborhood levels (Braga et al. 2019; Braga 
and Weisburd 2010). On the individual level, police officers are more likely to stop and search 
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blacks compared to whites in the United States (Alexander 2012; Ariel and Tankebe 2016; 
Baumgartner, Epp, et al. 2018; Davis et al. 2018; Epp et al. 2014; Langton and Durose 2013). 
There is little debate among scholars that black people have disproportionate rates of police 
contact relative to whites. Black people often report increased police scrutiny as discriminatory 
and are less likely to turn to police for protection than whites (Avakame, Fyfe, and McCoy 1999; 
Desmond, Papachristos, and Kirk 2016; Kirk and Papachristos 2011; Weitzer and Tuch 1999). 
Even though black people see disproportionate police contact as discriminatory, scholars debate 
whether the increased risk is due to racial bias on the part of officers or from non-race-based 
policing decisions targeting specific locations (Braga et al. 2019; Fridell 2004; Gumbhir 2007; 
Rojek et al. 2012).  
Social psychologists often argue that police officers have implicit biases against racial 
minorities that lead to differential, unfair treatment and more punitive outcomes (Eberhardt 
2019; Eberhardt et al. 2004; Glaser 2014; Voigt et al. 2017). Individual interactions with police 
officers that a community member perceives as discriminatory or unfair is referred to as unfair 
treatment by police (hereafter UTBP) in this paper. The definition of UTBP used in this paper 
does not measure an officer’s actions or the severity of police treatment but rests on the 
perception of respondents as having been unfairly treated during an encounter with police. I 
return to the subjectivity of the measure in the discussion section toward the end. While bias 
occurs in police-public interactions, the neighborhood-level strategies that police use to combat 
crime may also expose communities to police contact at different rates. Criminologists have 
shown that crime is often concentrated within specific parts of urban areas and police target these 
hot spots with proactive law enforcement strategies (Braga et al. 2019; Braga and Weisburd 
2010; Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012). Proactive policing—encompassing a variety of 
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aggressive, location-specific crime reduction tactics—aims to deter crime by seeking out people 
breaking the law and making police visible in areas where crime is likely to occur. Deterrence, 
however, does not only impact those likely to commit crimes but spills over onto entire 
communities.  
Research on the health correlates of UTBP and proactive policing practices has examined 
the two phenomena separately. UTBP has been measured in several social epidemiological 
surveys and has been found to be a unique form of social stress that can undermine psychological 
wellbeing (DeVylder et al. 2017; Geller et al. 2014, 2017). Aggressive policing—particularly 
Stop, Question, and Frisk in New York City—has been measured using police administrative 
data and linked to health surveys that do not contain a measure of UTBP (Sewell et al. 2016). I 
use data from the Nashville Stress and Health Study (NSAHS) combined with administrative 
records from Metro Nashville Police Department to test whether UTBP and proactive policing 
both contribute to depressive and anxiety symptoms. This paper contributes to the existing 
research literature by testing whether these two measures of policing have independent effects on 
mental health or whether they act together to limit psychological wellbeing. A second 
contribution of this paper is an examination of racial differences in the mental health effects of 
UTBP and proactive policing. I test whether black and white residents of Nashville are 
differently affected psychologically by UTBP and proactive policing in their neighborhood.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Recent high-profile police shootings of black men in the United States have brought race 
to the forefront of discussions about police (Davis 2017). Following the August 2014 shooting of 
Michael Brown—an 18-year-old black teenager in Ferguson, Missouri—by a police officer, the 
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community responded with protests claiming that police misconduct was rampant. Police 
responded to the protests with military equipment, tear gas, and rubber bullets. Similarly, in 
April of 2015, Freddy Grey was arrested in Baltimore for allegedly having a switchblade. Eye-
witnesses say that the police used excessive force when making the arrest. While being 
transported to the police station, Grey sustained a spinal cord injury that ultimately led to his 
death. Following his death, Baltimore residents protested for six nights. Both of these events 
sparked dozens of solidarity rallies in the United States (Williamson, Trump, and Einstein 2018) 
and around the world (Winsor 2016). While these incidents are not unique, the subsequent 
investigations of the Ferguson and Baltimore police departments by the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) certainly are. The Ferguson report found that police officials focused on black 
neighborhoods in order to generate revenue through ticketing and imposed severe court penalties 
for minor technical violations (U.S. Department of Justice 2015). They also found evidence of 
racial bias by officers and widespread community mistrust of the police department. The DOJ 
report on Baltimore found similar practices of unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests as 
well as excessive force directed toward black community members (U.S. Department of Justice 
2016). Ferguson and Baltimore are not isolated cases. According to the Associated Press, in 
2017, 14 police departments were operating with consent decrees—reform agreements with the 
DOJ usually overseen by a federal judge—related to racial bias in police procedures (Seewer 
2017).  
Blacks in the United States have generations of accumulated experience with 
discrimination from police (Natl. Acad. Sci. Eng. Med. 2018; Stevenson 2017). In the 
proceedings of the ninth Atlanta University Conference in 1904, W.E.B. DuBois (1904:54) 
reported that in a survey of 1,500 black school children, 36 percent reported that policemen were 
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“unkind.” As enforcers of the legal code, police officers upheld segregation and met reformers 
with violence and repression. By the 1950’s, the modern concept of police responding to 
emergencies and tackling social problems was solidified but there was deep inequality in the 
assistance that blacks received compared to whites. Throughout the Civil Rights Movement of 
the 1950’s and 1960’s, police were often used to crack down on peaceful protests and undermine 
political movements (Bergesen 1982). President Johnson’s Crime Commission published a 1967 
report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, finding that racial minorities had little trust in 
police officers and police institutions. The report stated that Commission observers had “seen 
instances of unambiguous physical abuse [including] officers striking handcuffed 
suspects…[and] reported that officers too seldom use polite forms of address to members of 
minority groups or juveniles” (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice 1967:102). Around the same time as the Crime Commission, James Baldwin (1966) 
wrote that “Harlem is policed like occupied territory.” Police officers aggressively patrolled the 
streets of Harlem creating two nations, separate and unequal (Embrick 2015). Fifty-years after 
Baldwin, Ta-Nehisi Coates (2016) similarly argued that “wanton discrimination is definitional to 
the black experience, and very often it is law enforcement which implements that discrimination 
with violence.”  
Clearly, the institution of policing in the United States is inseparable from the racialized 
social system (Bonilla-Silva 1997; Tonry 2011). Given the racial history of police mistreatment, 
it is no surprise that research shows that police abuses are not experienced equally for whites and 
blacks (DeGue, Fowler, and Calkins 2016; Kramer and Remster 2018; Smith and Holmes 2014). 
Since police mistreat black civilians more often than whites, when mistreatment occurs it may be 
a more salient form of stress for blacks than for whites. The potential of police mistreatment 
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could also act as a chronic stressor for blacks because the risk of police abuse is omnipresent. 
Whites might be more likely to see unfair police treatment as an aberration and the experience 
may not affect their sense of personal security. However, another argument could be made that 
the unexpectedness of police mistreatment for whites may make it salient for their wellbeing and 
would be similarly affected by UTBP. Beyond individual treatment, the law enforcement 
strategies that police choose to use may also affect blacks differently than whites. In Baldwin’s 
description of Harlem, whites may not have seen police as occupiers but protectors because they 
were concerned about crime and did not assume they were at risk of abuse. In a community 
report of Nashville that interviewed 25 black residents, a local non-profit found that the 
interviewees were concerned that the police did not protect them as they do whites in the city 
(Gideon’s Army 2016). Several interviewees in the report said that they felt anxiety when having 
to interact with police due to their past experiences. A common theme was differences in how 
predominantly black neighborhoods are policed. This paper examines how black and white 
Nashville residents have been treated by police and how the amount of proactive policing near 
their home can influence depressive and anxiety symptoms. The analysis is guided by the stress 
process model and conceptualizes UTBP and proactive policing in the neighborhood as potential 
stressors. 
 
Unfair Treatment by Police 
Recent research indicates that UTBP is a unique form of discrimination separate from 
other forms of unfair or biased treatment (DeVylder et al. 2017; Geller et al. 2014, 2017; 
McFarland, Taylor, McFarland, et al. 2018; McFarland, Taylor, and McFarland 2018). As a 
social institution with state authority, police are uniquely given the power to stop, search, arrest, 
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and use force if a suspect does not comply (Bittner 1970). Black people in the United States are 
more likely than whites to have police contact and to be searched, arrested, or have force used 
against them (Braga et al. 2019; Natl. Acad. Sci. Eng. Med. 2018). Police officers often 
stereotype blacks as more likely to be engaged in criminal activity than whites (Eberhardt 2019; 
Eberhardt et al. 2004; LeCount 2017). Stereotypes that lead to unfair treatment can be formed 
through multiple mechanisms. One mechanism is statistical discrimination. Police officers are 
aware of crime statistics that show racial disparity may apply this knowledge to how they treat 
individuals (Glaser 2014; Pager and Karafin 2009). Police officers may also develop bias over 
time though commonly interacting with racial minorities as suspects. They may develop a 
stronger association of race and suspiciousness over time, a process of social conditioning (Smith 
and Alpert 2007). Both statistical discrimination and social conditioning theory predict that 
police officers will display racial bias against people of color. Regardless of the causes, racial 
bias leading to unfair treatment can be seen in routine police-public contacts. In an analysis of 
body camera footage from traffic stops in Oakland, police officers were less likely to use 
respectful language with black drivers than they were with white drivers even after controlling 
for the race of the officer (Voigt et al. 2017). While it’s clear that blacks are more likely to 
experience UTBP than whites, the psychological impact of UTBP has only recently become a 
focus of research.  
Reporting findings from a 2012-2013 telephone survey of 1,261 young men in New York 
City, Geller et al. (2014) demonstrate that young men who experience intrusive police contact 
are at a greater risk of anxiety and trauma symptoms. They measure police intrusion as a scale of 
whether officers asked for identification, frisked or searched them, used harsh or racially tinged 
language, or threatened or used force during their most memorable police interaction. Similarly, 
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DeVylder and colleagues (DeVylder et al. 2017) surveyed residents of Baltimore, New York 
City, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C. who were part of Qualtrics Panels, a standing database 
of survey respondents run by the company Qualtrics, to assess exposure to police victimization 
and mental health. Using a newly created measure of police victimization measuring physical, 
physical with weapon, sexual, psychological, and neglect experiences from police officers, they 
found that black and Latino respondents were more likely to experience police victimization 
across most types of victimization than whites. These forms of victimization were also correlated 
with psychological distress and depressive symptoms scales.  
Several other studies examine UTBP on physical health outcomes. In two studies of 
UTBP using data from the Nashville Stress and Health Study, UTBP is measured using an item 
drawn from a larger major discrimination scale (McFarland, Taylor, McFarland, et al. 2018; 
McFarland, Taylor, and McFarland 2018). In one study, McFarland, Taylor, McFarland, and 
Friedman (2018) test whether personally experienced and vicarious (close personal others) 
UTBP is associated with telomere length—an indicator of biological aging associated with 
stress. Focusing on black and white men, the authors find that black men were more likely than 
whites to experience both personal and vicarious UTBP. Both personal and vicarious UTBP was 
associated with shorter telomere length for black men but had no relationship for white men. In 
another study, McFarland, Taylor, and McFarland (2018) tested whether the same personal and 
vicarious measures of UTBP in Nashville were associated with waist circumference. They found 
that vicarious but not personal UTBP was associated with higher waist circumference. Vicarious 
UTBP explained 12% of the black-white disparity in waist circumference. These findings 
suggest that UTBP can have a variety of impacts on wellbeing and delineating between personal 
and vicarious exposures may help identify mechanisms linking UTBP to health.  
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 Geller et al. (2014) and McFarland, Taylor, McFarland, and Friedman (2018) argue that 
UTBP is linked to the structural context of proactive policing. They both argue that proactive 
policing has made UTBP more common for men of color because it targets low-level offenses 
and the majority of those stopped have done nothing wrong. However, neither study measures 
proactive policing or whether police activity modifies the effect of UTBP on health outcomes. 
This paper includes measures of both UTBP and proactive policing.   
 
Proactive Policing 
Police aim to reduce crime in problem areas through focused deterrence (Braga and 
Weisburd 2010; Braga, Welsh, and Schnell 2015; Nagin 2013; Nagin et al. 2015). Deterrence 
theory argues that the criminal justice system should not only be about punishing criminals but 
convincing others not to commit crime in the future. Effective deterrence relies on three aspects 
of punishment: swiftness, severity, and certainty (Beccaria 1785). Modern research shows that 
the certainty of punishment is, by far, the most important aspect of deterrence (Nagin 2013; 
Nagin et al. 2015). Certainty is comprised of a number of conditional probabilities. When police 
focus on a specific area with proactive strategies, the probability that a crime is investigated and 
a suspect is arrested increases. Others in the community also recognize that the probability of 
apprehension is high and will therefore avoid criminal activity (Nagin 2013; Nagin et al. 2015). 
Proactive policing also draws from theories of zero-tolerance, order-maintenance, and broken-
windows policing (Braga and Weisburd 2010; Fagan et al. 2010; Wilson and Kelling 1982). To 
reduce serious crime, police focus on making arrests for misdemeanor crimes like minor drug 
possession or loitering. Common proactive enforcement strategies in communities include 
increasing police patrols in specific areas, increasing traffic or pedestrian stops and searches, and 
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using mobile crime suppression units (Koper 2014). Officers may also use “offender-oriented” 
strategies that focus on suspected gang members, known offenders, probationers, or parolees 
(Koper 2014). While all strategies are employed to reduce crime, black people are much more 
likely to experience these targeted, aggressive tactics than whites in ways that are not fully 
explained by differing rates of offending or neighborhood crime rate (Braga et al. 2019; Natl. 
Acad. Sci. Eng. Med. 2018). Living in areas that are targeted with proactive enforcement 
exposes people in those areas to higher risk of police contact, searches, arrest, and police use of 
force. By creating a racialized environment of social control, police also may be creating a social 
environment marked by chronic strain. 
To test the proposition that neighborhood policing practices can influence health, Sewell, 
Jefferson, and Lee (2016) merged data from the New York City Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) 
database with individual data from the 2012 NYC Community Health Survey to investigate the 
impact of SQF on psychological distress. The authors argue that since aggressive policing is 
primarily targeted toward men of color, they are likely to experience hypervigilance which is 
often linked to poor mental health. Examining two aspects of aggressive policing—the 
proportion of stops where frisking occurs and proportion of stops with use of force—the authors 
found that men living in aggressively policed areas are more likely to show symptoms of 
psychological distress than men in areas with less aggressive policing. Notably, this study 
controls for arrest rate, robbery complaint rate, neighborhood racial/ethnic/class composition, 
and individual demographic correlates of mental health. The results suggest that the 
neighborhood context of police activity may be experienced as a source of chronic strain. One 
major limitation of the NYC Community Health Survey is that it does not include measures of 
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police contact or subjective appraisals of unfair police treatment, a limitation addressed in this 
study. 
 
Racial Stress, Police, and Mental Health 
The stress process framework argues that stressors that are most likely to lead to 
psychological distress are those that are traumatic and undermine a sense of personal control and 
stability (Pearlin et al. 1981; Turner and Avison 2003; Wheaton 1994). For racial minorities, 
discrimination is critical for understanding stress (Pascoe and Smart Richman 2009; Williams 
and Mohammed 2009). Discrimination occurs when individuals or social institutions give 
differential or unfair treatment to a person based on group membership. Discrimination need not 
be intentional and can take many forms. For a person experiencing discrimination, the intent of 
the actor is less important than their understanding of their treatment being unfair, unjust, or 
different than other racial groups. Racial discrimination is common and has substantial mental 
and physical health impacts for black people in the United States. Several review articles 
conclude that experiences of racism and discrimination contribute to depression, psychological 
distress, anxiety, hypertension, poor self-rated health, certain cancers, obesity, substance abuse, 
and other chronic medical conditions (Mays, Cochran, and Barnes 2007; Paradies 2006; D. R. 
Williams et al. 2003; Williams and Mohammed 2009). In a meta-analysis, Pascoe and Richman 
(2009) examined 110 studies on discrimination and mental health. They found a robust 
relationship between discrimination and multiple mental health outcomes including depressive 
symptoms.  
Depressive symptoms and anxiety symptoms are interrelated types of psychological 
distress that may be influenced differently by discrimination. Examining each type of distress 
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independently provides a better understanding of the specific effects of stressors and types of 
interventions that are appropriate (Banks, Kohn-Wood, and Spencer 2006). Epidemiological 
research on depressive and anxiety symptoms show that even though blacks experience more 
stress than whites, they report the same or fewer symptoms of depression or anxiety (Barnes, 
Keyes, and Bates 2013; Erving and Thomas 2017; Erving, Thomas, and Frazier 2019; Keyes 
2009; Louie and Wheaton 2019; Mouzon 2013; Soto, Dawson-Andoh, and BeLue 2011). This 
finding is paradoxical given that stress exposure has a robust influence on mental health. Even 
though there are often differences in average levels of distress between blacks and whites, 
exposure to particular circumstances may have similar or different effects across groups. As 
discussed above, UTBP and proactive policing are racialized stressors more common in the lives 
of racial minorities than whites. For whites, proactive policing may be a salubrious factor since 
police are often understood as protectors against the risk of crime victimization while blacks may 
see police as a source of victimization (Anderson 1999; Stuart 2016; Stuart et al. 2015). Research 
on perceptions of police by race shows that blacks are less likely to trust the police and feel as 
though police are biased against blacks. A Pew Research Center survey from 2016 found that 
blacks are half as likely as whites (35% of blacks compared to 75% of whites) to think their local 
police treat racial and ethnic groups equally (Morin and Stepler 2016). The current study aims to 
better understand how UTBP and proactive policing can influence both depressive and anxiety 
symptoms as a form of racialized stress. Since both outcomes are interrelated forms of distress, 
the predicted relationships with UTBP and proactive policing are the same.  
Depressive symptoms are the most common form of psychological distress (Kessler et al. 
2005; Turner and Lloyd 1999). Symptoms often include sadness, hopelessness, an inability to 
carry out daily activities, trouble sleeping, thoughts of suicide, and poor appetite (Mirowsky and 
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Ross 2003; Radloff 1977). Racial discrimination is degrading and can undermine a person’s 
sense of happiness and worth leading to depression (Brown et al. 2000; Taylor and Turner 2002; 
Wheaton et al. 2017). For instance, Wheaton et al. (2017) found in the NSAHS that major 
discrimination events were associated with depressive symptoms for older black men in 
particular while younger black men were more affected by chronic everyday experiences of 
discrimination. Proactive policing is a chronic neighborhood strain and UTBP is a major 
discrimination event. These experiences could negatively affect mood since police are often 
viewed as a source of racial discrimination and unfair social control.   
Anxiety symptoms are also a type of psychological distress but reflect worry, tension, 
and panic about events and situations (Hunter and Schmidt 2010; Soto et al. 2011). Hunter and 
Schmidt (2010:213) argue that “awareness of racism influences anxiety via cultural mistrust, a 
collection of interpretations and behaviors considered an adaptive response to being an 
ethnoracial minority.” Police contact may be a particular situation that could evoke an anxious 
response (Geller et al. 2014). Past negative personal or vicarious experiences with police may 
make a person fear future police contact. Knowing that blacks are more likely than whites to face 
police abuses could foster cultural mistrust and anxiety (DeVylder et al. 2018). High police 
presence could exacerbate anxiety for people who have experienced UTBP. 
The stress process framework includes several important insights that assist with 
understanding how UTBP and proactive policing can affect psychological distress (Pearlin 1989, 
1999). Stressors are the experiences and circumstances that lead to stress. An individual’s social 
statuses and social context are associated with both the exposure to stressors as well as the 
coping resources available to manage stress. For instance, parental status may expose parents to 
stress related to children’s wellbeing that non-parents do not have. Stressors can also be 
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understood as life events or as chronic strains (Pearlin 1989; Wheaton 1994; Wheaton et al. 
2017). Pearlin (1989) argues that there are at least three potential relationships between stressful 
events and chronic strains that can create stress: 1) events leading to strains; 2) strains leading to 
events; and 3) strains and events providing meaningful contexts for one another. UTBP is a 
stressful event while aggressive policing practices in neighborhoods are chronic strains. The 
second and third potential relationships proposed by Pearlin (1989) could be taking place 
between UTBP and proactive policing. Policing practices could increase the probability of 
experiencing UTBP. For psychological distress, however, the most likely relationship is that 
UTBP and proactive policing create meaningful contexts for one another. UTBP is unlikely to be 
universally experienced. If a person sees unfair treatment as an anomaly, the exposure to the 
stressor may not translate to stress. However, seeing police conducting aggressive, proactive 
enforcement may make an experience of UTBP more likely to create stress. Similarly, prior 
UTBP could sensitize an individual to the policing context in their neighborhood creating stress. 
This relationship is potentially confounded by fear of crime victimization which may impact 
views of police presence. 
 
The Present Study 
Based on the previous review of UTBP, proactive policing, and mental health, this study 
tests whether black residents of Nashville are experiencing a psychological cost from police 
activity and unfair police treatment. Metro Nashville Police Department’s (MNPD) Manual 
states that “it is the policy of the department to police in a proactive manner” (Metropolitan 
Nashville Police Department 2018:441). Armenta (2017) found in her 2012 ethnography of 
MNPD that officers were encouraged to stop and search drivers to show their supervisors that 
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they were productive. Officers said that if they made more stops they would be rewarded with 
more desirable days off and assignments. Community activists have criticized MNPD’s use of 
traffic stops claiming that black drivers are overrepresented in stopped vehicles and that MNPD 
conducts more than double the traffic stops of similarly sized cities (Gideon’s Army 2016). 
Gideon’s Army (2016), a local non-profit, analyzed traffic stop and search data and found that 
black drivers were more likely to be searched and officers were less likely to find contraband 
indicating a lower threshold of suspicion applied to blacks compared to whites. In interviews 
with black community members, reports of feeling treated unfairly, harsh language, and arbitrary 
commands from officers were common themes (Gideon’s Army 2016). These findings suggest 
that Nashville is a city where policing requires more study and this paper examines whether 
police treatment in Nashville may be contributing to psychological distress of residents.  
I test the following hypotheses in the analysis: 
Hypothesis 1: Black respondents will be more likely to report personal and vicarious 
UTBP. 
Hypothesis 2: Living in an area with more proactive policing will increase risk of UTBP. 
Hypothesis 2a: Proactive policing will have a stronger association with UTBP for 
black respondents than whites. 
Hypothesis 3: Personal and vicarious UTBP will be associated with higher depressive 
and anxiety symptoms. 
Hypothesis 3a: Black respondents will have a stronger relationship between UTBP 
and depressive and anxiety symptoms than whites. 
Hypothesis 4: Proactive policing will be associated with higher depressive and anxiety 
symptoms.  
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Hypothesis 4a: Black respondents will have a stronger relationship between 
proactive policing and depressive and anxiety symptoms than whites. 
Hypothesis 5: Proactive policing will have a stronger relationship to depressive and 
anxiety symptoms for those who have experienced UTBP. 
Hypothesis 3a: Black respondents who have experienced UTBP will have a 
stronger relationship between proactive policing and depressive and anxiety 
symptoms than whites. 
 
METHODS 
Data 
The Nashville Stress and Health Study (NSAHS) is a population-based community sample of 
Nashville, Tennessee. Black and white adults between the ages of 21 and 69 were randomly 
sampled using a multistage, stratified approach. Between 2011 and 2014, 1,252 respondents—
627 black men and women and 625 white men and women—were surveyed. To select cases, a 
simple random sample of 199 block groups was taken and households were randomly selected in 
proportion to block group population size. Block groups were defined using boundaries from the 
2000 Census since 2010 boundaries were not available when sampling began. Black households 
were oversampled with the goal of selecting equal numbers of black men, black women, white 
men, and white women. Participation rates for screening and interviewing were calculated based 
on the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). The Response Rate 1 is 
30.2, the Cooperation Rate 1 is 74.2, the Refusal Rate is 30.2, and the Contact Rate 1 is 40.7. 
The survey design and sampling strategy  have been described in detail in other studies (Brown, 
Turner, and Moore 2016; Turner 2013; Turner, Thomas, and Brown 2016). Ten participants had 
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invalid block groups and an additional 34 respondents were missing data on study variables. 
They are excluded from all analyses. The present study uses data from 1,208 respondents, 604 
black and 604 white. NSAHS data are supplemented with administrative records from Metro 
Nashville Police Department (MNPD), obtained through a public records request for case-level 
data for all traffic stops, arrests, and incident reports made by officers from 2010 through 2014.  
 
Measures 
Dependent variables. 
Past month depressive symptoms were measured using the 20-item CES-D scale (Radloff 1977). 
Items include, “you felt depressed,” “you felt lonely,” “you felt that you could not shake off the 
blues,” and “you felt sad.” Responses were coded on a one-to-four scale with categories of “not 
at all” (1), “occasionally” (2), “frequently” (3), and “almost all the time” (4). Higher values 
indicate greater depressive symptoms. The 20 items were averaged (a=.92). Anxiety Symptoms is 
a scale comprised of five items. They include, “I felt worried over possible misfortunes,” “I felt 
tense, “I felt anxious,” I felt nervous,” and “I felt over-excited.” Responses were on a one-to-four 
scale from “not at all” to “very much.” Higher values indicate more symptoms of anxiousness. 
The five items were averaged (a=.83). 
 
Unfair treatment by police.  
UTBP is measured as being experienced personally or vicariously. As a part of the Major 
Discrimination Scale (Williams et al. 1997), respondents were asked if they or someone close to 
them has “been unfairly treated by the police (e.g., stopped, searched, questioned, physically 
threatened or abused)?” If they respond “yes,” they are asked if it happened to themselves, their 
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spouse, child, other relative, or close friend. Two mutually exclusive variables were created for 
discrimination against the respondent and others. The first, unfair treatment by police against 
self, is coded as a binary variable measuring whether the respondent had been treated unfairly by 
police. Respondents indicating personal UTBP were not included in the second variable 
measuring vicarious experiences. The second, vicarious unfair treatment by police, is a 
dichotomous variable with value 1 for anyone who reported police unfair treatment against their 
spouse, child, other relative, or close friend but not themselves. The reference category is 
respondents who have not experienced personal or vicarious UTBP. Fourteen respondents 
selected that they had both personally experienced unfair treatment by police and had a 
significant other also experience UTBP. These individuals were counted in the personal UTBP 
variable and not in the vicarious UTBP variable because personal experiences are likely to be 
more salient for mental health. Creating mutually exclusive categories is also necessary for the 
regression coefficients to be interpreted as a comparison to those who have not experienced 
UTBP and is consistent with previous research examining UTBP (McFarland, Taylor, 
McFarland, et al. 2018; McFarland, Taylor, and McFarland 2018).  
 
Policing and crime 
Policing and crime variables are calculated at the level of patrol zones, administrative regions of 
the city used for police deployment. MNPD officers are assigned to one of eight precincts in the 
city. Each of the precincts is demarcated into zones that are used for disbursing officers through 
the precinct. During each shift, one patrol officer responds to all non-emergency calls within 
their assigned zone. Zones can also be used to focus proactive policing units on problem areas. 
The shapefile for patrol zones was received from MNPD via a public record request. To link 
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NSAHS respondents to patrol zones, the Census block group shapefile was spatially joined to the 
shapefile of MNPD patrol zones. After joining, I calculated the percentage of each block group’s 
area that fell into each patrol zone. I assigned the block group to the zone with the largest area 
falling within it. The median area overlap of block groups with their assigned patrol zone was 
99.8% meaning that the majority of block groups were fully encompassed by their assigned 
zones. After assigning NSAHS participants to patrol zones, I aggregated total population counts 
of the block groups from the 2000 Census to the patrol zone level. Aggregated total population 
of patrol zones was used as the denominator for all policing and crime rates. For each 
respondent, the patrol zone rate per 1,000 residents was calculated using the following formula: @<36	\6@	1,000 = oEu ru ×	1,000 (1) 
Where oEu represents instances of policing or crime occurring in patrol zone w during the year 
prior to the respondent’s survey date, 3. Policing and crime variables are calculated for the year 
prior to the survey date to improve temporal ordering. Since the survey was fielded over a three-
year period, pooling the entire time span would not accurately reflect the exposure to police or 
crime that an early respondent would have experienced. Policing and crime variables are all 
highly skewed so they are log transformed prior to creating scales based on the following 
equation. 
;gnn6?	@<36	\6@	1,000 = log oEu ru ×	1,000 + 1  (2) 
Scales based on crime or police data can be created in a variety of ways. Even though the unit of 
measurement for all items is the same, a simple sum of rates may not be the best way to measure 
proactive policing and crime. In an additive measure, all incidents are given equal weight. But 
should one murder be given equal weight as one vehicle theft? One strategy used in previous 
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research is weighting incidents based on seriousness (Blumstein 1974). However, it is not clear 
how much weight should be applied to make categories equivalent. Is one murder equivalent to 
10 vehicle thefts? 100 vehicle thefts?  Rather than weighting incidents based on seriousness, I 
standardize each indicator with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 prior to averaging the 
items in the index. Standardizing the items produces scores for each patrol zone relative to other 
zones. Averaging the standardized, logged rates treats each item as an equal component of the 
index and the units can be understood as standard deviations from the mean patrol zone. 
Proactive policing is a composite of three measures of aggressive policing calculated 
from MNPD administrative records. First, the discretionary search rate per 1,000 residents 
measures the number of discretionary searches conducted during traffic stops within the 
respondent’s patrol zone for the year preceding their survey date. Discretionary searches are 
conducted based on the judgement of an officer and fall into three primary legal justifications; 
probable cause, reasonable suspicion of weapon possession, or driver consent. Searches 
conducted incident to arrest, due to an outstanding warrant, or for inventory when impounding a 
vehicle are excluded because they are non-discretionary. Non-discretionary searches are a 
byproduct of proactive policing due to increasing the number of traffic stops but they are not a 
policy objective of the enforcement strategies. Many non-discretionary searches are conducted 
because an arrest was made. The next item in the scale would incorporate searches incident to 
arrest. The second measure of proactive policing is the misdemeanor arrest rate per 1,000 
residents. In a “zero-tolerance” or “order maintenance” approach to policing, misdemeanor 
arrests are increased to create deterrence in the targeted area. All misdemeanor arrests in the 
patrol zone in the year prior to the survey date are used to calculate the misdemeanor arrest rate. 
The third indicator of proactive policing is the self-initiated incident rate per 1,000 residents. 
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Incident reports are either dispatched in response to a call for service or self-initiated by an 
officer. All incident reports that were self-initiated by a police officer are included in this 
measure. The three indicators of proactive policing—discretionary search rate, misdemeanor 
arrest rate, and self-initiated incident rate—were logged as shown in equation 2, standardized, 
then averaged to create the proactive policing scale (x=.96). Figure 12 shows a map of patrol 
zones in Nashville. The map is shaded by the proactive policing index described above.  
 
 
Figure 12: Proactive Policing Index in MNPD Patrol Zones  
 
 
 
Crime rate is an index of five crime types; burglary, auto theft, aggravated assault, 
robbery, and homicide. Incidents per 1,000 residents are computed for each of the five crime 
categories as shown in equation 1. To create the crime index, the five crime types are logged as 
shown in equation 2, standardized, then averaged (x=.81). The crime index and proactive 
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policing index are highly correlated (r=.86). Table 9 shows patrol zone level variables that 
comprise the proactive policing and crime indices prior to transformation as shown in equation 1. 
Proactive policing and crime variables are rates per 1,000 residents in the patrol zone. 
 
Sociodemographic and control variables.  
Sociodemographic variables were included due to their relationship with UTBP, proactive 
policing, depressive symptoms, or anxiety symptoms. Race is measured as a binary variable that 
compares black to white respondents. Age is measured in years and ranges from 22 to 69. Gender  
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Patrol-Zone Level Variable Comprising Proactive Policing and Crime 
Indices  
Statistic N Mean SD Min 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Max 
Total Residential 
Population 54 9,753.1 5,122.8 1,211 6,055.2 9,002.5 12,866.8 23,997 
Proactive Policing (per 1,000) 
Misdemeanor Arrests 54 149.9 159.2 12.5 50.7 93.2 199.3 730.4 
Self-Initiated Incidents 54 28.2 29.1 2.0 9.4 16.8 38.4 137.7 
Discretionary Searches 54 45.1 51.4 3.1 15.2 24.5 56.3 232.5 
Crime (per 1,000) 
Homicide 54 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
Robbery 54 1.0 1.0 0.04 0.4 0.8 1.3 4.6 
Aggravated Assault 54 5.7 4.6 0.3 3.1 4.1 7.8 22.6 
Burglary 54 2.1 1.2 0.3 1.4 1.9 2.8 6.6 
Vehicle Theft 54 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 
Note: SD=Standard Deviation, Pctl=Percentile 
 
distinguishes between women and men (reference). Years of education is the number of years of 
schooling that the respondent has completed. Employment variables are a set of binary indicators 
measuring full time employment (reference), part time employment, retired, unemployed, or 
other employment. Household income is measured using a scale from zero to 15. Zero indicates 
no income and each one unit interval represents a $5,000 increase up the fifth response range, an 
income of $20,000-$24,999. Each subsequent interval represents a $10,000 increase in 
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household income, for instance interval six ranges from $25,000 to $34,999. Category 15 
includes households earning $135,000 per year and above. Marital status compares married 
respondents (reference) to those who are separated or divorced, never married, and widowed. 
Parental status measures respondents with children in the home (reference) compared to those 
with children not living at home and those without children. 
 Three other control variables were included to adjust for potentially confounding factors 
for UTBP, proactive policing, or crime. Since the UTBP measure was drawn from a larger 
measure of discriminatory treatment, the other six, non-police, items are included to adjust for 
other forms of discrimination that may also impact mental health. The other items include being 
unfairly denied a promotion, not being hired for unfair reasons, being discouraged from 
completing education, being discouraged from pursuing a job or career, denial of housing by a 
landlord, and if neighbors have made their life difficult for unfair reasons. If the participant 
responded “yes,” they were asked if the event happened to themselves, spouse, child, other 
relative, or close friend. Two counts were created, non-police unfair treatment toward self and 
non-police vicarious unfair treatment. These two measures of non-police unfair treatment are 
correlated with UTBP (personal UTBP and personal non-police unfair treatment, r=.28; 
vicarious UTBP and vicarious non-police unfair treatment, r=.26). Finally, fear of crime was 
included to adjust for the possibility that perceptions of victimization could affect how police are 
viewed in the neighborhood. Fear of crime is a 10-item scale asking respondents how afraid they 
are of potential victimization. Items include, “having someone break into your house and take 
your personal belongings while you are away,” “being sexually assaulted or raped,” “having 
something taken from you by force (robbed),” “being the victim of a carjacking,” and “being 
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harassed by gang members.” All items are measured on a four-point scale from “not at all afraid” 
to “very afraid.” The 10 questions are averaged to produce the final measure (x=.94). 
 
Analysis Plan 
I conduct the analysis for this paper in several steps. First, means and proportions were 
calculated by race of the respondent. T-tests and chi-square tests were used to test for differences 
by race for all individual-level variables. Second, a multinomial logistic regression is estimated 
predicting unfair treatment by police using the nnet package in R (Venables and Ripley 2002). 
The first model includes only limited demographics, proactive policing, and crime variables; the 
second model adds all study variables; the third model includes an interaction term of proactive 
policing with race. Next, ordinary least squares regression models predicting depressive 
symptoms and anxiety symptoms are estimated for black and white respondents separately by 
sequentially adding blocks of independent variables to the model. The final model pools black 
and white respondents and includes a control for race. Robust standard errors clustered by patrol 
zone are calculated using the sandwich package in R (Zeileis 2004). The high correlation 
between proactive policing and crime makes multicollinearity a concern. The variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for the full regression models predicting depressive symptoms and anxiety 
symptoms are 4.0 for proactive policing and 4.1 for crime. While there is not a strict cut off for 
unacceptable VIFs, a VIF greater than 10 often indicates serious multicollinearity that will 
impact the estimates (O’brien 2007). The observed VIFs, however, do indicate that the variables 
are likely sensitive to one another’s effect. However, not including both variables likely means 
that the included variable is a proxy for the other. For instance, if crime is excluded, proactive 
policing would be a measure of both policing and the underlying crime in the zone. Therefore, 
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both variables are included in the models. Additionally, due to the fact that multiple respondents 
lived in the same patrol zone, alternate model specifications were tested. An F-test comparing a 
model with patrol zone fixed effects to OLS was not significant indicating that fixed effects were 
not necessary. An empty random intercept model had an intra-class correlation coefficient of .03 
indicating that the patrol-zone level errors are not correlated enough to require a multilevel 
model. Finally, two-way and three-way interaction effects are estimated among race, UTBP, and 
proactive policing. Significant results are plotted at two standard deviations from the mean of 
continuous variables using the plot_model() function from the sjPlot package in R (Lüdecke 
2018). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 10 shows means, proportions, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums for all study 
variables. Black respondents are more likely to report personally experiencing UTBP than whites 
(24.8% vs. 10.6%) and vicariously UTBP (21.5% vs. 7.6%). There were no racial differences in 
either depressive symptoms or anxiety symptoms. Black residents of Nashville are more likely 
than whites to live in neighborhoods with more aggressive policing and with higher crime. 
Correspondingly, black residents also have a higher fear of crime victimization than whites. 
Whites reported more years of education on average than blacks, 15 years compared to 13 years, 
respectively. Whites also had a higher household income than blacks. On the household income 
scale, whites averaged 9.6 while blacks averaged 6.3. Blacks also report more personal 
experiences of unfair treatment than whites against themselves (mean=.94 vs .67) and vicarious 
experiences against important others (mean=.52 vs. .39). There were several differences on 
marital status with whites being more likely to be married and less likely to never have married, 
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be separated or divorced, or be widowed than blacks. There is no significant difference in full 
time employment rate but whites are more likely than blacks to work part time while blacks are 
more likely to report being unemployed than whites. Finally, whites and blacks did not differ on 
the proportion of respondents with children at home but black participants were more likely than 
whites to have children that did not live with them and whites were more likely than blacks to 
never have had children.  
Table 10: Means, Proportions, Standard Deviations, Minimums, And Maximums for All Study Variables 
Stratified by Race (N=1,808) 
 Black (N=604) White (N=604)  
Statistic Mean/ Prop SD Min Max 
Mean/ 
Prop 
St. 
Dev. Min Max 
Sig. 
Diff. 
No UTBP .536 - 0 1 .818 - 0 1 *** 
UTBP-Self .248 - 0 1 .106 - 0 1 *** 
UTBP-Vicarious .215 - 0 1 .076 - 0 1 *** 
Depressive Symptoms 1.686 .478 1 3.350 1.663 .521 1 3.7  
Anxiety Symptoms 1.797 .699 1 4 1.912 .696 1 4  
Proactive Policing Scale .460 .880 -3.663 2.525 -1.410 2.382 -10.989 6.278 *** 
Crime Rate Scale .362 .729 -1.590 2.621 -1.873 2.816 -7.952 12.581 *** 
Fear of Crime 1.828 .849 1 4 1.614 .580 1 3.900 *** 
Female .517 - 0 1 .520 - 0 1  
Age 46.295 11.127 22 68 45.697 11.772 24 68  
Years of Education 13.015 3.097 0 25 15.002 2.824 3 28 *** 
Household Income 6.328 3.775 0 15 9.642 3.758 0 15 *** 
Unfair Treatment-Self (count) .940 1.235 0 6 .699 .990 0 5 *** 
Unfair Treatment-Vicarious (count) .515 .767 0 4 .387 .725 0 4 * 
Married .301 - 0 1 .598 - 0 1 *** 
Never Married .389 - 0 1 .189 - 0 1 *** 
Separated or Divorced .268 - 0 1 .190 - 0 1 ** 
Widowed  .041 - 0 1 .023 - 0 1 * 
Full-Time Employment .565 - 0 1 .646 - 0 1  
Part-Time Employment .094 - 0 1 .137 - 0 1 * 
Retired  .078 - 0 1 .060 - 0 1  
Unemployed  .197 - 0 1 .118 - 0 1 * 
Other Employment .066 - 0 1 .040 - 0 1  
Children at Home .457 - 0 1 .407 - 0 1  
Children Out of House .349 - 0 1 .240 - 0 1 * 
No Children .194 - 0 1 .353 - 0 1 ** 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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To better understand the social conditions associated with unfair treatment from police in 
Nashville, Table 11 reports results of a multinomial logistic regression predicting UTBP. Model 
1 includes race, gender, age, proactive policing, and crime. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, black 
respondents are more likely to experience UTBP personally and vicariously compared to whites. 
Women are less likely to report personal UTBP but more likely to report vicarious experiences 
of UTBP than men. Increasing age is associated with lower reports of UTBP personally but it is 
not associated with vicarious UTBP. Proactive policing is associated with a higher probability of 
reporting personal experiences of UTBP. Crime rate in the respondent’s patrol zone is not 
associated with UTBP.  Model 2 adds all other study variables. Race continues to be a strong 
predictor of unfair treatment. Proactive policing, however, has a diminished effect when  
controlling for other variables and is no longer significant. This provides partial support for 
Hypothesis 2 but the association is diminished when adjusting for covariates. Other forms of 
discrimination also predict UTBP. The count of personally experienced non-police unfair 
treatment is associated with a greater probability of reporting either personal or vicarious UTBP. 
Vicariously experienced non-police unfair treatment is associated with vicarious UTBP. 
Respondents who are never married or previously married report higher rates of personal UTBP 
relative to married individuals. More years of education is correlated with a lower likelihood of 
personal UTBP. Model 3 of Table 11 shows the interaction of race with proactive policing 
predicting personally experienced UTBP. The interaction term is not significant showing that 
proactive policing does not independently predict personal UTBP for either blacks or whites in 
this sample (b=-.418, se=.231, p=.070). Hypothesis 2a is not supported.
   
 
Table 11: Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Unfair Treatment by Police in Nashville, TN 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Self Vicarious Self Vicarious Self Vicarious 
Black 1.212*** (.194) 1.621*** (.211) .782*** (.220) 1.587*** (.232) .746*** (.216) 1.636*** (.248) 
Woman -1.154*** (.172) .347 (.178) -1.386*** (.202) .307 (.202) -1.394*** (.202) .308 (.203) 
Age -.023** (.007) -.015 (.008) -.032** (.010) -.011 (.010) -.032** (.010) -.011 (.010) 
Proactive Policing Scale .407* (.172) -.043 (.178) .314 (.186) .017 (.189) .575* (.235) -.075 (.249) 
Crime Scale -.332 (.214) -.156 (.226) -.385 (.234) -.163 (.238) -.342 (.235) -.171 (.239) 
Fear of Crime     -.066 (.123) .031 (.121) -.070 (.123) .029 (.121) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-Self 
(count)     .662
*** (.074) .269** (.084) .657*** (.074) .269** (.084) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-
Vicarious (count)     .009 (.138) .725
*** (.103) -.004 (.138) .729*** (.103) 
Never Married (Ref=Married)     .503 (.258) -.142 (.269) .512* (.258) -.140 (.270) 
Separated or Divorced     .555* (.246) -.030 (.262) .536* (.246) -.030 (.262) 
Widowed     -.076 (.617) .070 (.525) -.095 (.614) .069 (.526) 
Years of Education     -.089** (.031) -.008 (.032) -.086** (.031) -.009 (.032) 
Part time employment (Ref=Full time)     -.016 (.296) .211 (.300) .024 (.296) .198 (.301) 
Retired      .358 (.410) -.562 (.470) .408 (.411) -.561 (.470) 
Unemployed      -.133 (.270) .058 (.281) -.083 (.270) .055 (.281) 
Other employment     .342 (.398) -.007 (.409) .376 (.399) -.013 (.410) 
Household income     -.062* (.032) .022 (.031) -.063* (.032) .022 (.031) 
Kids out of house (Ref= kids at home)     .215 (.228) .153 (.244) .195 (.228) .154 (.244) 
No kids     -.223 (.240) .103 (.243) -.264 (.241) .109 (.244) 
Black X Proactive Policing         -.418 (.231) .111 (.252) 
Constant -1.560*** (.152) -2.672*** (.199) -.443 (.573) -3.426*** (.610) -.351 (.574) -3.477*** (.619) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,882.042 1,754.295 1,759.227 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 .097 .186 .185 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Depressive Symptoms 
Tables 12 and 13 report ordinary least squares regression results with robust standard errors for 
black and white respondents, respectively. Models 1-4 of Table 12 show that having experienced 
UTBP personally is associated with depressive symptoms in all models for black participants. 
Vicariously experienced UTBP is not a significant predictor of depressive symptomatology. 
Proactive policing is a significant predictor of depressive symptoms for black respondents in 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 12 but once controlling for socioeconomic status (Model 4) the 
coefficient becomes non-significant. For whites, shown in Table 13, having experienced UTBP 
personally predicts depressive symptoms only in Models 1 and 2. Once fear of crime and other 
forms of unfair treatment are added to the model, personal UTBP is no longer an independent 
predictor of psychological distress. In supplemental analyses (not shown), the reduction of 
personal UTBP to non-significance is driven by other non-police forms of unfair treatment rather 
than fear of crime. Proactive policing does not predict depressive symptoms for whites. The 
pooled model—Table 16, Model 1—combines blacks and whites while controlling for race. 
When adjusting for other factors, blacks have fewer depressive symptomatology than whites. In 
the pooled model, UTBP against the respondent is associated with depressive symptoms which 
supports Hypothesis 3. Proactive policing does not reach statistical significance in the pooled 
model (b=-.043, se=.024, p=.073) which does not support Hypothesis 4. Vicarious UTBP is non-
significant in all models showing that personal experiences of UTBP are more salient in shaping 
psychological distress than experiences of close others. 
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Table 12: Multivariate Regression Results of Depressive Symptoms on Unfair Treatment from Police, 
Proactive Policing, and Covariates for Black NSAHS Respondents with Robust Standard Errors 
 Black Respondents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) 
UTBP self .176*** (.050) .173*** (.049) .142** (.049) .101* (.046) 
UTBP Vicarious .005 (.045) .017 (.044) -.005 (.044) .004 (.042) 
Woman .202*** (.039) .196*** (.039) .120** (.038) .091* (.038) 
Age -.005*** (.002) -.006*** (.002) -.004** (.002) -.006*** (.002) 
Proactive Policing Scale   .087* (.035) .089** (.033) .058 (.032) 
Crime Scale   -.006 (.043) -.023 (.040) -.050 (.039) 
Fear of Crime     .163*** (.023) .146*** (.023) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-Self 
(count)     .045
** (.015) .053*** (.015) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-
Vicarious (count)     .025 (.024) .036 (.022) 
Never Married (Ref=Married)       .006 (.044) 
Separated or Divorced       .006 (.046) 
Widowed       .143 (.092) 
Years of Education       -.005 (.006) 
Part time employment (Ref=Full 
time)       .045 (.064) 
Retired        -.053 (.064) 
Unemployed        .109 (.057) 
Other employment       .269** (.083) 
Household income       -.021*** (.006) 
Kids out of house (Ref= kids at 
home)       .078 (.040) 
No kids       .077 (.049) 
Constant 1.539*** (.030) 1.502*** (.032) 1.207*** (.045) 1.378*** (.107) 
Observations 604  604  604  604  
R2 .075  .099  .193  .272  
Adjusted R2 .069  .090  .181  .247  
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 13: Multivariate Regression Results of Depressive Symptoms on Unfair Treatment from Police, 
Proactive Policing, and Covariates for White NSAHS Respondents with Robust Standard Errors 
 White Respondents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) 
UTBP self .287*** (.085) .260** (.083) .108 (.070) .052 (.065) 
UTBP Vicarious .143 (.079) .154 (.079) .041 (.068) .044 (.065) 
Woman .137** (.042) .131** (.042) .049 (.037) -.002 (.037) 
Age -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) -.00003 (.002) 
Proactive Policing Scale   .027 (.040) .043 (.036) .040 (.035) 
Crime Scale   .100 (.056) .019 (.050) -.020 (.047) 
Fear of Crime     .313*** (.037) .297*** (.035) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-Self 
(count)     .125
*** (.021) .091*** (.019) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-
Vicarious (count)     .039 (.028) .034 (.027) 
Never Married (Ref=Married)       .026 (.057) 
Separated or Divorced       .052 (.053) 
Widowed       -.032 (.091) 
Years of Education       -.013 (.007) 
Part time employment (Ref=Full 
time)       .122
* (.059) 
Retired        -.082 (.072) 
Unemployed        .251*** (.069) 
Other employment       .208* (.099) 
Household income       -.021** (.007) 
Kids out of house (Ref= kids at 
home)       -.006 (.055) 
No kids       .001 (.045) 
Constant 1.550*** (.029) 1.605*** (.034) 1.042*** (.061) 1.448*** (.135) 
Observations 604  604  604  604  
R2 .043  .063  .248  .330  
Adjusted R2 .037  .054  .237  .307  
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 14: Multivariate Regression Results of Anxiety Symptoms on Unfair Treatment from Police, Proactive 
Policing, and Covariates for Black NSAHS Respondents with Robust Standard Errors 
 Black Respondents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) 
UTBP self .148* (.068) .148* (.068) .119 (.068) .086 (.068) 
UTBP Vicarious .137 (.071) .140 (.071) .096 (.070) .097 (.071) 
Woman .221*** (.056) .221*** (.056) .115* (.055) .081 (.058) 
Age -.010*** (.002) -.010*** (.002) -.008*** (.002) -.008* (.003) 
Proactive Policing Scale   .012 (.055) .015 (.051) -.012 (.051) 
Crime Scale   .003 (.063) -.022 (.060) -.040 (.062) 
Fear of Crime     .230*** (.035) .217*** (.035) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-Self 
(count)     .050
* (.022) .048* (.022) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-
Vicarious (count)     .065 (.037) .068 (.037) 
Never Married (Ref=Married)       .066 (.074) 
Separated or Divorced       .066 (.074) 
Widowed       .009 (.138) 
Years of Education       .005 (.009) 
Part time employment (Ref=Full 
time)       .057 (.083) 
Retired        -.077 (.110) 
Unemployed        .179* (.087) 
Other employment       .303* (.127) 
Household income       -.011 (.009) 
Kids out of house (Ref= kids at 
home)       .043 (.065) 
No kids       .073 (.076) 
Constant 1.620*** (.044) 1.613*** (.047) 1.189*** (.070) 1.130*** (.167) 
Observations 604 604 604 604 
R2 .064 .064 .153 .186 
Adjusted R2 .058 .055 .140 .158 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001     
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Table 15: Multivariate Regression Results of Anxiety Symptoms on Unfair Treatment from Police, Proactive 
Policing, and Covariates for White NSAHS Respondents with Robust Standard Errors 
 White Respondents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) 
UTBP self .330** (.107) .306** (.107) .138 (.096) .127 (.097) 
UTBP Vicarious .162 (.100) .174 (.099) .023 (.087) .023 (.088) 
Woman .210*** (.056) .205*** (.056) .092 (.053) .054 (.054) 
Age -.010*** (.002) -.010*** (.002) -.010*** (.002) -.007* (.003) 
Proactive Policing Scale   .012 (.057) .033 (.052) .021 (.052) 
Crime Scale   .109 (.078) .005 (.073) .007 (.073) 
Fear of Crime     .397*** (.048) .396*** (.048) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-Self 
(count)     .128
*** (.028) .098*** (.027) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-
Vicarious (count)     .083
* (.034) .082* (.033) 
Never Married (Ref=Married)       .049 (.083) 
Separated or Divorced       .064 (.070) 
Widowed       -.201 (.115) 
Years of Education       .013 (.010) 
Part time employment (Ref=Full 
time)       .044 (.076) 
Retired        -.215* (.108) 
Unemployed        .217* (.088) 
Other employment       .113 (.123) 
Household income       -.021* (.009) 
Kids out of house (Ref= kids at 
home)       -.080 (.072) 
No kids       -.103 (.067) 
Constant 1.753*** (.042) 1.803*** (.048) 1.100*** (.080) 1.158*** (.190) 
Observations 604 604 604 604 
R2 .064 .064 .153 .186 
Adjusted R2 .058 .055 .140 .158 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 16: Multivariate Regression Results of Anxiety Symptoms on 
Unfair Treatment from Police, Proactive Policing, and Covariates for 
All NSAHS Respondents with Robust Standard Errors 
 All Respondents 
 (1) (2) 
 Depressive Symptoms 
Anxiety 
Symptoms 
 b (se) b (se) 
UTBP self .086* (.038) .104 (.056) 
UTBP Vicarious .022 (.036) .085 (.055) 
Black -.180*** (.031) -.276*** (.046) 
Woman .045 (.027) .065 (.039) 
Age -.003* (.001) -.007*** (.002) 
Proactive Policing Scale .043 (.024) .006 (.037) 
Crime Scale -.036 (.030) -.028 (.047) 
Fear of Crime .195*** (.019) .274*** (.029) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-Self 
(count) .075
*** (.012) .071*** (.017) 
Non-Police Unfair Treatment-
Vicarious (count) .037
* (.017) .077** (.024) 
Never Married (Ref=Married) .025 (.036) .050 (.054) 
Separated or Divorced .020 (.035) .057 (.050) 
Widowed .082 (.067) -.051 (.099) 
Years of Education -.010* (.005) .006 (.007) 
Part time employment (Ref=Full 
time) .078 (.044) .040 (.057) 
Retired  -.064 (.048) -.137 (.076) 
Unemployed  .164*** (.044) .174** (.062) 
Other employment .248*** (.065) .229* (.093) 
Household income -.021*** (.004) -.016* (.006) 
Kids out of house (Ref= kids at 
home) .039 (.033) -.010 (.048) 
No kids .038 (.032) -.001 (.049) 
Constant 1.542*** (.086) 1.353*** (.129) 
Observations 1,208 1,208 
R2 .281 .213 
Adjusted R2 .268 .199 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Figure 13: Interaction of Unfair Treatment by Police and Proactive Policing in Patrol Zone on 
Depressive Symptoms 
 
  
Table 17: Interaction effects of Depressive Symptoms Regressed on Interactions of Unfair Treatment from 
Police, Proactive Policing, and Race, Robust Standard Errors 
 Depressive Symptoms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) 
UTBP self .095 (.059) .070 (.037) .085* (.037) .134* (.062) 
UTBP Vicarious .052 (.067) .022 (.038) .022 (.038) .079 (.084) 
Black -.171*** (.037) -.175*** (.032) -.182*** (.032) -.145*** (.039) 
Proactive Policing Scale .043 (.026) .026 (.027) .053 (.029) .034 (.030) 
UTBP Self X Black -.015 (.072)     -.100 (.078) 
UTBP Vicarious X Black -.044 (.080)     -.094 (.097) 
UTBP Self X Proactive   .084* (.036)   .158* (.073) 
UTBP Vicarious X Proactive   .018 (.039)   .048 (.095) 
Proactive X Black     -.023 (.031) -.041 (.037) 
UTBP Self X Proactive X Black       -.056 (.087) 
UTBP Vicarious X Proactive X Black       .003 (.109) 
Constant 1.537*** (.085) 1.538*** (.084) 1.548*** (.085) 1.524*** (.086) 
Observations 1,208 1,208 1,208 1,208 
R2 .281 .284 .281 .287 
Adjusted R2 .267 .270 .268 .270 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 18: Interaction effects of Anxiety Symptoms Regressed on Interactions of Unfair Treatment from 
Police, Proactive Policing, and Race, Robust Standard Errors 
 Anxiety Symptoms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) 
UTBP self .175* (.087) .097 (.055) .101 (.054) .200* (.091) 
UTBP Vicarious .048 (.098) .082 (.056) .084 (.056) .113 (.123) 
Black -.262*** (.054) -.273*** (.047) -.283*** (.047) -.238*** (.057) 
Proactive Policing Scale .006 (.038) -.007 (.040) .044 (.043) .022 (.045) 
UTBP Self X Black -.106 (.105)     -.175 (.114) 
UTBP Vicarious X Black .044 (.117)     -.053 (.142) 
UTBP Self X Proactive   .046 (.052)   .129 (.106) 
UTBP Vicarious X Proactive   .041 (.058)   .110 (.140) 
Proactive X Black     -.087 (.045) -.106 (.055) 
UTBP Self X Proactive X Black       -.026 (.127) 
UTBP Vicarious X Proactive X Black       -.039 (.159) 
Constant 1.341*** (.125) 1.349*** (.124) 1.374*** (.124) 1.340*** (.126) 
Observations 1,208 1,208 1,208 1,208 
R2 .214 .214 .216 .219 
Adjusted R2 .199 .198 .201 .200 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
 
Anxiety Symptoms 
Turning to symptoms of anxiety in Tables 14, 15, and 16, both blacks and whites who personally 
experienced UTBP report higher anxiety symptoms in the first two models of Tables 14 and 15. 
When fear of crime and other forms of unfair treatment are added to the model, the coefficient 
for personal UTBP is reduced to non-significance. Proactive policing and crime rate is not 
associated with anxiety symptoms in any models. Table 16, Model 2, which pools both black and 
whites, shows that black participants report fewer anxiety symptoms than whites when 
controlling for other factors. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are not supported in relation to anxiety 
symptoms. 
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Interaction Effects 
Two-way and three-way interactions among race, UTBP, and proactive policing are shown in 
Tables 17 and 18. Table 17 shows interactions when predicting depressive symptoms while 
Table 18 reports interactions predicting anxiety symptoms. Only one interaction term is 
significant. Table 17, Model 2 shows the interaction of UTBP with proactive policing and 
supports Hypothesis 5. The coefficient for personal UTBP interacted with proactive policing is 
significant. The interaction is plotted in Figure 2. In patrol zones at one standard deviation below 
the mean level of proactive policing, UTBP has no relation to depressive symptoms. As the 
amount of proactive policing increases, however, depressive symptoms increase at a significantly 
higher rate for people who have personally experienced UTBP relative to those who have not 
experienced UTBP either personally or vicariously. The three-way interaction in Model 4 of 
Table 17 shows that this finding does not differ by race. No other interaction terms are 
significant in Tables 17 or 18 which shows that the impact of personally experienced UTBP and 
proactive policing on mental health is relatively consistent across racial groups. Hypotheses 3a, 
4a, and 5a which predicted race differences are not supported. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper examines the role of unfair treatment by police and neighborhood-level proactive 
policing on depressive symptoms and anxiety symptoms in a community sample of adults living 
in Nashville, Tennessee. The stress process model suggests that experiences of trauma—both 
personally experienced and experienced by significant others—can lead to symptoms of 
psychological distress (Pearlin 1989; Pearlin et al. 1981). Police may contribute to deleterious 
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mental health outcomes as an unique form of stress because of the legitimate coercive force they 
can exercise as an agent of the state (Geller et al. 2017; McFarland, Taylor, McFarland, et al. 
2018; Sewell et al. 2016). Experiences of UTBP may be a more salient stressor when living in a 
neighborhood where contact with police is likely and where police use more aggressive tactics to 
combat crime. Police often focus proactive policing in areas where crime is high so this analysis 
also controls for neighborhood crime rates. Finally, this paper examines racial differences in how 
UTBP and proactive policing may impact mental health.  
The findings show that UTBP is common, especially for black residents of Nashville. 
Blacks were more likely than whites to report UTBP both personally and vicariously through 
significant others. This result fits into the pattern of extreme racial disparities in policing, courts, 
and incarceration (Alexander 2012; Bobo and Thompson 2006; Patterson and Wildeman 2015; 
Tonry 2011). Both education and household income are associated with personal UTBP showing 
that those with higher socioeconomic status are less likely to report being unfairly treated by 
police. Higher neighborhood levels of proactive policing—defined as the discretionary search 
rate, misdemeanor arrest rate, and rate of police-initiated incident reports—were associated with 
a higher probability of reporting personally experienced UTBP when controls were not included 
in the model. However, after controlling for other forms of discrimination and socioeconomic 
status, proactive policing no longer predicts UTBP. A positive regression coefficient on a 
neighborhood measure of per-capita proactive policing suggests that unfair treatment happens 
close to home and is most likely in highly policed areas. However, previous research also 
suggests that unfair treatment is likely to happen when a person of color is deemed to be ‘out of 
place’ (Carroll and Gonzalez 2014). Areas that have low per-capita policing may also racially 
profile people of color in the neighborhood whether or not they live there. Take, for instance, 
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high income, predominantly white suburbs. Overall, the measure of proactive policing in this 
paper would likely indicate low proactive enforcement but police may see young black men in 
the neighborhood as suspicious possibly leading to a discriminatory police encounter. More 
research is needed to understand the spatial aspects of unfair treatment and police activity.  
Black respondents who personally experienced UTBP are more likely to report 
depressive symptoms than those who report no UTBP. For whites, personal UTBP is associated 
with depressive symptoms in initial models but once additional controls are added it is no longer 
an independent predictor of psychological distress. The results show that both whites and blacks 
are affected by fear of crime and non-police unfair treatment but for whites these factors 
outweigh the experience of UTBP. Being unfairly stopped, searched, questioned, physically 
threatened, or abused by police officers is a racialized stressor that undermines the psychological 
wellbeing of black residents of Nashville. This result adds to a growing body of research 
showing that the actions of police have consequences for the psychological and physical 
wellbeing of communities of color (DeVylder et al. 2017, 2018; Geller et al. 2014, 2017; 
McFarland, Taylor, McFarland, et al. 2018; McFarland, Taylor, and McFarland 2018; Oh et al. 
2017; Sewell 2017; Sewell and Jefferson 2016; Sewell et al. 2016). Interaction regressors of race 
with UTBP did not show a significant difference between blacks and whites in how personal 
UTBP affects depressive symptoms. While split models (Tables 12 and 13) show that UTBP is 
not a significant predictor of depressive symptoms for whites, the pooled model (Table 16, 
Model 1) shows personally experiencing police mistreatment similarly affects whites and blacks. 
The fact that UTBP is less common for whites may contribute to the differences between split 
and pooled models.  
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Vicarious UTBP is not associated with depressive symptoms. Vicarious UTBP was found 
to be associated with telomere length and waist circumference in other studies (See: McFarland, 
Taylor, McFarland, et al. 2018; McFarland, Taylor, and McFarland 2018) but this analysis found 
no relationship to the two measures of mental health. This finding is interesting given that this 
study uses the same dataset where vicarious UTBP was found to contribute to physiological 
health measures. Perhaps, vicarious experiences are most likely for people with many close 
social ties. Those ties may also be protective for psychological health while physical health could 
be impacted through alternative mechanisms. 
Similar to personal UTBP, proactive policing is associated with depressive symptoms for 
blacks but not whites. In the final model for black respondents controlling for socioeconomic 
status, proactive policing tipped to non-significance using a p<.05 cutoff. Proactive policing was 
measured as a composite of three population adjusted rates measured at the patrol zone level: 
discretionary search rate, misdemeanor arrest rate, and rate of police-initiated incident reports. 
Black residents living in areas with higher proactive police activity are more likely to report 
depressive symptoms than those living in low-policing areas. Several other studies have found 
similar results. Sewell et al. (2016) examined the effect of Stop, Question, and Frisk on mental 
health in New York City by assessing the proportion of stops in a neighborhood where frisks and 
use of force occurred. The findings similarly show that policing practices can affect 
psychological distress of people living in the community. Additional research is needed in other 
cities to examine how specific police policies and procedures affect community wellbeing.  
Neither personal nor vicarious UTBP are associated with anxiety symptoms when 
including controls. This result for anxiety symptoms diverges from Geller et al. (2014) who 
found that aggressive police intrusion in New York City had an association, albeit weak, with 
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anxiety symptoms. An important difference between these studies is the measure of unfair 
treatment. This paper uses a general measure that does not take severity or intrusiveness into 
account while Geller et al. (2014) measured the specific actions of the police to assess the 
intrusiveness of stops. The general nature of the UTBP measure is a limitation of this study. 
Finally, drawing on the stress process framework, this study tested whether UTBP and 
proactive policing created meaningful contexts for one another by including interaction terms in 
the model. Having experienced UTBP and living in high proactive policing areas is associated 
with higher depressive symptoms than for those who have not experienced UTBP living in 
similar areas. For those living in low-proactive policing areas, having experienced UTBP is 
associated with similar levels of psychological distress to those without UTBP. These two 
factors—unfair police treatment and high concentration of policing—create meaning for one 
another. Having had police mistreat you in the past is likely to make high police presence feel 
like a risk rather than protective. In highly policed areas, knowing that walking out of your home 
exposes you to police scrutiny may be a chronic strain if you have been mistreated by police in 
the past. This study shows that the mutual nature of both neighborhood police practices and 
police mistreatment should be studied further. Most research examines these factors in isolation 
due to data limitations. Police data is often challenging to obtain and survey data may not match 
to locations specific enough for neighborhood analysis. 
 There are several limitations to this study. The data are cross sectional and therefore 
temporal ordering of events cannot be established. Reverse causality may be occurring in at least 
two ways. There may be cases in which people exhibiting depressive symptoms are more likely 
to have contact with police. If a person is experiencing suicidal ideation, police may be called to 
intervene. People with depressive symptoms may cope by using drugs or alcohol which could 
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increase their chances of police contact. Those with mental health problems may also be more 
likely to understand their interactions with police as unfair than those who are not experiencing 
psychological distress. Social selection processes cannot be ruled out; however, research on 
causal direction between depressive symptoms and discrimination shows that poor mental health 
does not predict later perceptions of discrimination (Brown et al. 2000).   
There are also limitations with the measure of unfair treatment. In order to preserve cases, 
the variable includes all individuals who have experienced unfair treatment in their lifetime. For 
blacks in particular, context may have changed significantly during a respondent’s life—for 
example, a 50-year old respondent in 2014 would have been born the year the civil rights act was 
signed into law—and reports of UTBP may not reflect present circumstances. However, recalling 
long past UTBP may mean that the event made a lasting impression which could translate to 
additional stress. The measure of UTBP also does not include what type of exposure the 
respondent experienced. Feeling as though a traffic ticket for not coming to a complete stop at a 
stop sign was unfair is probably not an equivalent stressor to having been physically assaulted by 
an officer. This study is not able to delineate these instances and relies solely on the respondent’s 
perception of unfairness. The perception of unfairness also does not mean that the officer 
violated policy or treated the individual in a way differently than any other person. The 
respondent experiencing the event as unfair, however, is a better indicator for how they will be 
impacted by the event rather than whether it violated departmental policy. Finally, since one aim 
of this study was to link neighborhood-level predictors to individual outcomes, the use of 
ordinary least squares regression is not ideal. OLS is used because the sample size within 
neighborhoods was low and an empty model showed there was not enough level-2 variance to 
conduct multilevel modeling. Similarly, a model comparison between OLS and a fixed effects 
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model shows that fixed effects do not significantly improve the model fit. Robust standard errors 
are used to more conservatively estimate significance levels.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Racial discrimination is a common experience for people of color in the United States and the 
criminal justice system is one source of unequal treatment. Racial inequities in criminal justice 
involvement and incarceration are now primary drivers of racial stratification (National Research 
Council 2014; Western 2006). A growing body of research shows that contact with the criminal 
justice system—from police to incarceration—is associated with deleterious health outcomes 
(Sugie and Turney 2017; Wildeman and Wang 2017). Even without arrest or incarceration, the 
way that police treat community members and the policing practices policy makers decide to use 
can undermine physical and psychological wellbeing (DeVylder et al. 2017, 2018; Geller et al. 
2014, 2017; McFarland, Taylor, McFarland, et al. 2018; McFarland, Taylor, and McFarland 
2018; Oh et al. 2017, 2017; Sewell 2017; Sewell and Jefferson 2016). Policymakers, police 
administrators, and police officers must take these findings into account when deciding how to 
interact with the community. Policing strategies and training should attempt to minimize 
community perceptions of unfair treatment. When community members feel mistreated, they 
should have recourse that will help them resolve concurs so that a stressful experience does not 
become chronic stress. Race must also be a part of any discussion on policing. Given the history 
and current racial disparities in police mistreatment, police must grapple with the fact that their 
actions disproportionately fall on groups that are fighting for inclusion and equality. Many 
neighborhoods are high on police but low on justice. Community-based strategies to transform 
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the role of police in society are needed to fight the roots of inequality, not only its 
manifestations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on racial disparities and racial bias in discretionary vehicle searches by 
police and how proactive police practices affect the mental health of black community members. 
The first chapter argues that racial disparities in discretionary search decisions are evident 
throughout the first three years of officers’ careers. The data indicate that increased suspicion 
due to statistical discrimination is applied to black drivers. Additionally, officers conduct more 
searches, especially on black drivers, in the year prior to being eligible for a promotion which 
shows that the organizational structure of the police force provides an incentive for conducting 
searches. The second paper tests whether decisions to conduct discretionary searches and 
probable cause searches are influenced by racial or ethnic bias for patrol officers in their first 
three years on the force. I estimate a longitudinal hit rate test and a threshold test to determine 
whether searches are being conducted on black and Hispanic drivers with lower standards of 
evidence than for whites. The results indicate that discretionary searches and probable cause 
searches are applied in discriminatory ways. Probable cause searches have the greatest disparity 
even though the probable cause standard is a legal requirement that should be applied fairly. 
Finally, the third paper shifts to the potential impact of police strategy and experiences with 
police on mental health. I find that living in highly policed neighborhoods and having 
experienced unfair treatment from police (UTBP) is associated with an increased risk of 
depressive symptoms. The results have implications both for scholarship on race and policing as 
well as for policy makers and police organizations.  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARS AND RESEARCH 
One innovation of the first two papers is the treatment of racial disparities as career trajectories. 
Previous research tends to focus on specific years of police data and treat them as cross sectional. 
Taking a longitudinal perspective can help show how policing develops and changes over time. 
The longitudinal focus reveals how organizational norms can affect officers at different stages of 
their careers. Future research should continue examining career trajectories of police officers and 
how they affect racial disparities. In particular, research should focus on how racial disparities 
can be reduced. It is unclear from the existing literature whether implicit bias training, procedural 
justice training, community oversight interventions, internal affairs sanctions, and other 
interventions aimed to reduce bias from police have sustained effects on actual policing 
outcomes. Career stage and level of experience may alter the effect of interventions. Officers 
with more experience may be less open to changing practices than newer officers. Alternately, 
more experienced officers could have a better understanding of racial bias and embrace new 
practices.  
Geographic location is important for understanding racial disparities in policing but 
focusing on officers as the unit of analysis is another important avenue to pursue. Geography is 
important since agencies prioritize patrol practices based on location; however, practices of 
individual officers deserve more attention from researchers. As I show in the second chapter, 
focusing on individual officers presents an organizational setting where racial bias is the norm. 
Through an officer-level analysis, the “bad apples” narrative can be tested and countered. There 
is mounting evidence that individual officers do not account for the large racial disparities 
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evident throughout policing; rather, racial disparities are systemic and part of routine 
organizational practices (Bains 2018; Baumgartner, Epp, et al. 2018). 
 In many cases, identifying officers is not possible due to data limitations. For instance, 
Tillyer and Engel (2013) analyze data that include officer demographics but the unique officer 
identifier was removed “per the contractual arrangement with the agency to maintain officers’ 
confidentiality” (380). Researchers should push governmental bureaucracies to be transparent. 
Confidentiality can be maintained in ways that do not sacrifice our ability to conduct rigorous 
research. Unique officer identifiers should be requested in all police records. When possible, 
administrative records should be accessed through public records requests rather than contractual 
agreements so that data sharing is not restricted. Administrative records are usually public and 
we should encourage police organizations to use open data repositories like the Police Data 
Initiative through the National Police Foundation. 
Determining the appropriate unit of analysis is also an important methodological 
question. Simoiu et al. (2017) apply the threshold test to statewide traffic stop data from North 
Carolina and test whether the 100 police departments making the most traffic stops show racial 
bias in search decisions. Subsequent applications of the threshold test similarly apply the test to 
counties where state highway patrol officers made stops (Pierson, Simoiu, et al. 2017; Pierson, 
Corbett-Davies, et al. 2017) and departments in North Carolina (Baumgartner, Christiani, et al. 
2018). Simoiu et al. (2017) acknowledge that heterogeneity within jurisdictions may by a useful 
unit of analysis since policing in urban areas is hyper-localized. I am not aware of any research 
that applies the threshold test to geographic areas smaller than counties or jurisdiction. The 
officer-level application of the threshold test in the second paper is novel and shows that the test 
can be applied successfully to test for bias in officer decisions. Future research should examine 
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the impact of level of aggregation on the performance of the threshold test and how estimations 
of bias differ. 
Finally, the third paper of this dissertation adds to a growing body of research showing 
that aggressive police tactics and experiences of police discrimination affect mental and physical 
health, especially for blacks in the United States. In this dissertation, I combine a subjective 
measure of UTBP with a measure of neighborhood-level proactive policing. Those who have 
experienced UTBP have more depressive symptoms when living in highly policed areas than 
those who have had unfair police encounters but live in low-policing neighborhoods. Future 
research should measure subjective experiences of police discrimination more comprehensively 
as well as measure police practices at the neighborhood level. Currently, several scholars are 
developing more accurate measures of traumatic police exposure and testing which mental and 
physical health outcomes are affected (DeVylder et al. 2017, 2018; Geller et al. 2017; Ross 
2017). Nuanced measures of police discrimination should be applied in nationally representative 
data to understand the scale of police abuse in the United States. Researchers should also expand 
their focus to law enforcement agencies other than local police departments and racial and ethnic 
groups other than blacks. For instance, Latino and Hispanic communities are targeted by both 
local police as well as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (Armenta 2017; Rios 2011, 
2017; Stuart et al. 2015). ICE activities are not reflected in local police records but their activities 
(e.g. immigration raids, arrests, separating mixed immigration status families) may be a salient 
form of stress for Latinos and Hispanics regardless of immigration status. If aggressive local 
policing affects health, it is likely that aggressive immigration policing also undermines physical 
and mental wellbeing.  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICE POLICY 
Police policy is made at two levels, legislative policy and administrative policy. Legislators can 
change what constitutes a crime and how police jurisdictions are funded. Marijuana legalization 
in Colorado and Washington substantially decreased the number of vehicle searches that the state 
highway patrol conducted in both states (Pierson, Simoiu, et al. 2017). Legalizing or 
decriminalizing marijuana possession and possession of other drugs would drastically reduce the 
number of searches that officers conduct and fewer people would feel as though they were 
treated unfairly. Legalization would shift police focus from the War on Drugs to more serious 
crime (Alexander 2012). Criminal records due to drug crime should be expunged to increase the 
life chances of those who have been criminalized in the War on Drugs.  
Legislation should be passed creating robust transparency from police and other criminal 
justice agencies. Police organizations should be required by law to make administrative records 
publically available online. Open data practices encourage accountability. All of the MNPD data 
used in this dissertation were obtained through a series of public records requests. Organizations 
like Gideon’s Army in Nashville and The Invisible Institute in Chicago have used public records 
laws to access data and shine a light on social problems that administrators and legislators 
overlook. Additionally, independent research and police oversight should be encouraged and 
funded.  
While this dissertation focuses on racial disparities and bias in discretionary searches and 
the mental health consequences for the community, it also speaks to broader issues of urban 
policing. Federal, state, and local funding should incentivize reforms to police tactics and reduce 
police focus on misdemeanor arrests. Police department funding should be attached to reforms 
that aim to reduce racial bias and unnecessary police actions. Community members have high 
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expectations of professionalism and service from police officers. Police officer salaries should be 
commensurate with the expectations the society places on police. Higher pay in addition to a 
focus on police reform would improve recruitment of officers with diverse experiences who aim 
to create positive social change. 
The consequences attached to traffic citations and misdemeanor arrests also need reform. 
I do not directly address traffic citations, court fines, or fees in the dissertation but the results 
show that black people are more likely to be searched by police and the decision to conduct 
searches of blacks and Hispanics can be racially biased. Presumably, the resulting legal sanctions 
from discovering contraband will disproportionately impact blacks and Hispanics due to the fact 
that they are searched more often and with less suspicion than whites. Since police focus on the 
most marginal communities, legal sanctions will be concentrated among those who are already 
the most vulnerable. Alternatives to monetary court fines and fees should be encouraged. 
Monetary fines can exacerbate inequality and contribute to a cycle of debt and punishment 
(Stuart 2016; Stuart et al. 2015). Fines associated with citations or arrests should not be used by 
police agencies because they incentivize unethical citation and arrest practices (see U.S. 
Department of Justice 2015 for an example of unethical arrest and citation practices). 
Finally, legislators have a responsibility to redress the social consequences of tough on 
crime policies. The punitive turn in the United States that led to mass incarceration was 
accompanied by a reduction in social welfare programs. As the welfare state was rolled back, the 
resulting economic instability was met with a rollout of larger police forces and penal institutions 
(Stuart 2016). In practice, police work is often a response to social problems related to poverty 
and inequality (Herbert et al. 2018; Stuart et al. 2015). The tools that police officers have to 
respond to social problems are limited. Alternative, community-based resources are needed to 
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respond to situations where intervention is required but do not require police. Substance abuse 
and mental health treatment must be more accessible and responsive to immediate needs. 
Additionally, addressing the fundamental causes of inequality is necessary to change how police 
interact with the community. Racial residential segregation, concentrated poverty, racism, and 
discrimination produce the social system where police-community interactions take place 
(Anderson 1999; Massey 2007; Wilson 2012). To create sustainable change, a concerted effort is 
needed to reduce inequality and level the playing field for those who are marginalized. 
In contrast to legislative policy making, administrative policy change requires police 
officials and government employees to address current procedures. One key finding of this 
dissertation is that organizational structure matters. When patrol officers are in their third year on 
the force, they are planning ahead for when they become eligible for a promotion. Promotion 
decisions may not be officially based on the number of searches or arrests that an officer makes 
but there may be implicit (and explicit) messages that productivity will help officers be 
successful (Armenta 2017). Performance goals should not encourage punitive actions such as 
stops, searches, citations, or arrests. Instead, officers who have positive interactions with the 
community should be rewarded. Police officials should emphasize quality policing, not quantity 
policing. Crime analysis units should assess and track officers for changes in search patterns and 
disparate racial impact. Flagged officers should receive required, targeted interventions. 
Interventions should be evaluated for efficacy. 
The second paper of this dissertation shows that patrol officers in Nashville from 2010-
2017 conducted searches on Hispanic and black drivers with less suspicion than on white drivers. 
When consent-based searches were considered with probable cause searches, the amount of 
suspicion needed to initiate the search was reduced to the point of being arbitrary. Following 
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Gideon’s Army’s demand in the Driving While Black report (Gideon’s Army 2016), I would 
similarly call for the abolition of consent-based searches without probable cause. The threshold 
for initiating a consent search is so low that it is evident officers are conducting searches based 
on a whim, not the facts and circumstances of the encounter. If officers cannot establish probable 
cause to search a vehicle, they should not be searching the vehicle.  
The probable cause search thresholds for black, Hispanic, and white drivers is troubling. 
The probable cause standard is based on whether a “reasonable officer” would believe that 
evidence would be found in a search given the articulable facts and circumstances (Goldberg 
2013; Ortman 2016). My results show that officers discriminate against Hispanics and blacks 
when evaluating the facts and circumstances of a traffic stop. There are several possible reasons 
why bias is so common. There are likely organizational norms that heighten suspicion of blacks 
and Hispanics. I find in Paper 1 that statistical discrimination—believing that one group is more 
likely to have evidence than another based on group-level crime statistics—is a likely culprit. 
Another factor that could lead to officers practicing statistical discrimination and stereotyping is 
ignorance of cultural differences (Ray 2015). Rios (2017) argues that officers have very little 
familiarity with cultural signifiers and assume that innocuous tattoos and clothing are gang 
related. During her ethnographic observations in Nashville, Armenta (2017) saw MNPD officers 
debating whether Latino youth were workers or gang members. A lack of cultural awareness 
may be one cause of discriminatory searches. Officer training should emphasize applying the 
probable cause standard in culturally informed ways. Additionally, learning to contextualize 
racial difference in crime statistics may help officers avoid statistical discrimination. Training 
and continuing education should be rigorously evaluated for efficacy and revised if outcomes do 
not change. 
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 The findings that previous unfair experiences with police affect mental health show that 
there are insufficient mechanisms in place to heal the harms that people experience from police 
officers. Ideally, no one should experience unfair police treatment but the nature of police work 
as the application of coercive force guarantees that some parties will feel aggrieved. Procedural 
justice aims to minimize feelings of being mistreated in the legal process. Officers should aim to 
be procedurally just in all their interactions with the community. When people feel mistreated, 
they should be heard. MNPD’s bias-based policing policy is written so that almost no complaints 
of officer bias will be sustained. The policy states that biased based policing is “the selection of 
individuals for enforcement intervention based solely on a common trait of a group, such as race, 
ethnic origin, gender, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, or age” [emphasis in original] 
(Metropolitan Nashville Police Department 2018:441). Requiring that a group trait is the only 
reason for a police action virtually precludes accountability for officers who unfairly target racial 
minorities but provide a pretextual justification for their action (American Civil Liberties Union 
2017; Southern Poverty Law Center 2018). When a community member feels as though they 
have been discriminated against, a complaint will almost never be sustained as a policy violation. 
Even if a policy violation is not found, police officers should participate in a restorative justice 
process with the community member who felt harmed. An intervention could help the officer 
become better acquainted with community members and understand how their actions were 
interpreted by the person who felt harmed. Nashville’s newly formed Community Oversight 
Board is an exciting opportunity for police officers to heal the injustices that community 
members have felt from police.  
MNPD’s bias-based policing policy should be revised from only being applicable in 
cases where race is the sole reason for a police action to be more inclusive of situations where 
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bias occurs. Many states and police departments have revised their policies to be more inclusive 
of racially motivated policing. For instance, the New York City Police Department’s racial 
profiling and bias-based policing policy states:  
Race, color, ethnicity, or national origin may not be used as a motivating factor for 
initiating police enforcement action. When an officer’s decision to initiate 
enforcement action against a person is motivated even in part by a person’s actual 
or perceived race, color, ethnicity or national origin, that enforcement action 
violates Department policy unless the officer’s decision is based on a specific and 
reliable suspect description that includes not just race, age, and gender, but other 
identifying characteristics or information. (New York City Police Department 
2016) 
 
The policy from New York City Police Department reduces the risk that officers will unfairly 
target racial minorities without specific suspicion or a reliable suspect description. With a more 
expansive policy, police officers will be more likely to be held accountable for racial bias. 
Community members may also see that the police department is reforming and holding 
themselves accountable rather than giving their officers a legal loophole for racism. 
Finally, aggressive police practices need to be reevaluated. Experimental research shows 
that hot spot policing reduces crime by a small, but meaningful, degree (Braga et al. 2019; Braga, 
Papachristos, and Hureau 2014). This body of research does not address the long-term effects of 
targeted crime reduction strategies. If a neighborhood is regularly targeted with hot spot 
interventions, it is not clear what effects these have on crime or other community outcomes over 
longer time spans. The growing body of research on health effects of aggressive policing 
suggests that police unintentionally harm the people they are supposed to protect and serve. 
Community-based alternatives to aggressive, proactive strategies should be encouraged. 
Proactive policing has a place in the tactical repertoire of police forces but the benefits must be 
weighed against the costs. A more effective strategy may be to collaborate with community 
groups that aim to reduce crime through economic and social development. The “warrior cop” 
   143 
ideal and the focus on punitive policing is counterproductive for strengthening disadvantaged 
neighborhoods. Modern policing requires that officers exercise their coercive force responsibly 
and judiciously. Shifting organizational priorities, changing police culture, reducing racial 
disparities, and increasing positive police-community interactions will increase police legitimacy 
while improving public health.  
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